Decapitation strike

CV32: Dark days ahead for the USAF?

From Aviation Week's ARES Blog

Decapitation Strike

Posted by Bill Sweetman at 6/9/2008 7:03 AM CDT

The firing of Air Force secretary Michael Wynne and service chief of staff Gen Mike Moseley will have repercussions that last years, possibly decades, and far outweigh the legitimate question as to whether USAF leaders have played their hand well.

First of all, for almost a year from now, the USAF secretary's office will be filled by a caretaker. The chances that anyone with serious qualifications or goals would go through confirmation hearings in order to sit out the last few months of a lame-duck administration are zero.

The next generation of Air Force leaders, too, will know their place. Missions that ground commanders can see and hold will take priority. Advocacy for air power that will be useful in conflicts other than the one that is right under our nose will be indirect and diplomatic.

This is most likely the end of the line for the F-22 Raptor. The USAF fighter force will not be recapitalized until the JSF reaches IOC, which won't happen before 2014; and the JSF as delivered is a bomber with self-defense capability, not an air-combat aircraft. By the time we figure out if this was smart or not, it will be too late.

The powerful political interests that have called for the tanker replacement program to be overturned, delayed or split will now be stronger. After all, the case being made by Boeing and its bought-and-sold allies on the Hill finally rests on assertions that the USAF's selection process was capricious and undisciplined. This is an easier case to make when top leaders have been fired for failing to maintain standards. And let us be entirely clear about one thing: this has nothing to do with whether the USAF gets the right aircraft; it has to do with power, jobs and money.

Another area where USAF leaders fought, lost and ultimately only irritated people concerned the Army's plans for a vast fleet of Warrior UAVs. The USAF argued that the Army wasn't thinking about the impact of these aircraft on theater airspace, and that tieing UAVs to divisions would be wasteful. But the Army has promised to meet more needs in theater, and that's what mattered; the fact that the Army's plans are half-baked (where do they plan to get all those pilots, when their UAVs today are flown by contractors?) will not become apparent until later. The firings mean that the Army will get farther with its ambitions before they impact reality.

The USAF is also left leaderless as the Pentagon tries to plot a course on tactical airlift. The road to a giant tilt-rotor with a rotor-spread greater than a 747 wingspan starts here.

Ultimately, the firings confirm the Billy Mitchell syndrome. Army leaders can push FCS, or UAV programs that are wildly ambitious. The Marines can demand hundreds of billions of dollars of equipment to re-fight Guadalcanal. The Navy can insist on an arbitrary number of combat ships. But let USAF officers promote the interests of airpower in the same way, and they are not "team players". If there is any particular reason why this makes sense, please let us know.