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HG S2 (Intel Bot)

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Everything posted by HG S2 (Intel Bot)

  1. Every few years another article comes up concerned about the politicization of the military. Throughout human history this has been a “concern” – and rightfully so. In the founding of our own republic this was a top concern to the point we are not really supposed to have a standing army (though we do), we put a civilian at the head of it, and … well, here’s the applicable part; Article I, Section 8, Clause 12(AKA “The Army Clause”: “The Congress shall have Power To . . . raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years,” Our standing Army is still too large, but that is a topic for another day. It is welcome and good that we have these conversations with each other on a regular basis, as no good comes to any republic when the military leadership decides they can do a better job than civilians. When one of our favorite thinkers weighs in on the topic, Kori Schake, it deserves a good read over at War on the Rocks. (NB: on the same topic and also at WOTR, a 2020 article by David Barno and Nora Bensahel is also worth a read). There are some gaps in her discussion that I’ll get in to in a bit, but let’s look at her solid opening; American respect for its military is plummeting. It has dropped by 30 points in the past five years in surveys conducted by the Reagan Foundation. In their recently released poll, less than half of respondents have a great deal of trust and confidence in America’s military. Unless both civilian and military leaders take corrective actions to repair the breach, this will impede recruiting, diminish unit cohesion, and damage the bond between the military and the public it serves. As concerning as the drop itself is the reason. 62 percent of respondents said they were losing trust and confidence because the military leadership is becoming overly politicized. Nor is the attitude partisan: 60 percent of Democrats gave that answer, as did 60 percent of Independents and 65 percent of Republicans. Only 35 percent of respondents expressed confidence in the military’s ability to act in a professional and nonpolitical manner. Even though the American public has greater trust in their military than most nations have in theirs – and there is a lot of institutional capital there to burn through – the drop along all political persuasions is significant. As reported by Gallup, they are returning to levels not seen in over 35 years as it recovered from the decade after the fall of Saigon. Note the most dramatic fall is from what traditionally been the “pro military” side of the spectrum. That is where the story is. Military leaders should stick to the core functions of the profession and master saying “that’s a more appropriate question for the secretary of defense.” Politicians should stop hiding behind uniforms when enacting unpopular policies, and expend their efforts on passing relevant legislation in areas urgently in need of attention. Yes, they should. However, in the last few years we have seen the most senior uniformed members of the military from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Milley, USA and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gidlay, USN happily jump forward to weigh hip deep in to the most divisive domestic political cultural war topics – specifically racial essentialism. While Schake does mention this later in the article obliquely, it is important to understand when in front of the people’s elected representatives, Milley expended substantial institutional and personal capital arguing about how critical it was to his job to understand, “white rage.” Gilday on multiple occasions promoted and defended the cancerous racial essentialism of Ibram X. Kendi. Taking that example from his boss, the Chief of Naval Personnel let one of the worst kept secrets out and, well, let’s let him speak for himself and the institution he serves. “I think we should consider reinstating photos in selection boards,” Nowell said Tuesday at The Navy League’s 2021 Sea-Air-Space Exposition. “We look at, for instance, the one-star board over the last five years, and we can show you where, as you look at diversity, it went down with photos removed.” Telling a large portion of the people who would serve that you will not only judge them first by the color of their skin, but then determine – in the zero sum game that is promotions – what their career progression would be by the same – how does that make the military as an institution look good or having a promising future? We have to understand that too much of our defense nomenklatura have become “of” DC, and not just stationed “in” DC – absorbing all that comes from that isolated and unbalanced intellectual environment. Outside the beltway, racial essentialism is seen for what it actually is – racism – something that is rightfully disgusting to Americans of all stripes. Part of the military’s problem is classic elite capture by an unaware and pliable leadership. Perfect example; Military leaders worry about veteran political activism reflecting on the active-duty force. But they don’t believe public concerns about politicization of the military are affecting the force. Gen. David Berger, the commandant of the Marine Corps, recently said that “I don’t see and hear a conversation or an impact of woke-ism in the rank and file, at all.” The Army’s head of recruiting believes the concerns are having no effect on Americans’ willingness to serve. That is the least shocking news in the article and does not speak well to the Army's head of recruiting or General Berger’s breadth and depth of independent reading or their social circle. They should talk to members of Congress about the communications they receive from serving members on the topic. If Berger had not heard anything, it is because it is clear to everyone who works for him that he does not want to hear it. Anyone who has been a staff officer on a major staff knows that dynamic. I have active duty officers and enlisted reach out to little ‘ole me almost daily on what some now call “woke-ism.” A plurality of each emphasized how closed the discussion space is. You are told and you nod and comply. There is no conversation. There are no alternative perspectives. There is diktat. A few years ago I even had a serving 4-star via a rather strange cloak-and-dagger operation have an intermediary he discovered knew me IRL deliver to me, by hand, a written on dead tree outline of his concerns – what I had right, what I was a bit off frequency on, and what I was missing on this very topic. The request was to "not stop." “No effect?” Sorry, that simply is not true. The parents who are rebelling against “woke-ism” in their local school boards over the last few years will look to a military supporting “white rage” research and Kendism with a not sympathetic eye with their children’s future. The crossover is there and if senior leaders would wander out of their bubble, they would hear it. It is much more than that. The American public see senior leadership who refuse to defend their own institution. Our military reflects its nation, so of course will have many of the same ills. There are the usual suspects who will use any topic to bash the military they will never like and will attempt to paint the military with a very thick and broad brush – often using questionable metrics to describe a military full of racists, sexists, and rapists – and when confronted our senior leaders either remain silent or accept the worst descriptions of the personnel they lead. Service members see that. Family members see that. They also see a senior uniformed leadership who will discipline enlisted personnel, company grade and field grade officers with aplomb, but do nothing but defend, excuse, or even look the other way from abject failures from fellow General and Flag Officers (GOFO). The greatest national humiliation of our nation since the fall of South Vietnam was only 15-months ago, and yet who has taken responsibility or been held accountable? It was at best a negotiated surrender and retreat under fire – and yet in front of the people’s elected representatives we made excuses, fudged, or made the farcical claim that Kabul was a successful Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). (see 2:38) The whole disaster was treated like the weather. No one was to blame. It just “happened.” Nothing hurts confidence more than failure ... compounded by refusal to accept responsibility for it. In what really should be a separate article and given more space, Schake mentions a problem that has gotten much worse the last decade; But there have been a number of developments over the past several decades that have contributed to the perception of the military’s politicization. Veterans’ endorsement of presidential candidates has been an escalating arms race since retired Marine Commandant Paul X. Kelly endorsed Ronald Reagan in 1980. Presidential campaigns now routinely roll out lists of hundreds of retired flag officers and include uniformed military in campaign ads. The Bush administration left it to the military to persuade Congress to support the Iraq surge. In 2016, retired Gen. John Allen spoke at the Democratic National Convention to endorse the Democratic candidate while, in a more egregious move, retired Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn led chants of “lock her up” at the Republican National Convention. Little correction here, Kelley (with an e) endorsed Bush41 in ‘88, not Reagan in ‘80, but he isn’t really “Patient Zero” in the modern iteration of retired GOFO injecting themselves in to national politics for fun and clout. Kelley did not get any “reward” for the endorsement. When Bush41 became CINC, Kelley worked as a lobbyist and the Chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission. The real “Patient Zero” was Admiral William J. Crowe, USN. Unlike Kelley whose terminal position was Commandant of the Marine Corps, Crowe was the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was appointed by Clinton to the Ambassadorship to the United Kingdom. Crowe’s relief as CJCS was General Colin Powell, USA who served until 1993. As most recall, he was considered a possible Presidential candidate in 1996, was Secretary of State for Bush43 and became a high profile supporter of President Obama. So, there’s a template for you – and more have followed. Kelley, Crowe, and Powell’s political actions are not seen as exceptionally poor, they were rather tastefully done – but that flavor has changed significantly, especially the last decade. While Flynn's behavior mentioned by Schake did not help the military’s reputation on the left side of the political spectrum, retired USAF General Mike Hayden continues to be one of the most red in tooth and claw left wing partisans in the public space, including heading the now disgraced list of 51 intelligence professionals who tried to cover-up the release of the content of Hunter Biden’s laptop after years of almost Hale-Bopp conspiracy beliefs about Russia. His over the top partisanship soured many on the right against what they saw as a growing DC GOFO leftism that advanced with each year. Popping up on a regular basis about whatever was "the latest thing" was the comically vicious presence of retired Army Lieutenant General Mark (full semi-auto) Hertling. Both Hayden and Hertling continue to lead with their status as a general officer - retired or not. That makes an impact. In this stew of the last decade you could not turn your head without the gratuitous use of a person's status as GOFOs to promote the most contentious domestic political issues. A textbook example would be retired Army Generals David Petraeus, Stanley McCrystal, and Martin Dempsey, along with retired Admiral William McRaven, USN diving into, of all things, domestic gun control. You also have people like retired Vice Admiral Mike Franken, USN, who ran for Senate in Iowa. Just look at his campaign page. His first three pics are of him with a “Navy” hat, him in choker whites, then a DDG. He does have a disclaimer at the bottom, “Vice Admiral Franken (Ret) is a former member of the U.S. Navy. Use of his military rank, job titles, and photographs in uniform does not imply endorsement from the Department of Defense.“ That’s nice, but everyone who voted against him was, at least subconsciously, voting against a man in uniform. Again, in a 50/50 nation whose founding documents are suspicious (rightfully) of senior military leaders, it's not a good look. As a guy whose “Mark Twain” is “CDR Salamander” & dabbles in politics more than I should – I’m not against mentioning your military rank after you retire … but a middling field grade officer is not a GOFO and if done deftly isn't a problem at all. None of those GOFO mentioned above have been very deft in their high profile partisanship. That makes an impact, and no one is forcing them to do it. Indeed, if anything, we have fewer politicians with military backgrounds than before, covered again in WOTR, this time by our friend Claude Berube; Retired military getting in to politics is just part of our republic. Retired GOFO, due to their unique position in our culture, have a special responsibility retired E5 and O5 do not. We cannot/should not outlaw it ... but likewise, neither should they be treated with deference or kid gloves. Welcome to the rice fields, sir. So, where does it go outside the lines? Well, we’ve been living in a master class of wrongness as of late; …the serving chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff marched with the president in battle dress through a public square that had been forcibly cleared during the 2020 social justice protests. Gen. Mark Milley admirably apologized, but the image is likely to be what most in the public remember long after. Milley has leaned into other political controversies too: offering his view of critical race theory during Congressional hearings and backgrounding virtually every journalist’s account of the Trump administration in order to cast himself as the savior of the republic. As I mentioned earlier this year, the rapid fall in the reputation of our military has accelerated under Milley’s watch under two administrations. While it is comfortable for some on both sides of the political spectrum to try directly or indirectly make this a political issue – indeed this entire article is about politics – at its core it is a problem with our uniformed leadership and their view of themselves and their position. It did not start with Milley – but he piled worse on top of bad. Milley clumsily engaging on political topics has made it fair game for Congress to press him and other military leaders — including every flag officer that is put forward for three-star promotion — on political issues. As Congress should. Milley has been the most overtly political CJCS since the equally misaligned-with-mission Admiral Mike Mullen, USN. If the uniformed senior leadership is going to be political, then the actual political bodies in our nation will react to them like antibodies to a foreign object. This is good, and healthy - and well deserved. If the institutional military does not like it, then they need to promote different people or better police their own. If they need help, call the Australian military for some peer guidance. The overwhelming majority of the military — including and especially its leadership — are pleading to be left out of the febrile partisan politics of the moment. For the good of the country, politicians should heed that plea. I disagree strongly here. Nope. No one gets out easy like that. The uniformed military leadership does not get to dive in to politics and make excuses for politicians on one side of the spectrum, and then get upset when the other side of the political spectrum calls them in to account. If you play stupid games, you get stupid prizes. The military suffers as a whole, yes, because these leaders decided to spend the institutional capital of their services in support of domestic political fights or their personal political futures. There is serious work to be done to defend America. Politicizing the military will make it weaker — not stronger. Yes there is, and it starts with having GOFO depoliticize themselves. That won’t happen if their actions are allowed to go unchallenged. Milley, Gilday and others are already political. Reset with new leaders who understand that they need to take us in a healthier direction, and the rest will follow. If not, then either the Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch should bring them to heel. If they do that, then the Judicial Branch won’t have to step in at the last minute - no one wants that. View the full article
  2. This was only a matter of time given the events and personalities in the last couple of years. The foundation has been built over the last decade for something much larger to be built. It is a cliché, but it is true; nations don't have friends - they have interests. Saudi Arabia is rich in two things; hydrocarbons and problems. They have a human capital problem, a religious problem, and a Persian problem - not to mention their troublesome neighborhood. All both support and threaten the power of thee House of Saud. They need good friends who will help them on the outside with trade and military assistance, but will not interfere with their delicate domestic concerns. In parallel with a lower level of reliance on hydrocarbons from the Middle East and a weariness from over three decades of fighting low-level wars in the area, the United States is openly trying to decouple. To encourage this decoupling - or to virtue signal - our established chattering classes take almost hostile positions in the open against the Saudis, from their human rights acts against opponents, to their ongoing conflict in the civil war in Yemen. There is one global power who is more than happy to buy oil at market prices and has zero interest in Saudi internal affairs - the People's Republic of China. As we are insulting the Saudis, the PRC is courting them. The Smartest People in the Room™ didn't give the Saudis much of an option; Xi landed in the Saudi capital Riyadh on Wednesday for a multiple-day visit to the oil-rich kingdom and received a lavish welcome from MBS and other Saudi dignitaries on Thursday. Saudi military jets accompanied the Chinese president’s aircraft, a purple carpet was rolled out upon his arrival and canons were fired. On Friday, Xi invited Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud to visit China, according to Saudi state TV. Xi’s visit includes his attendance at a “Saudi-Chinese summit,” a China-Arab and a China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, SPA reported. On Thursday, China and Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that includes a number of deals and memoranda of understanding, including on hydrogen energy, on coordination between the kingdom’s Vision 2030 and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and with regards to direct investment, SPA reported, without providing details. Low hanging fruit for the PRC, and the Saudis have been carefully keeping this option open - as you'll note there have been little to no protests from the Islamic world over the PRC's actions against the Uyghurs. We all know what would be happening if France, Britain, Germany, or the USA did such things against their Muslim minority. For a nation who spent much of the last quarter of the 20th Century exporting one of the most extreme forms of Sunni Islam to the world, the 21st Century Saudi leadership seems to have different motivations - mostly survival in an increasingly divergent future. I don't blame the PRC here at all, and we're making this an easy call for the Saudis. Heck, were I Saudi, I would do the same thing. If I were a PRC supporter, I would just smile. Saudi's MBS rolls out the red carpet for China's Xi, in a not too subtle message to Biden. Xi’s warm welcome stood in stark contrast to the frigid atmosphere surrounding US President Joe Biden’s visit to the kingdom earlier in the year. Biden, who previously vowed to turn Saudi Arabia into a “pariah” after the murder of Khashoggi, in October said the US needs to “rethink” its relationship with the kingdom after the Saudi-led oil cartel OPEC+ slashed oil production.Washington has also been at odds with China over Taiwan, a democratically governed island of 24 million people that Beijing claims as its territory despite never having controlled it, and China’s expanded influence in the Middle East. The world is constantly in motion. Friends and alliances change. The Middle East is ripe for change, and the PRC is there to help them. If you pour a fresh cup of coffee and play this out for the next 5-10 years, some very interesting - and radically different - worlds emerge. View the full article
  3. From the NDAA to some rather positive words from the SECNAV on some of our favorite maritime areas of concern, so far December has produced a few positives to think about - if you don't think too much about the Army-Navy game on Saturday... This week's Midrats free for all will start here and then we'll work our way around the national security landscape. As always, open topic, open phones ... so come join us for the conversation Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern. Join us live if you can, but it not, you can get the show later by subscribing to the podcast. If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.View the full article
  4. Last week was the story of the HMS JERVIS BAY and her crew during the Battle of Convoy HX84. When we finished last week, HMS JERVIS BAY was out of the fight and the convoy was scattered - but she did her job. ...and so the pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER, unopposed now, closed in. However, there was a Canadian ship, the SS BEAVERFORD, armed with one 4 inch & one 3 inch gun who turned towards the SHEER and her six 11 inch, eight 5.9 inch guns and eight 21 inch torpedo tubes. What was the BEAVERFORD? JERVIS BAY was lost, and here is where we pick up the story, wonderfully told by Roger Litwiller; What can you say of such men? Such leaders? Such Sailors?Fullbore. First posted 16NOV2018.View the full article
  5. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, many Americans attributed the naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany as a factor leading to the cataclysmic conflict and had little appetite for further naval spending by the United States. Influenced by pacifist voices as well desiring to cut the budget, President Warren Harding invited hosted a naval arms confrontation in Washington between 1921-22 that resulted in an understanding between the five-post World War I naval powers of the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy to place a moratorium on new capital ship construction and impose tonnage restrictions on the fleets of the five signatory nations. Advocates for sea power within the U.S. Navy were not pleased with what were seen as anti-naval developments and one of the strongest advocates for sea power, Captain Dudley Knox, recognized the public relations value of American naval history to convey to the American public the importance maintaining a strong Navy. Writing in the January 1926 Naval Institute Proceedings, Knox argued that many historical records that served as primary sources for telling the Navy’s great story were hidden away in the Nation’s attics and closets. Calling for a successor organization to the New York-based Naval Historical Society that had been in decline, Knox called for the creation of what would become the Naval Historical Foundation that was incorporated as a non-profit organization in the nation’s capital in March 1926. 1 The incorporation application listed the objectives of the foundation as educational and literary through the “collection, acquisition, and preservation…of manuscripts, relics, books, pictures, and all other things and information pertaining to the history and traditions of the United States Navy and Merchant Marine” plus “the diffusion of knowledge respecting such history and traditions, either by publication or otherwise.” 2 At the inaugural held om March 23, 1926. Rear Admiral Austin Knight, author of Knight’s Modern Seamanship was elected as the organization’s first president. The membership of the new organization grew to include the former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in World War I, Vice Adm. William S. Sims, and a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. With a trust fund seeded with a $1,000 contribution from the U.S. Naval Institute, The Naval Historical Foundation began a mission of searching for and acquiring papers, artifacts, illustrations and other historical items. With the recent opening of the National Royal Maritime Museum in Greenwich, UK, the Naval Historical Foundation petitioned the regents of the Smithsonian Institute for a similar facility in the nation’s capital. Turned down, the foundation, led now by retired Adm. William L. Rodgers, would pursue the concept of a national naval museum on the Mall. Though the organization had a strong friend in the White House with President Roosevelt, the economic doldrums of the Great Depression meant the Navy Museum on the Mall would not come to fruition. Eventually, the Foundation would make an arrangement to acquire the carriage house of the Stephen Decatur Home located on the northwest corner of Lafayette Square across from the White House for use as a museum. The small museum would be open to the public for thee decades starting in 1950. In the meantime the Foundation initiated a publication program in 1932 with the publication of – The Early History of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Marine Service (1789-1849). Following the departure of Admiral Rodgers, Adm. Joseph Strauss led the organization from 1943 until 1946. Needing a capital campaign to make what would become known as the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King took charge as president and led a vigorous fund-raising effort, aided by his Vice President, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Health issues forced Fleet Admiral King to step down in 1949. His successor, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy would complete the capital campaign and lead the foundation during the next decade. On May 18, 1950 the new Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum opened its doors with its first exhibit entitled: “Commodore Thomas Truxtun and Stephen Decatur and the Navy of their Times.” Shortly thereafter, noted naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison gave a talk on “The Battle of Midway.” Besides launching the new museum, Leahy finalized arranged with the Library of Congress to hold and provide custodial care for the Foundation’s growing manuscript collection that was being maintained at a warehouse at Fort Washington in Maryland south of Washington. Those documents were formally donated to the nation in 1998 and can be assessed through its Manuscript Division Reading room. With the success of the Morison talk, Leahy continued a lecture series on subjects of naval historical interest to Washington-area members and guests. Later co-sponsored by the Smithsonian Institute, the series continued until 1967. With Leahy’s passing, long-time Foundation secretary Dudley W. Knox fleeted up to president and served until his death in 1961. During his short tenure he initiated a film series designed to educate America’s youth about naval history and the relationship of sea power in relationship to the national welfare. With the assistance and cooperation of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Foundation placed seven films with the American Film Service for distribution. Covering broadly the early history of the Navy, they were entitled: The War of Independence, 1775-1783; Naval War with France and Tripoli; The War of 1812, World Wide Operations in Peace and War (1815-1869); Civil War, Parts Iⅈ and Navy Decline, the New Navy and War with Spain (1863-1898.) Two more films were added to the program that lasted into the 1980’s. These films were widely viewed. In 1977 an estimated 45,000 students in 24 states saw at least one of the films. Towards the end of Knox’s tenure, the members of the organization approved and adopted new by-laws that provided for a board of directors and a chairman. Adm. Robert B. Carney served for two nearly decades as the first chairman. Vice Adm. John F. Shafroth relieved Knox as president and served in that position until 1967. During Sharoth’s tenure the Foundation expanded its publication programs. He initiated a Spring and Fall report to the membership. In 1963, an article on naval history was inserted into this newsletter. By the Fall of 1979, the expanded newsletter was renamed Pull Together, a name taken from the Queenstown Association, a group of veterans who served in Ireland with the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy during the first World War. Besides the newsletter, the Foundation published a pamphlet series to cover subjects that were too large for treatment in the newsletter. Nearly three dozen monographs would be published over the next three decades with early titles such as I was a Yeoman F (1967); The Incredible Alaska Overland Rescue (1968); and The Enlistment, Training, and Organization of Crews for Our Navy Ships (1972). Vice Adm. Walter S. Delany became president in 1967 and lead the Foundation until his death in 1980. During his tenure the Navy consolidated many of its historical entities and the Naval Historical Center (now the Naval History and Heritage Command) became an official entity beginning in 1975. The Navy Department Library was one of the entities that would become part of the Naval Historical Center. Delany’s passion for the library was such that the present reading room was dedicated in his honor. Just before he passed away in 1980, Delany hired Capt. David A. Long ,who had retired as the Deputy Directory of Naval History at the Naval Historical Center, to serve as an executive director to perform the daily operational functions for the organization. Long served in this position until 1988. With the loss of DeLany and the retirement of Carney a year later, the Foundation turned to two former Chiefs of Naval Operations for leadership. Adm. James L. Holloway, III began an 18-year tenure as president in 1980. Adm. Arleigh A. Burke would serve a four-year term as chairman, beginning in 1981. Under the leadership of the two admirals, the Foundation reviewed the status of the Truxtun-Decatur Museum and determined that the Foundation would be better positioned to promote the Navy’s story to the American public by supporting the Navy Museum at the Washington Navy Yard, an entity that owed its existence to Chairman Burke, who two decades earlier as the Chief of Naval Operations, had been impressed with naval museums in Europe. With the closing of the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, the Foundation assumed a direct support role for the Navy’s flagship history museum. In 1983, the Foundation-operated Pilot House Gift Shop opened, with a portion of the profits set aside for the museum. The Navy Museum Store continues to serve the visiting public today. During the Burke-Holloway stewardship of the Foundation, the foundation initiated a committee to raising funds to acquire museum quality furnishings for Tingey House, the new home for the Chief of Naval Operations on the grounds of the Navy Yard. The previous home of the CNO at the Naval Observatory had been acquired for use by the Vice President of the United States. In decades following the creation on the “Tingey House” fund, the Foundation has donated nearly $200,000 for the purchase and repair of furnishings. Also, in 1985, Foundation director Adm. Jerauld Wright, began a campaign to restore the birthplace of John Paul Jones in Kirkbean, Scotland. The Foundation’s “Friends of John Paul Jones” group raised $50,000 towards the project and continues to urge support for this American naval heritage site. The son of Adm. Joseph Strauss, Rear Adm. Elliott Strauss, became the third chairman of the Foundation, presiding over the Board of Directors until 1998. Capt. Kenneth Coskey, another former Deputy Director of the Naval Historical Center and a former POW who had spent over six years as a POW in Vietnam relieved Long as executive director in 1988. During the 1990’s, the Foundation took several initiatives that would lead to an expansion of the size of the staff. With a $20,000 grant provided by Ambassador William H.G. Fitzgerald, the Foundation hired a graduate student, David Winkler, to conduct oral history work. Eventually, Winkler joined the staff to serve as the Foundation’s historian. 1998-1999 marked another shift in Foundation leadership as Admiral Holloway relieved the 95 year-old Strauss as Chairman and former Chief of Naval Aviation and Naval Reserve Vice Adm. Robert F. Dunn replaced Holloway as president. Another former Deputy Director of Naval History, Capt. Charles T. Creekman relieved Captain Coskey as Executive Director. Under the new regime, the oral history program expanded through the use of volunteers and a Naval Heritage Speakers program sent experts to address audiences around the country. Furthermore, the Foundation partnered with other organizations to sponsor numerous symposia and conferences on topical historical subjects. Another outreach initiative was the U.S. Navy Heritage Mini-Series, short history videos that were incorporated into the Navy’s General Military Training regimen. During this timeframe the publication of two coffee-table books contributed to the Foundation’s coffers. The Navy, known as the “White Book” was first published in 2000 and has undergone several reprints. This narrative treatment of American naval history has sold over 400,000 copies and remains in high demand. In contrast U.S. Navy, A Complete History, nicknamed the “Gray Book” printed three years later, provided a chronology of U.S. Navy history through the war in Iraq and also sold well. During the first decade of the 21st century the Foundation conducted a capital campaign to build out a Cold War Gallery for the Navy Museum in historic Building 70 at the Washington Navy Yard. Though several galleries were completed, the foundation ended its capital campaign following the tragic shootings at the Washington Navy Yard in 2013 that limited public assess to the Museum. In 2008, Adm. Bruce DeMars relieved Adm. Holloway who had served as president and then chairman of the Foundation for a remarkable 28 years. Adm. Holloway served as Chairman Emeritus until his passing in September 2019. Under Admiral DeMars leadership, the Foundation expanded its recognition programs. Included is the Commodore Dudley Knox Medal presented as a lifetime recognition award for a historian who contributed outstanding naval historical scholarship, mentorship for future historians, and leadership in the naval history and heritage field. Also inaugurated to recognize former president Vice Admiral Dunn, the foundation initiated the Vice Admiral Dunn NROTC Essay Contest for midshipmen attending the nation’s universities. The Foundation has increased its electronic outreach efforts through publishing Naval History Book Reviews and supporting the International Journal of Naval History. Its weekly Thursday’s Tidings e-letter featuring naval history germane to current events has attracted a strong following. Second Saturday webinars also became a popular feature. With Admiral DeMars retiring to Chairman Emeritus status, Adm. William J. Fallon assumed the chairman’s role. A accomplishment occurred in late 2018 with the foundation hosting a symposium to conduct a historical retrospective of the interdependence of the civilian nuclear power industry and the Navy’s reactors program. The symposium served as a clarion call to many who had been ignoring the decline of the nuclear power industry in recent decades. Unfortunately, the pandemic shut down a major funding stream for the organization – hosting events in the Navy Museum. With senior foundation leadership proving incapable of addressing the cash flow deficit caused by the declining revenues, Admiral Fallon approached U.S. Naval Institute about a merger early in 2022 and after months of negotiations, the membership was informed in mid-November and asked to approve of the proposal on December 7. Despite vigorous opposition, the subsequent vote approved the merger and the foundation dissolved on December 31, 2022. 1 Ryan D. Wadle, Selling Sea Power: Public Relations and the U.S. Navy, 1917-1941. University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, OK. (2019), pp. 61-62. 2 Incorporation document can be found at www.navyhistory.org. The post A History of the Naval Historical Foundation first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  6. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, many Americans attributed the naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany as a factor leading to the cataclysmic conflict and had little appetite for further naval spending by the United States. Influenced by pacifist voices as well desiring to cut the budget, President Warren Harding invited hosted a naval arms confrontation in Washington between 1921-22 that resulted in an understanding between the five-post World War I naval powers of the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy to place a moratorium on new capital ship construction and impose tonnage restrictions on the fleets of the five signatory nations. Advocates for sea power within the U.S. Navy were not pleased with what were seen as anti-naval developments and one of the strongest advocates for sea power, Captain Dudley Knox, recognized the public relations value of American naval history to convey to the American public the importance maintaining a strong Navy. Writing in the January 1926 Naval Institute Proceedings, Knox argued that many historical records that served as primary sources for telling the Navy’s great story were hidden away in the Nation’s attics and closets. Calling for a successor organization to the New York-based Naval Historical Society that had been in decline, Knox called for the creation of what would become the Naval Historical Foundation that was incorporated as a non-profit organization in the nation’s capital in March 1926. 1 The incorporation application listed the objectives of the foundation as educational and literary through the “collection, acquisition, and preservation…of manuscripts, relics, books, pictures, and all other things and information pertaining to the history and traditions of the United States Navy and Merchant Marine” plus “the diffusion of knowledge respecting such history and traditions, either by publication or otherwise.” 2 At the inaugural held om March 23, 1926. Rear Admiral Austin Knight, author of Knight’s Modern Seamanship was elected as the organization’s first president. The membership of the new organization grew to include the former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in World War I, Vice Adm. William S. Sims, and a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. With a trust fund seeded with a $1,000 contribution from the U.S. Naval Institute, The Naval Historical Foundation began a mission of searching for and acquiring papers, artifacts, illustrations and other historical items. With the recent opening of the National Royal Maritime Museum in Greenwich, UK, the Naval Historical Foundation petitioned the regents of the Smithsonian Institute for a similar facility in the nation’s capital. Turned down, the foundation, led now by retired Adm. William L. Rodgers, would pursue the concept of a national naval museum on the Mall. Though the organization had a strong friend in the White House with President Roosevelt, the economic doldrums of the Great Depression meant the Navy Museum on the Mall would not come to fruition. Eventually, the Foundation would make an arrangement to acquire the carriage house of the Stephen Decatur Home located on the northwest corner of Lafayette Square across from the White House for use as a museum. The small museum would be open to the public for thee decades starting in 1950. In the meantime the Foundation initiated a publication program in 1932 with the publication of – The Early History of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Marine Service (1789-1849). Following the departure of Admiral Rodgers, Adm. Joseph Strauss led the organization from 1943 until 1946. Needing a capital campaign to make what would become known as the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King took charge as president and led a vigorous fund-raising effort, aided by his Vice President, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Health issues forced Fleet Admiral King to step down in 1949. His successor, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy would complete the capital campaign and lead the foundation during the next decade. On May 18, 1950 the new Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum opened its doors with its first exhibit entitled: “Commodore Thomas Truxtun and Stephen Decatur and the Navy of their Times.” Shortly thereafter, noted naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison gave a talk on “The Battle of Midway.” Besides launching the new museum, Leahy finalized arranged with the Library of Congress to hold and provide custodial care for the Foundation’s growing manuscript collection that was being maintained at a warehouse at Fort Washington in Maryland south of Washington. Those documents were formally donated to the nation in 1998 and can be assessed through its Manuscript Division Reading room. With the success of the Morison talk, Leahy continued a lecture series on subjects of naval historical interest to Washington-area members and guests. Later co-sponsored by the Smithsonian Institute, the series continued until 1967. With Leahy’s passing, long-time Foundation secretary Dudley W. Knox fleeted up to president and served until his death in 1961. During his short tenure he initiated a film series designed to educate America’s youth about naval history and the relationship of sea power in relationship to the national welfare. With the assistance and cooperation of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Foundation placed seven films with the American Film Service for distribution. Covering broadly the early history of the Navy, they were entitled: The War of Independence, 1775-1783; Naval War with France and Tripoli; The War of 1812, World Wide Operations in Peace and War (1815-1869); Civil War, Parts Iⅈ and Navy Decline, the New Navy and War with Spain (1863-1898.) Two more films were added to the program that lasted into the 1980’s. These films were widely viewed. In 1977 an estimated 45,000 students in 24 states saw at least one of the films. Towards the end of Knox’s tenure, the members of the organization approved and adopted new by-laws that provided for a board of directors and a chairman. Adm. Robert B. Carney served for two nearly decades as the first chairman. Vice Adm. John F. Shafroth relieved Knox as president and served in that position until 1967. During Sharoth’s tenure the Foundation expanded its publication programs. He initiated a Spring and Fall report to the membership. In 1963, an article on naval history was inserted into this newsletter. By the Fall of 1979, the expanded newsletter was renamed Pull Together, a name taken from the Queenstown Association, a group of veterans who served in Ireland with the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy during the first World War. Besides the newsletter, the Foundation published a pamphlet series to cover subjects that were too large for treatment in the newsletter. Nearly three dozen monographs would be published over the next three decades with early titles such as I was a Yeoman F (1967); The Incredible Alaska Overland Rescue (1968); and The Enlistment, Training, and Organization of Crews for Our Navy Ships (1972). Vice Adm. Walter S. Delany became president in 1967 and lead the Foundation until his death in 1980. During his tenure the Navy consolidated many of its historical entities and the Naval Historical Center (now the Naval History and Heritage Command) became an official entity beginning in 1975. The Navy Department Library was one of the entities that would become part of the Naval Historical Center. Delany’s passion for the library was such that the present reading room was dedicated in his honor. Just before he passed away in 1980, Delany hired Capt. David A. Long ,who had retired as the Deputy Directory of Naval History at the Naval Historical Center, to serve as an executive director to perform the daily operational functions for the organization. Long served in this position until 1988. With the loss of DeLany and the retirement of Carney a year later, the Foundation turned to two former Chiefs of Naval Operations for leadership. Adm. James L. Holloway, III began an 18-year tenure as president in 1980. Adm. Arleigh A. Burke would serve a four-year term as chairman, beginning in 1981. Under the leadership of the two admirals, the Foundation reviewed the status of the Truxtun-Decatur Museum and determined that the Foundation would be better positioned to promote the Navy’s story to the American public by supporting the Navy Museum at the Washington Navy Yard, an entity that owed its existence to Chairman Burke, who two decades earlier as the Chief of Naval Operations, had been impressed with naval museums in Europe. With the closing of the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, the Foundation assumed a direct support role for the Navy’s flagship history museum. In 1983, the Foundation-operated Pilot House Gift Shop opened, with a portion of the profits set aside for the museum. The Navy Museum Store continues to serve the visiting public today. During the Burke-Holloway stewardship of the Foundation, the foundation initiated a committee to raising funds to acquire museum quality furnishings for Tingey House, the new home for the Chief of Naval Operations on the grounds of the Navy Yard. The previous home of the CNO at the Naval Observatory had been acquired for use by the Vice President of the United States. In decades following the creation on the “Tingey House” fund, the Foundation has donated nearly $200,000 for the purchase and repair of furnishings. Also, in 1985, Foundation director Adm. Jerauld Wright, began a campaign to restore the birthplace of John Paul Jones in Kirkbean, Scotland. The Foundation’s “Friends of John Paul Jones” group raised $50,000 towards the project and continues to urge support for this American naval heritage site. The son of Adm. Joseph Strauss, Rear Adm. Elliott Strauss, became the third chairman of the Foundation, presiding over the Board of Directors until 1998. Capt. Kenneth Coskey, another former Deputy Director of the Naval Historical Center and a former POW who had spent over six years as a POW in Vietnam relieved Long as executive director in 1988. During the 1990’s, the Foundation took several initiatives that would lead to an expansion of the size of the staff. With a $20,000 grant provided by Ambassador William H.G. Fitzgerald, the Foundation hired a graduate student, David Winkler, to conduct oral history work. Eventually, Winkler joined the staff to serve as the Foundation’s historian. 1998-1999 marked another shift in Foundation leadership as Admiral Holloway relieved the 95 year-old Strauss as Chairman and former Chief of Naval Aviation and Naval Reserve Vice Adm. Robert F. Dunn replaced Holloway as president. Another former Deputy Director of Naval History, Capt. Charles T. Creekman relieved Captain Coskey as Executive Director. Under the new regime, the oral history program expanded through the use of volunteers and a Naval Heritage Speakers program sent experts to address audiences around the country. Furthermore, the Foundation partnered with other organizations to sponsor numerous symposia and conferences on topical historical subjects. Another outreach initiative was the U.S. Navy Heritage Mini-Series, short history videos that were incorporated into the Navy’s General Military Training regimen. During this timeframe the publication of two coffee-table books contributed to the Foundation’s coffers. The Navy, known as the “White Book” was first published in 2000 and has undergone several reprints. This narrative treatment of American naval history has sold over 400,000 copies and remains in high demand. In contrast U.S. Navy, A Complete History, nicknamed the “Gray Book” printed three years later, provided a chronology of U.S. Navy history through the war in Iraq and also sold well. During the first decade of the 21st century the Foundation conducted a capital campaign to build out a Cold War Gallery for the Navy Museum in historic Building 70 at the Washington Navy Yard. Though several galleries were completed, the foundation ended its capital campaign following the tragic shootings at the Washington Navy Yard in 2013 that limited public assess to the Museum. In 2008, Adm. Bruce DeMars relieved Adm. Holloway who had served as president and then chairman of the Foundation for a remarkable 28 years. Adm. Holloway served as Chairman Emeritus until his passing in September 2019. Under Admiral DeMars leadership, the Foundation expanded its recognition programs. Included is the Commodore Dudley Knox Medal presented as a lifetime recognition award for a historian who contributed outstanding naval historical scholarship, mentorship for future historians, and leadership in the naval history and heritage field. Also inaugurated to recognize former president Vice Admiral Dunn, the foundation initiated the Vice Admiral Dunn NROTC Essay Contest for midshipmen attending the nation’s universities. The Foundation has increased its electronic outreach efforts through publishing Naval History Book Reviews and supporting the International Journal of Naval History. Its weekly Thursday’s Tidings e-letter featuring naval history germane to current events has attracted a strong following. Second Saturday webinars also became a popular feature. With Admiral DeMars retiring to Chairman Emeritus status, Adm. William J. Fallon assumed the chairman’s role. A accomplishment occurred in late 2018 with the foundation hosting a symposium to conduct a historical retrospective of the interdependence of the civilian nuclear power industry and the Navy’s reactors program. The symposium served as a clarion call to many who had been ignoring the decline of the nuclear power industry in recent decades. Unfortunately, the pandemic shut down a major funding stream for the organization – hosting events in the Navy Museum. With senior foundation leadership proving incapable of addressing the cash flow deficit caused by the declining revenues, Admiral Fallon approached U.S. Naval Institute about a merger early in 2022 and after months of negotiations, the membership was informed in mid-November and asked to approve of the proposal on December 7. Despite vigorous opposition, the subsequent vote approved the merger and the foundation dissolved on December 31, 2022. 1 Ryan D. Wadle, Selling Sea Power: Public Relations and the U.S. Navy, 1917-1941. University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, OK. (2019), pp. 61-62. 2 Incorporation document can be found at www.navyhistory.org. The post A History of the Naval Historical Foundation first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  7. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, many Americans attributed the naval arms race between Great Britain and Germany as a factor leading to the cataclysmic conflict and had little appetite for further naval spending by the United States. Influenced by pacifist voices as well desiring to cut the budget, President Warren Harding invited hosted a naval arms confrontation in Washington between 1921-22 that resulted in an understanding between the five-post World War I naval powers of the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy to place a moratorium on new capital ship construction and impose tonnage restrictions on the fleets of the five signatory nations. Advocates for sea power within the U.S. Navy were not pleased with what were seen as anti-naval developments and one of the strongest advocates for sea power, Captain Dudley Knox, recognized the public relations value of American naval history to convey to the American public the importance maintaining a strong Navy. Writing in the January 1926 Naval Institute Proceedings, Knox argued that many historical records that served as primary sources for telling the Navy’s great story were hidden away in the Nation’s attics and closets. Calling for a successor organization to the New York-based Naval Historical Society that had been in decline, Knox called for the creation of what would become the Naval Historical Foundation that was incorporated as a non-profit organization in the nation’s capital in March 1926. 1 The incorporation application listed the objectives of the foundation as educational and literary through the “collection, acquisition, and preservation…of manuscripts, relics, books, pictures, and all other things and information pertaining to the history and traditions of the United States Navy and Merchant Marine” plus “the diffusion of knowledge respecting such history and traditions, either by publication or otherwise.” 2 At the inaugural held om March 23, 1926. Rear Admiral Austin Knight, author of Knight’s Modern Seamanship was elected as the organization’s first president. The membership of the new organization grew to include the former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe in World War I, Vice Adm. William S. Sims, and a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. With a trust fund seeded with a $1,000 contribution from the U.S. Naval Institute, The Naval Historical Foundation began a mission of searching for and acquiring papers, artifacts, illustrations and other historical items. With the recent opening of the National Royal Maritime Museum in Greenwich, UK, the Naval Historical Foundation petitioned the regents of the Smithsonian Institute for a similar facility in the nation’s capital. Turned down, the foundation, led now by retired Adm. William L. Rodgers, would pursue the concept of a national naval museum on the Mall. Though the organization had a strong friend in the White House with President Roosevelt, the economic doldrums of the Great Depression meant the Navy Museum on the Mall would not come to fruition. Eventually, the Foundation would make an arrangement to acquire the carriage house of the Stephen Decatur Home located on the northwest corner of Lafayette Square across from the White House for use as a museum. The small museum would be open to the public for thee decades starting in 1950. In the meantime the Foundation initiated a publication program in 1932 with the publication of – The Early History of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Marine Service (1789-1849). Following the departure of Admiral Rodgers, Adm. Joseph Strauss led the organization from 1943 until 1946. Needing a capital campaign to make what would become known as the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King took charge as president and led a vigorous fund-raising effort, aided by his Vice President, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Health issues forced Fleet Admiral King to step down in 1949. His successor, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy would complete the capital campaign and lead the foundation during the next decade. On May 18, 1950 the new Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum opened its doors with its first exhibit entitled: “Commodore Thomas Truxtun and Stephen Decatur and the Navy of their Times.” Shortly thereafter, noted naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison gave a talk on “The Battle of Midway.” Besides launching the new museum, Leahy finalized arranged with the Library of Congress to hold and provide custodial care for the Foundation’s growing manuscript collection that was being maintained at a warehouse at Fort Washington in Maryland south of Washington. Those documents were formally donated to the nation in 1998 and can be assessed through its Manuscript Division Reading room. With the success of the Morison talk, Leahy continued a lecture series on subjects of naval historical interest to Washington-area members and guests. Later co-sponsored by the Smithsonian Institute, the series continued until 1967. With Leahy’s passing, long-time Foundation secretary Dudley W. Knox fleeted up to president and served until his death in 1961. During his short tenure he initiated a film series designed to educate America’s youth about naval history and the relationship of sea power in relationship to the national welfare. With the assistance and cooperation of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Foundation placed seven films with the American Film Service for distribution. Covering broadly the early history of the Navy, they were entitled: The War of Independence, 1775-1783; Naval War with France and Tripoli; The War of 1812, World Wide Operations in Peace and War (1815-1869); Civil War, Parts Iⅈ and Navy Decline, the New Navy and War with Spain (1863-1898.) Two more films were added to the program that lasted into the 1980’s. These films were widely viewed. In 1977 an estimated 45,000 students in 24 states saw at least one of the films. Towards the end of Knox’s tenure, the members of the organization approved and adopted new by-laws that provided for a board of directors and a chairman. Adm. Robert B. Carney served for two nearly decades as the first chairman. Vice Adm. John F. Shafroth relieved Knox as president and served in that position until 1967. During Sharoth’s tenure the Foundation expanded its publication programs. He initiated a Spring and Fall report to the membership. In 1963, an article on naval history was inserted into this newsletter. By the Fall of 1979, the expanded newsletter was renamed Pull Together, a name taken from the Queenstown Association, a group of veterans who served in Ireland with the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy during the first World War. Besides the newsletter, the Foundation published a pamphlet series to cover subjects that were too large for treatment in the newsletter. Nearly three dozen monographs would be published over the next three decades with early titles such as I was a Yeoman F (1967); The Incredible Alaska Overland Rescue (1968); and The Enlistment, Training, and Organization of Crews for Our Navy Ships (1972). Vice Adm. Walter S. Delany became president in 1967 and lead the Foundation until his death in 1980. During his tenure the Navy consolidated many of its historical entities and the Naval Historical Center (now the Naval History and Heritage Command) became an official entity beginning in 1975. The Navy Department Library was one of the entities that would become part of the Naval Historical Center. Delany’s passion for the library was such that the present reading room was dedicated in his honor. Just before he passed away in 1980, Delany hired Capt. David A. Long ,who had retired as the Deputy Directory of Naval History at the Naval Historical Center, to serve as an executive director to perform the daily operational functions for the organization. Long served in this position until 1988. With the loss of DeLany and the retirement of Carney a year later, the Foundation turned to two former Chiefs of Naval Operations for leadership. Adm. James L. Holloway, III began an 18-year tenure as president in 1980. Adm. Arleigh A. Burke would serve a four-year term as chairman, beginning in 1981. Under the leadership of the two admirals, the Foundation reviewed the status of the Truxtun-Decatur Museum and determined that the Foundation would be better positioned to promote the Navy’s story to the American public by supporting the Navy Museum at the Washington Navy Yard, an entity that owed its existence to Chairman Burke, who two decades earlier as the Chief of Naval Operations, had been impressed with naval museums in Europe. With the closing of the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, the Foundation assumed a direct support role for the Navy’s flagship history museum. In 1983, the Foundation-operated Pilot House Gift Shop opened, with a portion of the profits set aside for the museum. The Navy Museum Store continues to serve the visiting public today. During the Burke-Holloway stewardship of the Foundation, the foundation initiated a committee to raising funds to acquire museum quality furnishings for Tingey House, the new home for the Chief of Naval Operations on the grounds of the Navy Yard. The previous home of the CNO at the Naval Observatory had been acquired for use by the Vice President of the United States. In decades following the creation on the “Tingey House” fund, the Foundation has donated nearly $200,000 for the purchase and repair of furnishings. Also, in 1985, Foundation director Adm. Jerauld Wright, began a campaign to restore the birthplace of John Paul Jones in Kirkbean, Scotland. The Foundation’s “Friends of John Paul Jones” group raised $50,000 towards the project and continues to urge support for this American naval heritage site. The son of Adm. Joseph Strauss, Rear Adm. Elliott Strauss, became the third chairman of the Foundation, presiding over the Board of Directors until 1998. Capt. Kenneth Coskey, another former Deputy Director of the Naval Historical Center and a former POW who had spent over six years as a POW in Vietnam relieved Long as executive director in 1988. During the 1990’s, the Foundation took several initiatives that would lead to an expansion of the size of the staff. With a $20,000 grant provided by Ambassador William H.G. Fitzgerald, the Foundation hired a graduate student, David Winkler, to conduct oral history work. Eventually, Winkler joined the staff to serve as the Foundation’s historian. 1998-1999 marked another shift in Foundation leadership as Admiral Holloway relieved the 95 year-old Strauss as Chairman and former Chief of Naval Aviation and Naval Reserve Vice Adm. Robert F. Dunn replaced Holloway as president. Another former Deputy Director of Naval History, Capt. Charles T. Creekman relieved Captain Coskey as Executive Director. Under the new regime, the oral history program expanded through the use of volunteers and a Naval Heritage Speakers program sent experts to address audiences around the country. Furthermore, the Foundation partnered with other organizations to sponsor numerous symposia and conferences on topical historical subjects. Another outreach initiative was the U.S. Navy Heritage Mini-Series, short history videos that were incorporated into the Navy’s General Military Training regimen. During this timeframe the publication of two coffee-table books contributed to the Foundation’s coffers. The Navy, known as the “White Book” was first published in 2000 and has undergone several reprints. This narrative treatment of American naval history has sold over 400,000 copies and remains in high demand. In contrast U.S. Navy, A Complete History, nicknamed the “Gray Book” printed three years later, provided a chronology of U.S. Navy history through the war in Iraq and also sold well. During the first decade of the 21st century the Foundation conducted a capital campaign to build out a Cold War Gallery for the Navy Museum in historic Building 70 at the Washington Navy Yard. Though several galleries were completed, the foundation ended its capital campaign following the tragic shootings at the Washington Navy Yard in 2013 that limited public assess to the Museum. In 2008, Adm. Bruce DeMars relieved Adm. Holloway who had served as president and then chairman of the Foundation for a remarkable 28 years. Adm. Holloway served as Chairman Emeritus until his passing in September 2019. Under Admiral DeMars leadership, the Foundation expanded its recognition programs. Included is the Commodore Dudley Knox Medal presented as a lifetime recognition award for a historian who contributed outstanding naval historical scholarship, mentorship for future historians, and leadership in the naval history and heritage field. Also inaugurated to recognize former president Vice Admiral Dunn, the foundation initiated the Vice Admiral Dunn NROTC Essay Contest for midshipmen attending the nation’s universities. The Foundation has increased its electronic outreach efforts through publishing Naval History Book Reviews and supporting the International Journal of Naval History. Its weekly Thursday’s Tidings e-letter featuring naval history germane to current events has attracted a strong following. Second Saturday webinars also became a popular feature. With Admiral DeMars retiring to Chairman Emeritus status, Adm. William J. Fallon assumed the chairman’s role. A accomplishment occurred in late 2018 with the foundation hosting a symposium to conduct a historical retrospective of the interdependence of the civilian nuclear power industry and the Navy’s reactors program. The symposium served as a clarion call to many who had been ignoring the decline of the nuclear power industry in recent decades. Unfortunately, the pandemic shut down a major funding stream for the organization – hosting events in the Navy Museum. With senior foundation leadership proving incapable of addressing the cash flow deficit caused by the declining revenues, Admiral Fallon approached U.S. Naval Institute about a merger early in 2022 and after months of negotiations, the membership was informed in mid-November and asked to approve of the proposal on December 7. Despite vigorous opposition, the subsequent vote approved the merger and the foundation dissolved on December 31, 2022. 1 Ryan D. Wadle, Selling Sea Power: Public Relations and the U.S. Navy, 1917-1941. University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, OK. (2019), pp. 61-62. 2 Incorporation document can be found at www.navyhistory.org. The post A History of the Naval Historical Foundation first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  8. By Pam Ribbey, Washington, DC: Opus Self-Publishing, Politics and Prose Bookstore (2022) Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb, Ph.D. This self-published booklet is, in the main, a biography of Pam Ribbey’s grandfather, focuses on her own research and discussions with him on his is role before, during, and immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Capt. Charles Hamilton Maddox, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1909, served as a United States naval officer and was a veteran of both World Wars. He had also attended the Harvard Graduate School of Applied Science and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Captain Maddox retired in 1946 and passed away unexpectedly in1964. He had been” in charge” of the British Empire Section for the Office of U.S. Naval Intelligence in Washington, DC in the 1930s. He was a pioneer in naval radio communication and pre-World War II Naval War College faculty member, and, in November and December 1941, commanded a “secret” Task Group in the South Pacific. She writes (“Note” p.3): “There is an ‘Official Past’ about the Pearl Harbor Attack of 7 December 1941, and there is what really happened.” She also mentions the November 2018 “avoidable” Woolsey Fire that swept through 100,000 acres of dry chaparral in the Malibu Mountains of southern California in which she lost fifteen years of archival research and interviews along with her Pearl Harbor library of books and photographs. The story she tells in her publication derives “from a few notes evacuated that night.” Her narrative begins with the flagship USS Antares (AKS-3) and destroyer USS Selfridge (DD-357) of Task Group 15.2, Base Force Squadron 8, of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, under the command of Captain Maddox serving as the commodore. (For more on Antares and Selfridge see the reviewer’s write-ups at the end of the review) In late November, Maddox conferred in a “secret meeting” with Sir Harry Luke, British Western Pacific High Commissioner (WPHC), on his yacht at Canton Island (p. 42). The Task Group returned to Pearl Harbor departing in late November from Canton and Palmyra Islands but “shadowed” by an IJN fleet submarine seen 28 November and 5 December. On 6 December, the Task Group spotted a hostile submarine (confirmed by sonar on Selfridge) near the entrance to Pearl Harbor and Maddox ordered the USS Ward (DD-139) and a PBY-5 Catalina (14-P-1) piloted by Ens. William Tanner to attack and sink the Japanese midget submarine. Ward attacked and sank it, thus firing the first shots of the Pacific War. Some of what Maddox saw and did 5-7 December was written in a letter, dated 16 December, to his wife Isabel who was living in Washington, DC. At this point Ribbey inserts material from Layton’s 1985 book (no citation) and cites a Layton archives letter (2-CL-41, revised) dated 14 October 1941 concerning US Pacific Fleet security at Pearl Harbor. She refers to War Plan Orange exercises at the Naval War College in the 1930s, when Maddox took the role of “Japanese Admiral.” In 1937, he was detached from ONI and took command of the light cruiser USS Raleigh (CL-7), flagship of Squadron 40-T, but then assumed command of USS Porter (DD-356) flagship of Destroyer Squadron 5, and then Task Group 15.8. in October 1941. The author then reviews materials on the German armed merchant cruiser Atlantis and IJN submarines in the Indian Ocean, and July and August 1940 secret British documents about the British Far East Fleet and Far East Situation, and reports that Canton and Palmyra Islands were preparing for war (pp. 14-15). She also notes that station HYPO was tracking Japanese merchant and war ships, and the stations in the Pacific that had DF equipment (Canton and Palmyra are on her list that had DF since 1940 but may have lacked trained operators according to Layton). German raiders in the central Pacific are identified (Orion and Komet) as sinking Allied shipping, and the sinking of HMAS Sydney by Raider G/Schiff 41 (HSK Kormoran on 24 November 1941 is also mentioned. Antares departed with Selfridge from Canton via Palmyra on 26 November and from Palmyra for Pearl Harbor four days later (p. 52) and a sailor in Antares “certainly saw” an IJN submarine following (p. 60). Selfridge, low on fuel, would depart the Task Group at 2015 on 6 December before Antares saw a midget submarine at 0600 outside of Pearl Harbor on 7 December (pp. 61-62). The author next interjects a HYPO alert about a concentration of Japanese submarines in the Marshalls and Rochfort’s priority alert to Op-20-6 resulting in the war warnings of 27 and 28 November. Next, Captain Maddox ordered the sinking of the midget submarine and we learn that thirty IJN fleet submarines were “arrayed in a fan formation” outside the mouth of Pearl Harbor” (pp. 61-62). The deck log of the destroyer USS Ward indicates an exchange of messages with Antares, but the latter’s deck log does not mention this. The Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings vol. 36 (1945) concluded that the minesweeper USS Condor (AMC-14) sighted the periscope of a midget submarine at 0350 and reported this to Ward but the message was not passed along to higher authorities (i.e. Admiral Kimmel). Ribbey writes that “It is difficult determining the exact time to any of these events because they fluctuated between testimony and Deck Logs.” She comments that the 14th Naval District Communications Office kept “several different types of logs,” why were they never presented in evidence?” (pp. 69-70). She concludes that there is missing testimony and missing coded radio messages and states that “ The Imperial Japanese Submarine Force was discovered through sight contact and sound contact by my grandfather Commodore Maddox, ConTrainRon 8 of Task Group 15.2 when he sighted the ocean-cruising Japanese Fleet Submarine following USS Antares from Canton Island through the 5 December sonar contact by destroyer USS Selfridge, then the hostile Japanese midget submarine sighted and ordered sunk by Senior Office Present Afloat (SOPA), Captain Charles H. Maddox, USN on the bridge of Antares that 7 December 1941 dawn” (pp. 70-71). She cites the Antares Log Book for 7 December 0-4 and 4-8 and the locations of the Antares, destroyer Ward, tow-boat Keosanqua, and other vessels through 0930 after the second Japanese attack wave departed. In the next part of the narrative, she draws together information from a variety of sources noting that “the true story needs to be told” (p. 76). These sources include members of the Antares crew whom she interviewed by telephone. Maddox was not promoted to Rear Admiral by Admiral Nimitz on 10 October 1942; he retired in 1946 and died on 23 October 1964. She states that his service record being sent to him was “undeliverable” and had been destroyed by burning on 22 September 1964 by the Officer Records Branch. Ribbey writes that a copy of “Secret Operations Order 13-41” delivered to Maddox by USS Selfridge on 18 November, had been removed from the dossier prior to its transfer to the National Archives and Records Administration files in College Park, Maryland, when she sought the document in October 2019 (p. 37). There is no mention of the Luke-Maddox meeting in Sir Harry Luke’s From a South Seas Diary 1938-1942 (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1945) or in the Antares log (p. 49). This is likely true because British documents were embargoed after the war (and many still are until 2041) and the meeting took place on Luke’s yacht, so no record would have appeared in the Antares log. She also reports (pp. 81-82) that a briefcase containing Pearl Harbor documents and photographs being sent to Ribbey’s home in California had “disappeared from my grandmother’s home in Washington, DC in the early 1970s.” And (p. 95) “Priority despatches from his [Captain Maddox’s] command to Headquarters of the 14th Naval District and CINCPAC, along with files from his career with the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) are missing.” “Huge swaths of other 1941 U.S. and Allied Naval Intelligence files are also still ‘missing’ from archives worldwide ….”(p. 95). As we approach the 81st anniversary of the Pearl Harbor Attack, a new round of publications and inferences about the period leading up to the event and the event itself are being issued. For example, these include recently released documents from Japanese, British, and American archives clarifying that radio silence had not been maintained by the Kido Butai enroute from Hitokappu Bay to the Hawaiian Islands (See James M. D’Angelo in Pearl Harbor Declassified: The Evidence of American Foreknowledge of the Attack (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2021) pp. 78-103). Ribbey claims radio silence was maintained (p. 102). D’Angelo notes that there is missing correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt in late November 1941 (p. 65) but also reports that the JN-25B Japanese code had been broken by the British at Bletchley Park in November 1941 (p. 188). Was this reported to the Americans? Nonetheless, Pam Ribbey has attempted to resurrect and justify her grandfather’s actions in late November and early December 1941. However, the troublesome issues of missing, stolen (?), burned, and destroyed documents during and after World War II, coupled with the November 2018 “avoidable” Woolsey Fire in southern California which destroyed her collection of documents and photographs is lamentable and might have strengthened her case. She does not use the word “conspiracy” in her narrative but her writings lend credence to strange happenings and the evidence presented does not fully convince this reader and raises more questions than answers. Parting observations: There was no “Table of Contents,” “Bibliography,” “Notes,” or “Index.” Your reviewer counted 15 incomplete citations in the narrative text ranging from Edwin T. Layton, with Roger Pineau and John Costello, And I Was There (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985) and Layton’s Papers at the U.S. Naval War College, to the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, and various committee inquiries such as those chaired by Hart, Hewitt, and Clausen. The author utilizes some available archive documents (other documents remain classified) and survivor’s stories about her grandfather, Captain Charles Hamilton Maddox (b. February 23, 1886, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada – d. September 21, 1964, Bethesda, Maryland). No biographical files for Maddox exist at the Naval History and Heritage Command’s “Modern Biographical Files in the Navy Department Library” or U.S. Naval Institute “Oral Histories” (launched in 1969): www.history.navy.mil/research/library/research-guides/modern-biographical-files-ndl.html#M and www.usni.org/press/oral-histories. Ribby’s narrative runs continuously from pages 5 through 106 without chapters, headings, subheadings or other breaks. The “Photos” (both portraits and copies of documents) are not correlated with the narrative. Dr. Kolb is a United States Naval Institute Golden Life Member. Background on the two ships not found in the Ribbey narrative: USS Antares was laid down in July 1918 as the steel-hulled freighter Nedmac, completed one year later, and acquired by the U.S. Navy on 30 November 1940 to be renamed as an Antares-class cargo ship (AG-10). Serving initially in the Atlantic Fleet as target repair and photographic ship, she was reclassified as a general stores issue ship (AKS-3) and transferred to the Pacific Fleet, operating between the West Coast (San Pedro, Mare Island Navy Yard, and San Francisco) and Pearl Harbor and Pacific islands atolls. These included Palmyra Island Naval Air Station (established in August 1941) situated directly south of the Hawaiian Islands, and Canton Island (originally called Kanton Island) located approximately halfway between Hawaii and Fiji, where, beginning in May 1939, Pan American World Airways had developed, a refueling base for their Clippers flying to New Zealand by May 1940. Antares was assigned to the Hawaiian Department, U.S. Army, during the critical program to develop an air ferry route through the southern Pacific to the Philippines that would avoid the Japanese mandated islands of the central Pacific. On 3 November 1941, Antares left Oahu for Canton Island with 308 military (elements of the 804th Engineer Battalion) and civilian personnel, and towing a 500-ton barge with the Battalion’s construction equipment and two smaller barges that foundered en route (for details, see Kathleen Williams’ Development of the South Pacific Air Route, USAAF Historical Studies 45, Army Air Force Historical Office, 1946). USS Selfridge was a Porter-class destroyer laid down in 1933, assigned to Pearl Harbor in 1940, and served as an escort for Antares to and from Palmyra Island arriving at Pearl Harbor berth X-9 only minutes before the Japanese attack. USS Ward (DD-139) was laid down during World War I as a Wickes-class destroyer in 1918 and on 7 December was under the command of Lt. Commander William W. Outerbridge, conducting a precautionary patrol off the entrance to Pearl Harbor when she encountered and sank a Japanese midget submarine. Marine scientists located the wreck of the midget submarine on 28 August 2002 about 3 nmi. (5.5 km) in American waters at a depth of 1,200 ft., verifying that the Ward’s number-three gun crew had hit the conning tower of the Ko-hyoteki-class two-man submarine with one shot and sunk it. USS Condor (AMc-14) was a coastal minesweeper of the United States Navy constructed as the wooden-hulled purse seiner New Example in 1937 then acquired by the U.S. Navy on 28 October 1940, and wan war the entrance to Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December. (For additional details, see several volumes of James Mooney’s Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1969-1991). War Alert in the Tropical Dawn at Pearl. By Pam Ribbey (Washington, D.C.: 2022) The post War Alert in the Tropical Dawn at Pearl first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  9. By Pam Ribbey, Washington, DC: Opus Self-Publishing, Politics and Prose Bookstore (2022) Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb, Ph.D. This self-published booklet is, in the main, a biography of Pam Ribbey’s grandfather, focuses on her own research and discussions with him on his is role before, during, and immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Capt. Charles Hamilton Maddox, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1909, served as a United States naval officer and was a veteran of both World Wars. He had also attended the Harvard Graduate School of Applied Science and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Captain Maddox retired in 1946 and passed away unexpectedly in1964. He had been” in charge” of the British Empire Section for the Office of U.S. Naval Intelligence in Washington, DC in the 1930s. He was a pioneer in naval radio communication and pre-World War II Naval War College faculty member, and, in November and December 1941, commanded a “secret” Task Group in the South Pacific. She writes (“Note” p.3): “There is an ‘Official Past’ about the Pearl Harbor Attack of 7 December 1941, and there is what really happened.” She also mentions the November 2018 “avoidable” Woolsey Fire that swept through 100,000 acres of dry chaparral in the Malibu Mountains of southern California in which she lost fifteen years of archival research and interviews along with her Pearl Harbor library of books and photographs. The story she tells in her publication derives “from a few notes evacuated that night.” Her narrative begins with the flagship USS Antares (AKS-3) and destroyer USS Selfridge (DD-357) of Task Group 15.2, Base Force Squadron 8, of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, under the command of Captain Maddox serving as the commodore. (For more on Antares and Selfridge see the reviewer’s write-ups at the end of the review) In late November, Maddox conferred in a “secret meeting” with Sir Harry Luke, British Western Pacific High Commissioner (WPHC), on his yacht at Canton Island (p. 42). The Task Group returned to Pearl Harbor departing in late November from Canton and Palmyra Islands but “shadowed” by an IJN fleet submarine seen 28 November and 5 December. On 6 December, the Task Group spotted a hostile submarine (confirmed by sonar on Selfridge) near the entrance to Pearl Harbor and Maddox ordered the USS Ward (DD-139) and a PBY-5 Catalina (14-P-1) piloted by Ens. William Tanner to attack and sink the Japanese midget submarine. Ward attacked and sank it, thus firing the first shots of the Pacific War. Some of what Maddox saw and did 5-7 December was written in a letter, dated 16 December, to his wife Isabel who was living in Washington, DC. At this point Ribbey inserts material from Layton’s 1985 book (no citation) and cites a Layton archives letter (2-CL-41, revised) dated 14 October 1941 concerning US Pacific Fleet security at Pearl Harbor. She refers to War Plan Orange exercises at the Naval War College in the 1930s, when Maddox took the role of “Japanese Admiral.” In 1937, he was detached from ONI and took command of the light cruiser USS Raleigh (CL-7), flagship of Squadron 40-T, but then assumed command of USS Porter (DD-356) flagship of Destroyer Squadron 5, and then Task Group 15.8. in October 1941. The author then reviews materials on the German armed merchant cruiser Atlantis and IJN submarines in the Indian Ocean, and July and August 1940 secret British documents about the British Far East Fleet and Far East Situation, and reports that Canton and Palmyra Islands were preparing for war (pp. 14-15). She also notes that station HYPO was tracking Japanese merchant and war ships, and the stations in the Pacific that had DF equipment (Canton and Palmyra are on her list that had DF since 1940 but may have lacked trained operators according to Layton). German raiders in the central Pacific are identified (Orion and Komet) as sinking Allied shipping, and the sinking of HMAS Sydney by Raider G/Schiff 41 (HSK Kormoran on 24 November 1941 is also mentioned. Antares departed with Selfridge from Canton via Palmyra on 26 November and from Palmyra for Pearl Harbor four days later (p. 52) and a sailor in Antares “certainly saw” an IJN submarine following (p. 60). Selfridge, low on fuel, would depart the Task Group at 2015 on 6 December before Antares saw a midget submarine at 0600 outside of Pearl Harbor on 7 December (pp. 61-62). The author next interjects a HYPO alert about a concentration of Japanese submarines in the Marshalls and Rochfort’s priority alert to Op-20-6 resulting in the war warnings of 27 and 28 November. Next, Captain Maddox ordered the sinking of the midget submarine and we learn that thirty IJN fleet submarines were “arrayed in a fan formation” outside the mouth of Pearl Harbor” (pp. 61-62). The deck log of the destroyer USS Ward indicates an exchange of messages with Antares, but the latter’s deck log does not mention this. The Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings vol. 36 (1945) concluded that the minesweeper USS Condor (AMC-14) sighted the periscope of a midget submarine at 0350 and reported this to Ward but the message was not passed along to higher authorities (i.e. Admiral Kimmel). Ribbey writes that “It is difficult determining the exact time to any of these events because they fluctuated between testimony and Deck Logs.” She comments that the 14th Naval District Communications Office kept “several different types of logs,” why were they never presented in evidence?” (pp. 69-70). She concludes that there is missing testimony and missing coded radio messages and states that “ The Imperial Japanese Submarine Force was discovered through sight contact and sound contact by my grandfather Commodore Maddox, ConTrainRon 8 of Task Group 15.2 when he sighted the ocean-cruising Japanese Fleet Submarine following USS Antares from Canton Island through the 5 December sonar contact by destroyer USS Selfridge, then the hostile Japanese midget submarine sighted and ordered sunk by Senior Office Present Afloat (SOPA), Captain Charles H. Maddox, USN on the bridge of Antares that 7 December 1941 dawn” (pp. 70-71). She cites the Antares Log Book for 7 December 0-4 and 4-8 and the locations of the Antares, destroyer Ward, tow-boat Keosanqua, and other vessels through 0930 after the second Japanese attack wave departed. In the next part of the narrative, she draws together information from a variety of sources noting that “the true story needs to be told” (p. 76). These sources include members of the Antares crew whom she interviewed by telephone. Maddox was not promoted to Rear Admiral by Admiral Nimitz on 10 October 1942; he retired in 1946 and died on 23 October 1964. She states that his service record being sent to him was “undeliverable” and had been destroyed by burning on 22 September 1964 by the Officer Records Branch. Ribbey writes that a copy of “Secret Operations Order 13-41” delivered to Maddox by USS Selfridge on 18 November, had been removed from the dossier prior to its transfer to the National Archives and Records Administration files in College Park, Maryland, when she sought the document in October 2019 (p. 37). There is no mention of the Luke-Maddox meeting in Sir Harry Luke’s From a South Seas Diary 1938-1942 (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1945) or in the Antares log (p. 49). This is likely true because British documents were embargoed after the war (and many still are until 2041) and the meeting took place on Luke’s yacht, so no record would have appeared in the Antares log. She also reports (pp. 81-82) that a briefcase containing Pearl Harbor documents and photographs being sent to Ribbey’s home in California had “disappeared from my grandmother’s home in Washington, DC in the early 1970s.” And (p. 95) “Priority despatches from his [Captain Maddox’s] command to Headquarters of the 14th Naval District and CINCPAC, along with files from his career with the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) are missing.” “Huge swaths of other 1941 U.S. and Allied Naval Intelligence files are also still ‘missing’ from archives worldwide ….”(p. 95). As we approach the 81st anniversary of the Pearl Harbor Attack, a new round of publications and inferences about the period leading up to the event and the event itself are being issued. For example, these include recently released documents from Japanese, British, and American archives clarifying that radio silence had not been maintained by the Kido Butai enroute from Hitokappu Bay to the Hawaiian Islands (See James M. D’Angelo in Pearl Harbor Declassified: The Evidence of American Foreknowledge of the Attack (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2021) pp. 78-103). Ribbey claims radio silence was maintained (p. 102). D’Angelo notes that there is missing correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt in late November 1941 (p. 65) but also reports that the JN-25B Japanese code had been broken by the British at Bletchley Park in November 1941 (p. 188). Was this reported to the Americans? Nonetheless, Pam Ribbey has attempted to resurrect and justify her grandfather’s actions in late November and early December 1941. However, the troublesome issues of missing, stolen (?), burned, and destroyed documents during and after World War II, coupled with the November 2018 “avoidable” Woolsey Fire in southern California which destroyed her collection of documents and photographs is lamentable and might have strengthened her case. She does not use the word “conspiracy” in her narrative but her writings lend credence to strange happenings and the evidence presented does not fully convince this reader and raises more questions than answers. Parting observations: There was no “Table of Contents,” “Bibliography,” “Notes,” or “Index.” Your reviewer counted 15 incomplete citations in the narrative text ranging from Edwin T. Layton, with Roger Pineau and John Costello, And I Was There (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985) and Layton’s Papers at the U.S. Naval War College, to the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, and various committee inquiries such as those chaired by Hart, Hewitt, and Clausen. The author utilizes some available archive documents (other documents remain classified) and survivor’s stories about her grandfather, Captain Charles Hamilton Maddox (b. February 23, 1886, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada – d. September 21, 1964, Bethesda, Maryland). No biographical files for Maddox exist at the Naval History and Heritage Command’s “Modern Biographical Files in the Navy Department Library” or U.S. Naval Institute “Oral Histories” (launched in 1969): www.history.navy.mil/research/library/research-guides/modern-biographical-files-ndl.html#M and www.usni.org/press/oral-histories. Ribby’s narrative runs continuously from pages 5 through 106 without chapters, headings, subheadings or other breaks. The “Photos” (both portraits and copies of documents) are not correlated with the narrative. Dr. Kolb is a United States Naval Institute Golden Life Member. Background on the two ships not found in the Ribbey narrative: USS Antares was laid down in July 1918 as the steel-hulled freighter Nedmac, completed one year later, and acquired by the U.S. Navy on 30 November 1940 to be renamed as an Antares-class cargo ship (AG-10). Serving initially in the Atlantic Fleet as target repair and photographic ship, she was reclassified as a general stores issue ship (AKS-3) and transferred to the Pacific Fleet, operating between the West Coast (San Pedro, Mare Island Navy Yard, and San Francisco) and Pearl Harbor and Pacific islands atolls. These included Palmyra Island Naval Air Station (established in August 1941) situated directly south of the Hawaiian Islands, and Canton Island (originally called Kanton Island) located approximately halfway between Hawaii and Fiji, where, beginning in May 1939, Pan American World Airways had developed, a refueling base for their Clippers flying to New Zealand by May 1940. Antares was assigned to the Hawaiian Department, U.S. Army, during the critical program to develop an air ferry route through the southern Pacific to the Philippines that would avoid the Japanese mandated islands of the central Pacific. On 3 November 1941, Antares left Oahu for Canton Island with 308 military (elements of the 804th Engineer Battalion) and civilian personnel, and towing a 500-ton barge with the Battalion’s construction equipment and two smaller barges that foundered en route (for details, see Kathleen Williams’ Development of the South Pacific Air Route, USAAF Historical Studies 45, Army Air Force Historical Office, 1946). USS Selfridge was a Porter-class destroyer laid down in 1933, assigned to Pearl Harbor in 1940, and served as an escort for Antares to and from Palmyra Island arriving at Pearl Harbor berth X-9 only minutes before the Japanese attack. USS Ward (DD-139) was laid down during World War I as a Wickes-class destroyer in 1918 and on 7 December was under the command of Lt. Commander William W. Outerbridge, conducting a precautionary patrol off the entrance to Pearl Harbor when she encountered and sank a Japanese midget submarine. Marine scientists located the wreck of the midget submarine on 28 August 2002 about 3 nmi. (5.5 km) in American waters at a depth of 1,200 ft., verifying that the Ward’s number-three gun crew had hit the conning tower of the Ko-hyoteki-class two-man submarine with one shot and sunk it. USS Condor (AMc-14) was a coastal minesweeper of the United States Navy constructed as the wooden-hulled purse seiner New Example in 1937 then acquired by the U.S. Navy on 28 October 1940, and wan war the entrance to Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December. (For additional details, see several volumes of James Mooney’s Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1969-1991). War Alert in the Tropical Dawn at Pearl. By Pam Ribbey (Washington, D.C.: 2022) The post War Alert in the Tropical Dawn at Pearl first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  10. December 7th is always a good moment to remember that sometimes the world pivots at its own time and place of choosing. View the full article
  11. I lived and worked with Germans for years. In their young years, my children's second language - mostly to help their father shop - was German. I have a great affection for Germany and Germans - but with great affection comes great expectations. I know that my expectations for Germany is not that out of alignment with many Germans, however those Germans and their view of Germany are not presently holding power. As one does with things one values yet does not meet their potential, honest affection requires one to speak up and if needed take action. The final part of the Merkle administration was problematic, but under the present SDP government led by Olaf Scholz - the Cold War socialist and Soviet apologist, Germany's irresponsible stance in the face of European and NATO security requirements cannot go without consequences. The present, "Just do enough in security to look like we're doing something, but not too much..." should be called out for exactly what it is. Germany, even more than France, is the keystone to Europe. Too many nations look to her for leadership culturally, economically, and security. Poland is an emerging leader, but she does not have the population or GDP power to match Germany. Though Germany's present dysfunction is multi-causal, the core of the problem is that the German people chose the wrong leader at the wrong time. We're going to go to Foreign Policy and Politico to demonstrate. The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has an essay in FP's Jan/Feb edition. It is a long and winding apologia, but look at this Salamanderesque quote from Scholz; The world must not let Putin get his way; Russia’s revanchist imperialism must be stopped. The crucial role for Germany at this moment is to step up as one of the main providers of security in Europe by investing in our military, strengthening the European defense industry, beefing up our military presence on NATO’s eastern flank, and training and equipping Ukraine’s armed forces. Germany’s new role will require a new strategic culture, and the national security strategy that my government will adopt a few months from now will reflect this fact. For the last three decades, decisions regarding Germany’s security and the equipment of the country’s armed forces were taken against the backdrop of a Europe at peace. Now, the guiding question will be which threats we and our allies must confront in Europe, most immediately from Russia. These include potential assaults on allied territory, cyberwarfare, and even the remote chance of a nuclear attack, which Putin has not so subtly threatened. The transatlantic partnership is and remains vital to confronting these challenges. U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration deserve praise for building and investing in strong partnerships and alliances across the globe. But a balanced and resilient transatlantic partnership also requires that Germany and Europe play active roles. One of the first decisions that my government made in the aftermath of Russia’s attack on Ukraine was to designate a special fund of approximately $100 billion to better equip our armed forces, the Bundeswehr. We even changed our constitution to set up this fund. This decision marks the starkest change in German security policy since the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955. Our soldiers will receive the political support, materials, and capabilities they need to defend our country and our allies. The goal is a Bundeswehr that we and our allies can rely on. To achieve it, Germany will invest two percent of our gross domestic product in our defense. Sounds good, but it is just cover. Of course, serious nations know 2% is a floor, not a ceiling - but there it is. Earlier this year there was all sorts of talk about boosting spending and getting that floor reached as soon as practical. His words above seem to signal that. Really? From Politico on Monday, Germany on Monday walked back its promise to swiftly raise defense spending to at least 2 percent of its economic output — breaching the key commitment made days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to become a more serious military force. Berlin also sought to play down internal warnings about delays to a flagship procurement of new fighter jets. During a government press conference, Chief Spokesperson Steffen Hebestreit scaled down expectations for Germany’s defense spending, telling journalists that the 2 percent target would be missed not only this year, but also likely next year: “It’s still open whether that [goal] will be achieved” in 2023, Hebestreit said, adding that his “cautious expectation” was that Germany would still meet the target within this legislative period, which ends in 2025. ... The 2 percent pledge had been a key promise of Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech to the German Parliament in February, just days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in which the chancellor said: “We will from now, year after year, invest more than 2 percent of gross domestic product invest in our defense.” This commitment, which is in line with what all members of the NATO military alliance agreed to in 2014, was reiterated by Scholz in an op-ed in Foreign Affairs on Monday — although he no longer said the commitment would be upheld “from now on.” Last month, it had already emerged that Germany will likely miss its 2 percent target in 2023 as the regular defense budget of about €50 billion will slightly shrink by about €300 million. Only a comparably small first tranche of a massive €100 billion special military upgrading fund is expected to be paid out. Scholz is not an honest nor a reliable partner. Besides public shaming, what can be done? As outlined many times, there is Plan Salamander; In NATO, General and Flag Officer billets are distributed amongst nations in a rather complicated way, but this formula is controlled by NATO – and as such – can be changed. Entering argument: take the present formula for “fair distribution” and multiply by .75 any nation that spends 1.5% to 1.99% GDP on defense. Multiply by .5 any nation that spends between 1.25% to 1.499%. Multiply by .25 1.0% to 1.240%. If you fall below 1%, you get nothing and your OF5 (Col./Capt) billets are halved. 1.25x for 2.01%-2.25%. 1.5X for 2.26%-2.75%; 1.75x for 2.76% -3.0%. 2x for +3.01%. The NATO nations facing Russia directly are smaller and poorer than Germany and are all spending - or soon will spend - responsibly. All relationships that are successful and respectful have a common formula; reward positive behavior; punish negative behavior. Going by to Scholz's article in FP, he reminds everyone what is really driving this. Something going back for decades with him and his cohorts; a thinly disguised dislike of NATO and the Anglo-Saxon influence that comes with it. Like their Western Frankish brothers out of Paris, for a thousand years there is a pull on the German people to control Europe. NATO, be design, will prevent that. What won't? The EU; More broadly, the EU must overcome old conflicts and find new solutions. European migration and fiscal policy are cases in point. People will continue to come to Europe, and Europe needs immigrants, so the EU must devise an immigration strategy that is pragmatic and aligns with its values. This means reducing irregular migration and at the same time strengthening legal paths to Europe, in particular for the skilled workers that our labor markets need. On fiscal policy, the union has established a recovery and resilience fund that will also help address the current challenges posed by high energy prices. The union must also do away with selfish blocking tactics in its decision-making processes by eliminating the ability of individual countries to veto certain measures. As the EU expands and becomes a geopolitical actor, quick decision-making will be the key to success. For that reason, Germany has proposed gradually extending the practice of making decisions by majority voting to areas that currently fall under the unanimity rule, such as EU foreign policy and taxation. Europe must also continue to assume greater responsibility for its own security and needs a coordinated and integrated approach to building its defense capabilities. For example, the militaries of EU member states operate too many different weapons systems, which creates practical and economic inefficiencies. To address these problems, the EU must change its internal bureaucratic procedures, which will require courageous political decisions; EU member states, including Germany, will have to alter their national policies and regulations on exporting jointly manufactured military systems. ... NATO is the ultimate guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security, and its strength will only grow with the addition of two prosperous democracies, Finland and Sweden, as members. But NATO is also made stronger when its European members independently take steps toward greater compatibility between their defense structures, within the framework of the EU. Enough of coddling Germany and not rewarding responsible security partners. Time for NATO to at least start to make a point, and make it publicly. View the full article
  12. Building a coherent intellectual foundation of an effective military force to be ready to defend the nation and its interests never ends. As a levee against a large and turbulent river must be constantly monitored, maintained, and reinforced – so too must support for reasoned, reality-based, up-to-date, and sound arguments continue against the constant erosion from doe-eyed “war is new” and sharper “this is my hobby horse” idea/concept sellers looking to grow an empire or to reinforce their world view. For every “New Model Army,” “AirLand Battle” or “War Plan Orange,” there is a “New Look” or “Transformationalism.” Let me just put this marker out there: what we call “Irregular Warfare” is about as “Regular Warfare” as can be. There is nothing “new” here. There is nothing “exciting” here … but there is danger in selling it too hard or worse, bureaucratize the entire concept. Just one example that should be top of mind to everyone. You know the last war that was started based on the concept of “Irregular War” being primary? Someone sold to their political bosses that war would be quick, cheap, and all the hard parts of traditional war could be solved by a few highly trained “irregular” forces? The Russians in February of 2022, that’s who. The “Special Military Operation” that was supposed to be just a few days, lighting quick, transformational. 2014 but with Kyiv/Kiev instead of Crimea. Instead they have a grinding war regressing to the mean; mass, firepower, logistics, manpower. As if the Russo-Ukrainian War isn’t happening, over the last year there has been a big push to sell the military cure-all of “Irregular Warfare.” As we have outlined here often through the years, from riverine to specialized helicopter squadrons, in peace too many short sighted people want to decommission capabilities in the irregular warfare area that we will need again in the next war - like we always do. I do not care if "thought leaders" find them icky, short of sponsorship, or "too specialized" (whatever that means), they will be needed. You can do a job with a good tool well, or with a bad tool poorly - but the job must be done. This failure of vision from the uniformed and civilian leaders in the bureaucracy cannot be solved by growing the bureaucracy, can it? The intentional distraction and sub-optimization of our existing war colleges cannot be fixed by creating yet another, should it? I am sympathetic to a desire to make sure this skillset does not die on the vine – I was there at C5F at 09/11/2001 in the opening months of the Afghan conflict - but we need to be careful about keeping it in the proper context. A solid overview of the challenges is in Sean McFate’s latest in The Hill. Warning here, it reads like two different articles. It starts off in a direction that triggered the first part of my post - McFate is the author of The New Rules of War: How America Can Win--Against Russia, China, and Other Threats, so this is kind of his bag. He also attacks wargaming - something I would think he would want more of, not less. Anyway, the second part that should stand alone has some solid observations on what/where such a a “Functional Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare” should be. It all revolves around Section 1299L of the Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act of 2021.Congress authorized the creation of a “Functional Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare” in Section 1299L of the Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. The center should fill critical gaps between thought leaders, irregular warriors, and international partners. Done well, it will vastly improve our irregular warfighting capabilities and understanding.In some way, I guess this is Congress doing what I've asked it to do - force DOD to do its job - but this is such a blunt tool. It is the law though, so how do you execute it? Let me get the bad part of his article out of the way first;Today’s defense community has forgotten that strategic competition is won through irregular warfare — a dangerous mistake. Taiwan wargamers view ultimate “competition” as conventional warfare, and recreate the Battle of Midway in the Taiwan Straits with Ford-class carriers and F-35s. It proves the saying: “Generals always fight the last war, especially if they won it.” The conflict probably would go nuclear in hours or days, and the gamers’ artificially prolonged conventional war phase is fantasy. I'm sorry, but no. The last 10-months have clearly showed everyone that "prolonged conventional war" is a reality. It is the normal flow of events when major powers or their alliances reach near parity. "The last war" was/is where "irregular warfare" was the reality. When the next war comes, what haunts my mind is a cleverly briefed "72-hr War" turns in to 72-weeks or 72-months. McFate has 180-deg lockoff here.Policymakers are equally misguided. Of the $780 billion defense budget, the Pentagon is overwhelmingly buying conventional war weapons like fighter jets and navy ships while ignoring irregular war capabilities. The budget for U.S. Special Operations Command, which oversees all American special operators everywhere, is 75 percent the cost of an aircraft carrier, and we’re building three at $13.3 billion a ship, with two more planned. Budgets are moral documents because they do not lie. The Defense Department is preparing for a war with China that looks like World War II with better technology, an improbable scenario.Again, I'm not buying what he is selling. All evidence points to the greatest military threat in the short to medium term is from the People's Republic of China. If we are lucky, it will be for us at least a maritime and aerospace war. That is what we need to prepare and invest in. That means "fighter jets and navy ships." Their missions will be supported by properly funded "irregular forces" - not the other way around. Again, "irregular warfare" is subset of "regular warfare." Always has been. Always will be. Now to Part-2 of the article I like;...there are four pitfalls the Irregular Warfare Center (or whatever it will be called) must avoid. First, it should not “reinvent the wheel.” There is a relatively small but robust infrastructure within the Defense Department that already delivers elements of the center’s mission. Yes. Agreed. Improve that. McFate does outline significant dangers of rent-seeking and poor thinking;Second, some think the center should be housed at a civilian university, but this would be a mistake. Most universities eschew the study of war as distasteful, and academic literature is notoriously left-wing. It’s why war colleges exist. Last year, the director of Yale University’s Grand Strategy Program resigned in controversy over her public disdain for Henry Kissinger and teaching Black Lives Matter and “Strategies of U.S. Social Change.” When Yale demurred, she caviled it had succumbed to “donor pressure.” Yale’s Faculty Senate and History Department backed her up, stating professors and programs should never be “under outside surveillance.” Not a good omen for the Defense Department. Additionally, exceedingly few professors specialize in irregular warfare strategy, and there are zero programs dedicated to the topic. Housing the center at a place full of rookies makes no sense. The Defense Department’s desire to leverage academic institutions is principled but unwise.This is correct. However, if he thinks in 2022 that the academic disease has not infected not just our war colleges but also our service academies, he is greatly mistaken. These are not "right wing" institutions, just the opposite. Especially in the last 15-years, in many areas and departments they are fully left-wing - and not very military.Third, to do its job, the center must constantly interact with warfighters, the interagency, and policymakers, and that means Washington, D.C. You cannot influence from afar. The National Defense University might be the optimal choice because it’s located in D.C. and is the Defense Department’s premiere senior service school. It houses five war colleges, three regional centers, and a research arm. It offers an accredited master’s degree in Security Studies and its students are exclusively senior leaders (15+ years of service) from across the military, interagency and allied nations, and all are moving up in their organizations. This is the exact population the center is tasked to influence.Sadly, I believe he is correct here. I say "sadly" because as many here can attest, DC is an abnormal carbuncle on our nation. Its social, intellectual, cultural, and informational stew is out of alignment with the nation it serves. The longer military personnel spend in DC, the more of them become "of" DC and not just "in" DC. It is not a healthy place. I don't like this reality, but I can accept it. Fourth, some in the Pentagon overlook the importance of allies and imagine the center as inherently inward gazing. We are delusional if we think we can “go it alone.” Building partnership capacity is a form of integrated deterrence and mutual strength...In some ways, the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) offers a blueprint for the new center. It’s the U.S. military’s “Irregular War College” and resides at the National Defense University and Fort Bragg, home of the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces. This may be a better idea. Sure would get fewer people and brains being corrupted by DC, and the deer hunting is better if nothing else. Like the DC option, it would give us an opportunity to retool an existing institution. Give me 96-hours and the manning documents for the DC and NC operations, and I might be able to help pay for it out of hide - especially if I had the option of taking some of the paid positions in Newport, Carlisle, and Leavenworth. Some of those academic positions are, how does one say, "sub-optimally aligned with the mission of the Department of Defense." I have a list. View the full article
  13. Now that you’re in that time where you’re trying to make that transition from Thanksgiving to Christmas & New Years saturation … give your stomach and mind a break and join EagleOne and Sal for a maritime and national security free for all this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern. As is usual with our free for all format, the studio line is open for you to call in and the chat room will be running for your questions, observations … or even topics you wish we’d discuss but it seems we never get around to. In the course of the hour we’ll try to at least touch on this week’s warship chicken in San Diego, why everyone should care about secure undersea infrastructure, and take another look at how the logistics failures by the Russians ashore informs planning for logistics planning for a major Pacific war at sea. No guests, no set agenda, just open phones, open minds, and open chat room for those who are with us live Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern. Join us live if you can, but it not, you can get the show later by subscribing to the podcast. If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well. View the full article
  14. You go to war with what you have or what you can quickly patch together, the end result of the decision of others who will not have to fight, not have to command, not have to die. There is no time to what-if. There is no time to complain. There is only time to get underway. Duty. Mission. Training. You have what you have, but it is what you do with it that matters. War is not fair. Your enemy will not wait for you to be ready. Time arrives when it want to.November 1940. America is over a year from joining the war. The Blitz is in its 2nd month. Liverpool has been bombed over 200 times already. German U-Boats rule the North Atlantic. In Halifax, a convoy forms. 37 freighters heading to Britain across a hostile sea. They get one escort.One. A converted merchant ship armed with a few late-19th Century manually aimed 6" guns that could fire - with a well trained crew - about 8-rounds per minute with a range of 14,600 yards. She was the HMS JERVIS BAY, and she had a mission. An extended quote from the HMS JERVIS BAY website, That is 30,000 yards. Who was Krancke? The Skipper of the pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER. SHEER was armed with 11" guns with a range of 39,000 yards and a secondary armament of 5.9" guns with a range of 25,000 yards. The Skipper of the HMS JERVIS BAY, Captain Edward Fegen, VC SGM, Royal Navy, knew this. Let's pick up Chuck Lyons story over at WarfareHistoryNetwork; Of the 254 crewmembers of JERVIS BAY, only 68 survived the battle. The Skipper of JERVIS BAY, 49-yr old Captain Edward Fegen, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross as a result of this action. The Battle of Convoy HX-84 was far from over even after the loss of JERVIS BAY. For that, you'll have to wait for next Friday's FbF. First posted 09NOV2018.View the full article
  15. Life is short, and people are few. That little cornerstone was pointed out to me yesterday when I found out that Raymond Pritchett, AKA "Galrahn" passed away last week. How do you remember a friend and colleague who passes away too early? Everyone has there own way, mine is to tell a story. Here an outline of the Raymond I got to know. I got to know him like most listeners here did - via the maritime natsec online community. Raymond and I used to have fun talking about "the early days" and that is where I'd like to start the story, as in this corner of the world, that is how we got to know Raymond. While everyone is online and communicating via a huge constellation of methods today, the first phase where in addition to many of you, Raymond and I (unknowingly at the time) used to communicate was in Phase-1 of the online navalist community; bulletin boards, forums, and chat rooms. In the early 1990s through the early 2000's that is all there pretty much was. There was a community though, and in some ways it was a better community. Everyone had an online name they went by, that is where Galrahn came from. I ran under a variety of names, but the ethos of that era is where "CDR Salamander" came from. When Raymond and I first met face to face a dozen years ago, we pulled that thread for awhile until we realized we had actually been exchanging ideas for a long time, well before we both started blogging. Yes, blogging. For those who were not there, milblogging in the early years was a surprisingly small space. I started in the summer of 2004 after being inspired by places such as National Review's The Corner and John Donovan's Castle Argghhh!!!. Plus or minus a year from when I started there was a Navy presence in the online discussion space. There was the late Neptunus Lex, Steeljaw Scribe, The Stupid Will Be Punished, Skippy-San, Boston Maggie, EagleOne, and a few others. It was a free wheeling place and we communicated and occasionally collaborated with each other. There was no social media churn like you see today. There was us and our comments sections; that was it. Looking back at it, we all were writing for roughly the same reasons - it was a hobby and we did not care to rely on traditional institutional structures to get our ideas out there - if they would facilitate it at all. We would bounce in to each others comments sections, link to each other's posts ... it was a new place to exchange ideas and discuss topics we did not think were getting discussed properly. That was Phase-2, and right in the juicy middle of Phase-2 was when Raymond came onboard with his blog, "Information Dissemination" (ID) in 2007 and we all started to get to know him. ID started simple, but then quickly grew. ID grew fast and for all the right reasons. Raymond was good, clear, direct. He then brought on other writers who to this day represent some of the best thinking in navalist circles. That is a key part of Raymond's legacy. He knew this wasn't a zero sum game. More voices need space to come forward, to work around the barriers, filters, and warping nature of traditional institutions who dominated the discussion space. His sharp critique and tight arguments are why when you found yourself in disagreement with him, you had to pay attention. At the end of the day, you may remain in disagreement, but Raymond helped you better understand an opposing view, and as such, better refine your oppositional view to his. All without rancor ... if he saw you as an honest player. Bad actors or grifters? He did not suffer them all that well. I spent last night reviewing the ID archives to where he commented on my writings and then in the CDR Salamander archives to where I mentioned his. It had me nodding my head, smiling on occasion, but more than anything else missing that phase. As a sidenote, in 2012 Wired had a nice overview of the rise of ID. We then came to Phase-3; the podcast/social media expansion. A few months after I left active duty in 2009 I started to think about the possibility to take advantage of the growth of bandwidth that might present the opportunity to have a "radio show" without having access to a radio. Audio recordings were nothing new online, but at that time "podcast" was not the term of art or that common. In to the space came our friend Claude Berube who saw the same opportunity and thought that Raymond, EagleOne, and I should have a talk show. I had not thought of doing a group show - and without Claude's push may have never gone solo - but I could think of nothing better than spending an hour with two individuals I've communicated with for years and had the greatest respect for. If you dig in to the Midrats archive's first year, there's "Galrahn" as our third co-host. Of course, life gets busy, and with work and a growing family of young'uns, weekend time became a premium. Raymond had to drop, but we managed to bring him back for an anniversary show in 2016. In 5-weeks we celebrate our 13th anniversary of a show that Raymond helped create. 2016 is roughly where Phase-4 started and Raymond was not "out there" as much as we selfishly wanted him to be, but playing in the maritime natsec space was a hobby. He had a serious job and a big family ... but he was always there if you dropped him a line. That was probably for the best. Phase-4 saw the closing of the Navy's mind in a way. Not a byproduct of, but in sympathy with, the rise of twitter - things started to get nasty. Senior leadership became more distant. PAO's who used to reach out on a regular basis, now were hard to get a word from ... for everyone. The Navy's information ecosystem is a more distracted, paranoid, and toxic environment - right at a time where it needs more ideas, more openness, and smart minds like Raymond's to face the challenges west of Wake. That revival, if it comes, will not have Raymond's help. The last few years, Raymond and I would drop an email, send a DM, or like we did last in March of this year, tweet back and forth to each other - but that was it. We all think we have more time. Of course, he knew he was sick, but I didn't know. I wouldn't think someone almost a decade younger than I am would go so early. None of us in this space knew. I last saw Raymond in person last almost exactly five years ago at NAVYCON One. As in San Diego the previous time, Raymond may not have been a Sailor, but he could hang with them. With an interesting gaggle of folks who many of you would recognize, we haunted the Annapolis pubs until closing. We all had the honor of meeting one of Raymond's daughters who was there I think to keep dad out of trouble. It was five years ago, but I still smile at our conversation and good company. I'll miss him for two reasons; professionally I hoped he would find an opportunity to rejoin the conversation with vigor when work and family would allow; personally I was looking forward to an opportunity once again to spend an evening of good food and good drinks with a good man. If you never met Raymond in person, take time to watch his presentation. I think he'd be honored if you would, a screenshot of it was his twitter profile. This is where I'd like to make a point I've brought up to many in the past. Raymond started ID when he was 32. Didn't even have a Navy background and was always a great person to point to in order to tell people they aren't too young or too inexperienced to be a good thinker and share those ideas. He was on the short list for me to point to whenever the usual suspects would bring credentialism-based barriers in the face of people bringing ideas forward. Look who listened to Raymond - and that defines the man. Ideas and character matter, not your CV. Credentialism: those who care the most about credentials seem to know the least; those who care the least about credentials seem to learn the most. We all learned a lot from Raymond. For those who never got a chance to know Raymond in person, here is what I took away from three occasions covering a half dozen days we broke bread and shared drinks from San Diego to DC; he was funny. He loved, more than anything else, his family; he loved our Navy; he was self-deprecating, to a fault; he was welcomingly direct with his opinions of himself, you, and others; he was rough on those who deserved it, but understanding of everyone else, and exceptionally nice ... with a sly smirk when he decided someone needed to be poked in the rib. He left too early. Selfishly, I wish I knew he was sick - but if he wanted others to know, he would have let us know. He was, in the end, a private man - and I respect that. He left us as we knew him; his own man on his own terms. View the full article
  16. Raymond, We Will Miss YouView the full article
  17. By Staff Historian Dr. Dave Winkler It was an honor back in 2011 to meet Tom Hudner who toured the Cold War Gallery that the Naval Historical Foundation had raised funds for. Ten years earlier the NHF hosted a symposium about the Korean War to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War and the Hudner rescue attempt to save Ens. Jessie Brown was discussed in detail and retired Vice Adm. Gerald Miller stood up in the back of the Navy Memorial theater to state he had been on the bridge of Leyte when radio transmissions of the loss of Brown’s aircraft and Hudner’s subsequent ditching of his aircraft to attempt to extract Brown were received. Miller recalled Leyte’s skipper was furious that Hudner had cost the U.S. Navy an aircraft and opined that he should be court-martialed. However, the task group commander – a rear admiral – countermanded the captain’s recommendation stating “Court-martial – Hell No! I want Hudner put in for a Medal of Honor.” And that lead to the one of the final scenes with the presentation of the medal to Hudner at the White House. A second observation was a movie scene where Brown was asked to do a photo shoot with Life magazine and being pressed about being a black aviator and his responses were not unlike the female naval aviators I met aboard USS Enterprise following their combat operations in Operation Desert Fox in 1999. Apparently when the press arrived in the immediate aftermath of the airstrikes against Iraq the reporters all asked “We want to interview the women.” Both Brown and these pathbreaking female aviators shared the same conviction that they were merely U.S. naval aviators and did not warrant any special attention over their peers. That being said, they understood they had broken some barriers and were most willing to discuss their experience with this combat historian. Their stories have been archived with the Naval History and Heritage Command. The post Two Observations on Devotion first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  18. By Staff Historian Dr. Dave Winkler It was an honor back in 2011 to meet Tom Hudner who toured the Cold War Gallery that the Naval Historical Foundation had raised funds for. Ten years earlier the NHF hosted a symposium about the Korean War to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War and the Hudner rescue attempt to save Ens. Jessie Brown was discussed in detail and retired Vice Adm. Gerald Miller stood up in the back of the Navy Memorial theater to state he had been on the bridge of Leyte when radio transmissions of the loss of Brown’s aircraft and Hudner’s subsequent ditching of his aircraft to attempt to extract Brown were received. Miller recalled Leyte’s skipper was furious that Hudner had cost the U.S. Navy an aircraft and opined that he should be court-martialed. However, the task group commander – a rear admiral – countermanded the captain’s recommendation stating “Court-martial – Hell No! I want Hudner put in for a Medal of Honor.” And that lead to the one of the final scenes with the presentation of the medal to Hudner at the White House. A second observation was a movie scene where Brown was asked to do a photo shoot with Life magazine and being pressed about being a black aviator and his responses were not unlike the female naval aviators I met aboard USS Enterprise following their combat operations in Operation Desert Fox in 1999. Apparently when the press arrived in the immediate aftermath of the airstrikes against Iraq the reporters all asked “We want to interview the women.” Both Brown and these pathbreaking female aviators shared the same conviction that they were merely U.S. naval aviators and did not warrant any special attention over their peers. That being said, they understood they had broken some barriers and were most willing to discuss their experience with this combat historian. Their stories have been archived with the Naval History and Heritage Command. The post Two Observations on Devotion first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  19. By Sean Walsh Last week I was able to watch the new movie Devotion along with three other NHF members. The movie centers around the real-life friendship between Ens. Jesse L. Brown, the first African American naval aviator* and Lt. (JG) Thomas Hudner and is based on the book of the same name by Adam Makos, previously reviewed here. I suspect many of you have seen trailers for Devotion on television and are familiar with the basic story. Prior to seeing the film I also re-read portions of Such Men As These by David Sears, about naval carrier aviation during the Korean War and watched the classic film The Bridges at Toko-ri to get additional background. The movie starts in late 1949 with the first meeting between Brown and Hudner upon Hudner reporting into VF-32 at Naval Air Station Quonset Point and being assigned to fly as Jesse’s wingman due to his relative lack of flying experience despite being senior in rank. One of the surprises to me was despite the times, Jesse’s skill as a pilot was recognized by his seniors and peers although the discrimination he had suffered in the training pipeline is alluded to. Jesse’s wife, Daisy and their young daughter are also introduced here. Another pleasant surprise is that the squadron is shown flying the Grumman F8F Bearcat which is historically accurate. After a short period, the squadron transitions to the F4U Corsair, conducting carrier qualifications on the USS Leyte, an Essex class carrier. Although not discussed in the movie, the reason was due that VF-32 was assigned a primary role of ground attack (their sister fighter squadron in the carrier air group, VF-31, were flying F9F Panthers, a jet aircraft and had the primary fighter role). The challenge of landing the Corsair on a carrier is discussed and depicted. This was before the advent of the angled deck. Again as a surprise, the movie timeline then moves to a Mediterranean deployment by the Leyte including a port visit to the French Rivera and the glamour there including meeting a young Elizabeth Taylor which actually happened. A group of young enlisted Marines are also introduced who VF-32 later fly in support of in Korea. During this deployment the Korean War breaks out and the Leyte is re-deployed to the Western Pacific. At this point the action takes off with exciting flying sequences including AD Skyraiders in addition to the Corsairs conducting strikes. This culminates with VF-32 flying in support of the First Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir, Jesse being hit by ground fire, crash landing and Tom Hudner also crash landing in a futile effort to extract Jesse from his plane before having to leave him. The final sequence shows Hudner receiving the Medal of Honor from President Truman with Daisy in attendance. A closing postscript notes that they remained in touch for the rest of their lives. Comparing the movie to the book, some of the timeline is condensed which is understandable. One event that was contrived was disrespect shown by the young Marines in the Mediterranean and Jesse. The Marines were there but were on a different ship and did not interact with VF-32. What is true was the Jesse’s squadron mates supported him when he was discriminated against. Also not shown in the movie are the Panthers of VF-31 but this is probably due to production limitations. When we left the movie, we compared notes and agreed that the movie was well done both as a story and technically. I would recommend reading the book as well which has much more detail including about Jesse and Tom’s early lives, and the Marines on the ground. This was based on extensive research and interviews with surviving participants and family members. As a final note, it would be easy to dismiss the relationship between the two protagonists as idealized but the detail in the book shows that the friendship as well as the respect shown him by his fellow crew members was genuine. The book details that after his death, the crew of the Leyte took up a collection to fund a scholarship for his daughter and that Tom Hudner contributed an honorarium that he received from his home town to Daisy so that she could complete her education. …* Actually Oscar Holmes would hold the distinction of being the Navy’s first African American pilot, sworn in as an ensign on September 28. 1942. Designated a naval aviator on June 30, 1943, Holmes fair skin tone allowed him to break the racial barrier. “They didn’t ask me and I didn’t tell them,” he would later state. Eventually the race of his parents was noted on his birth certificate but the Navy remained low key as his duties involved ferrying aircraft around the south. He would go on to become the first black air controller for the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The post Devotion – A Sony Pictures Movie first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  20. By Sean Walsh Last week I was able to watch the new movie Devotion along with three other NHF members. The movie centers around the real-life friendship between Ens. Jesse L. Brown, the first African American naval aviator* and Lt. (JG) Thomas Hudner and is based on the book of the same name by Adam Makos, previously reviewed here. I suspect many of you have seen trailers for Devotion on television and are familiar with the basic story. Prior to seeing the film I also re-read portions of Such Men As These by David Sears, about naval carrier aviation during the Korean War and watched the classic film The Bridges at Toko-ri to get additional background. The movie starts in late 1949 with the first meeting between Brown and Hudner upon Hudner reporting into VF-32 at Naval Air Station Quonset Point and being assigned to fly as Jesse’s wingman due to his relative lack of flying experience despite being senior in rank. One of the surprises to me was despite the times, Jesse’s skill as a pilot was recognized by his seniors and peers although the discrimination he had suffered in the training pipeline is alluded to. Jesse’s wife, Daisy and their young daughter are also introduced here. Another pleasant surprise is that the squadron is shown flying the Grumman F8F Bearcat which is historically accurate. After a short period, the squadron transitions to the F4U Corsair, conducting carrier qualifications on the USS Leyte, an Essex class carrier. Although not discussed in the movie, the reason was due that VF-32 was assigned a primary role of ground attack (their sister fighter squadron in the carrier air group, VF-31, were flying F9F Panthers, a jet aircraft and had the primary fighter role). The challenge of landing the Corsair on a carrier is discussed and depicted. This was before the advent of the angled deck. Again as a surprise, the movie timeline then moves to a Mediterranean deployment by the Leyte including a port visit to the French Rivera and the glamour there including meeting a young Elizabeth Taylor which actually happened. A group of young enlisted Marines are also introduced who VF-32 later fly in support of in Korea. During this deployment the Korean War breaks out and the Leyte is re-deployed to the Western Pacific. At this point the action takes off with exciting flying sequences including AD Skyraiders in addition to the Corsairs conducting strikes. This culminates with VF-32 flying in support of the First Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir, Jesse being hit by ground fire, crash landing and Tom Hudner also crash landing in a futile effort to extract Jesse from his plane before having to leave him. The final sequence shows Hudner receiving the Medal of Honor from President Truman with Daisy in attendance. A closing postscript notes that they remained in touch for the rest of their lives. Comparing the movie to the book, some of the timeline is condensed which is understandable. One event that was contrived was disrespect shown by the young Marines in the Mediterranean and Jesse. The Marines were there but were on a different ship and did not interact with VF-32. What is true was the Jesse’s squadron mates supported him when he was discriminated against. Also not shown in the movie are the Panthers of VF-31 but this is probably due to production limitations. When we left the movie, we compared notes and agreed that the movie was well done both as a story and technically. I would recommend reading the book as well which has much more detail including about Jesse and Tom’s early lives, and the Marines on the ground. This was based on extensive research and interviews with surviving participants and family members. As a final note, it would be easy to dismiss the relationship between the two protagonists as idealized but the detail in the book shows that the friendship as well as the respect shown him by his fellow crew members was genuine. The book details that after his death, the crew of the Leyte took up a collection to fund a scholarship for his daughter and that Tom Hudner contributed an honorarium that he received from his home town to Daisy so that she could complete her education. …* Actually Oscar Holmes would hold the distinction of being the Navy’s first African American pilot, sworn in as an ensign on September 28. 1942. Designated a naval aviator on June 30, 1943, Holmes fair skin tone allowed him to break the racial barrier. “They didn’t ask me and I didn’t tell them,” he would later state. Eventually the race of his parents was noted on his birth certificate but the Navy remained low key as his duties involved ferrying aircraft around the south. He would go on to become the first black air controller for the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The post Devotion – A Sony Pictures Movie first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  21. By J. Michael Wenger, Robert J. Cressman, and John F. Di Virgilio, Naval Institute Press (2022) Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb, Ph.D. This is the fourth volume in the Pearl Harbor Tactical Series published by the Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. The previous three volumes are No One Avoided Danger: NAS Kaneohe Bay and the Japanese Attack of 7 December 1941 (2015); This is No Drill: The History of NAS Pearl Harbor and the Japanese Attacks of 7 December 1941 (2018); and They’re Killing My Boys: The History of Hickam Field and the Attacks of 7 December 1941 (2019) previously reviewed by me in 2020: navyhistory.org/2020/12/pearl-harbor-tactical-studies-series/ The first three volumes in the series documented the attacks on the Naval Air Stations at Kane’ohe Bay and Pearl Harbor, and the Army Air Corps field at Hickam. These publications focused on descriptions of actions in the air and on the ground at the deepest practical tactical level, from both the U.S. and Japanese perspectives. The narratives provide histories of each airfield and descriptions of the fields, hangars and buildings, the numbers and types of aircraft present at the time of attack and the resulting damage after the 7 December 1941 attack. This fourth volume is longer and even more detailed than each of its predecessors, and is comprised of 12 chapters (xxi + 337 pages), accompanied by 319 illustrations – primarily black-and-white images – 29 lists or tables, 655 scholarly endnotes, a bibliography with 643 entries, and a detailed 22-page index. A Pitiful, Unholy Mess is a detailed combat narrative focusing on the Japanese attacks on O‘ahu’s Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa Fields. Since these bases comprised O’ahu’s fighter defenses, the Japanese determined that it was essential to neutralize these bases – in particular Wheeler Field – in order to prevent U.S. aircraft from interfering with attacks on the Pacific Fleet anchored in the harbor on a peaceful Sunday morning. Although the loss of life at the three fields was less than that sustained by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the attacks caused devastation and chaos that proved disastrous and helped to bring the United States into World War II. The illustrations include photos from the NHHC [Naval History and Heritage Command] and line drawings and maps especially prepared for this volume. The bibliography (pp. 301-314) is divided into 53 categories, 50 of which are primary sources with 502 citations, and 141 secondary sources, which include books, articles, and Internet resources. The archival sources include U.S. Army Air Force Individual Flight Records at NARA [National Archives and Records Administration], St. Louis, that provided operational details of the pilots’ flights, as well of their military careers. The authors were among the first to research these microfilmed records within months after NARA, St. Louis accessioned them. Other major resources included an array of American documents, reminiscences, interviews, and photographic images. In addition, the authors sought Japanese accounts and photography from the attacks, many of these appearing in print for the first time. For example, information from the reports of the Japanese air groups and the aircraft carrier Shōkaku has never before been used. The authors researched the backgrounds and personalities of key Japanese participants and translated and incorporated Japanese aircrew rosters from the attacks. The authors acknowledge the assistance of Japanese historians and researchers in the United States and Japan. Therefore, the narratives of both sides provide a meticulous understanding of the events at Wheeler, Bellows and Haleiwa Fields that has been impossible to present heretofore. These unique materials were unavailable for the earlier volumes in the Pearl Harbor Tactical Series. The initial chapter documents the development of Wheeler Field located south of Schofield Barracks on O’ahu by men of the U.S. Army beginning in February 1922. The first permanent buildings (hangars for aircraft were also used as barracks, shops, and headquarters) were completed by July 1923 with an NCO club, BOQ officers’ club, machine shop, and fire station soon to follow. In a region of heavy rainfall, the buildings had flat roofs…. The original buildings were demolished 1932-1936 with new construction begun 1939-1941. The first Control Tower was constructed in early 1940 and an underground fueling system with six 50,000 gallon tanks, mess hall, headquarters building, barracks, and aircraft revetments also completed before 7 December 1941; a map illustrates the finished base. The “primitive backwater” had been converted into a desired “ideal spot” to be stationed. The second chapter recounts the development of Bellows and Haleiwa airfields as “satellites” of Wheeler Field on the south coast of O’ahu near Honolulu among “sugar cane and guava bushes” beginning in March 1917. An area of 1,510 acres was purchased from Crown Lands of Kamehameha III and initially served as the Waimanalo Military Reservation gunnery range prior to the Air Corps developing a rest camp and landing field in 1928 with a tent “city” before the permanent construction of a landing strip in 1933 and buildings in 1936, with “no frills” structures built 1939-1941 [still with flat roofs]. A permanent Control Tower was proposed by Lt. Gen. Walter Short on 5 April 1941. The original area at Haleiwa contained a sugar plantation, railway, a tourist hotel, and private airfield and there was no paved runway until 1941 which accommodated three Pursuit Squadrons (45th , 46th , and 47th ) that rotated from Wheeler Field. Chapter 3 focuses on the genealogy of Wheeler Field beginning at the end of the biplane era in 1930. All metal fighters arrived from San Diego in March 1938 when Lt. Col. William Lynd assumed command and Wheeler officially separated from Schofield Barracks by August 1939. Twenty P-36As as pursuit aircraft arrived from Michigan and Virginia via California in September 1939 and the Hawaiian Air Force (HAF) was established in November 1940 with Major General Frederick Martin in command of obsolete P-26 and P-36 aircraft. By February 1941 Admiral Kimmel had taken command of the Pacific Fleet and lamented the inexperience among Army pilots, and shortfalls in men and materiel, but arranged for P-36A and P-40B aircraft from as far as Buffalo, NY to assemble in California and ferried by naval carrier to Wheeler. Army P-36s were brought by USS Enterprise to O’ahu in February and March from NAS San Diego having been flown there from Selfridge Field, MI and Hamilton Field, CA. Brigadier General Davidson assumed command at Wheeler in April 1941and revised the pursuit squadron command structure in October 1941 — the authors suggest “musical chairs” in the modifications. Hence, by December 1941, Wheeler and other airfields had old or obsolete planes, untried pursuit pilots, and new Army and Navy commanders in an interservice battle for air assets (pp. 61-62). Chapter 4: “It Was a Paradise … A Quiet and Peaceful Life.” This chapter describes the airmen who were assigned to Wheeler and Bellows and who represented a “cross section of America’s population.” Individuals who were interviewed described their impressions of barracks and tent cities, the construction of modern quarters, and Hawaii. In addition, famous military and civilian pilots visited the two fields; among them were Australian World War I aviator Sir Charles Kingsford- Smith and the already famous Amelia Earhart Putnam who crashed her Lockheed 10E Electra when a tire failed on takeoff. The annual “Dole Derby” competition of flights from the West Coast to Hawaii with a $25,000 prize was a diversion. Entertainment and morale were also discussed and Schofield Barracks was officially separated from Wheeler on 30 August 1939. Beer gardens, boxing matches, and baseball games were significant diversions and there was widespread gambling, swimming and sunbathing, and “going to town” at Honolulu and Waikiki. Nothing is said about local women as “diversions.” Chapter 5: “A Rather Carefree Lot Who Had to be Kept in Check” characterizes ranks and specialties and the complexities of the multi-engine ships of the 4th Reconnaissance Squadron compared to the single-engine planes of the 46th Pursuit Squadron. The importance of revetment construction and bunkers and duties of defense squads are also documented. Wheeler aircraft were Curtiss P-36 and P-40s (the latter with inadequate armor and armament) and North American O-47s; Bellows also had O-47s (flown by a pilot with an observer-rear gunner). In September 1941 training emphasis shifted from individual pilot training to tactical training in groups of aircraft, and the pace of training accelerated to overcome lax mentality, weak leadership, and “ignorance of Japan’s intentions and timetables” (p. 106). The subsequent essay, “’Concern with Preparing Ourselves, and Come What May’: The Last Weeks of Peace” documents differences in attitudes toward the Japanese as potential adversaries by comparing Germany with Japan. Several “occurrences” took place: Brig. Gen. Howard Davidson (7th Fighter Command in Hawaii) was absent on a trip to the United States from 15 October to 3 December 1941 and left no adequate replacement to conduct training operations. CNO Adm. Harold Stark had devised plans to transfer Marine Aircraft Group 21 to Wake and Midway or, alternatively, send Army planes via Navy aircraft carrier. A 27 November conference of Army and Navy staffs with Admiral Kimmel reached an impasse – no formal record of this meeting was kept (pp. 107-109), although Army pilots practiced takeoffs from Navy carriers. The 27 November “War Warning” from Gen. George C. Marshall was sent without mentioning Hawaii itself. The alert was still in effect on 3 December when Davidson returned and there were delays in returning aircraft to revetments from hangar frontage locations when the alert ended (pp. 113-117). We are also informed that the “movement of aircraft requires substantial preparation.” In Chapter 7 “’The Town was Jumping’: The Last Hours of Peace” the authors provide stories of individual Americans regarding their leaves on Saturday night, 6 December while Japanese airmen were preparing to fly to O’ahu on the morning of 7 December. Actions at NAS Pearl Harbor, Hickam and Wheeler are recounted with the deployments and attacks by dive bombers, high-level bombers, and fighters led by Lieutenant Commander Takakashi, Lieutenant Sakamoto, and Commander Fuchida. The narratives are accompanied by ground plans of the American aircraft locations and detailed maps of the attacks. “’Dear God What Did We Do to Deserve This?’ The First-Wave Attacks at Wheeler” (pp. 133-165) elaborates the attacks and provides comprehensive details including lists of the attack leaders and groups, as well as the names of pilots and radiomen-rear gunners. The designated targets and results of the attacks are also specified. Opinions on the efficacy of the Japanese attacks by the Japanese themselves and by American are reviewed; the former noting efficiency and cost-effective execution of tactics and damage assessments — the latter are combined in one report making separate evaluations difficult. In the evaluations of United States personnel, they observed that the Japanese “lacked discipline in target selections.” Chapter 9: “’Disperse All Your Planes and Fly Fully Loaded with Ammunition’: The First-Wave Attacks at Haleiwa and Bellows” (pp. 167-187) provides an overview of officers and pilots preparing their planes and the well-known actions of 2 nd Lieutenants Welsh and Taylor, as well as lesser knowns: Rogers, and Brown and Dains (the latter two were killed). The unexpected landings of two B-17s (one B-17E and one B-17C) at Bellows flying in from California and avoiding Wheeler and Pearl Harbor are also described. Chapter 10: “’It Was an Awful Looking Situation’: Haleiwa and Wheeler Launch Their Fighters.” Taylor, Welch, and Brown initially flew to Haleiwa in P-40s to receive orders before attacking the Japanese. Many planes from the 18th and 15th Pursuit Groups were destroyed by Sakamoto’s dive bombers which, inadvertently, caused so much smoke that they obscured other potential American targets. Chapter 11: “’Disperse the Flyable Aircraft and Prepare Them for Launch’: Fighter Action over O’ahu” (pp. 196-233) recounts the Japanese Second Attack Wave. Five actions are detailed: 1) Bellows Field (map p. 197) with the Japanese dive bomber tactics documented as are the exploits of Flying Cadets Myers and Whitman, 1st Lieutenant Bishop, and 2nd Lieutenants Welch, Taylor, and Christiansen (the latter died). 2) Barbers Point and Ewa Field were dive bombed but Taylor and Welch also flew here as well. 3) Ka’a’awa radar station was defended by Dains in a P-40B who shot down a bomber; Taylor and Welch landed here for fuel and/or ammunition. 4) Wheeler Field where Taylor and Welch battled bombers and where members of the 89th Coastal Artillery Regiment from Schofield, using BARs, shot down a Japanese aircraft. 5) Kane’ohe Bay (map p. 218) where Army pilots from the 46th Pursuit Squadron (1st Lieutenant Sanders and 2nd Lieutenants Sanders and Rasmussen) conducted dog fights with the Japanese attackers while a sailor with a Browning Automatic Rifle shot down or damaged an enemy plane. Chapter 12: “’Looks Like We’ve Had it for Now’: The Aftermath” (pp. 234-262). Visual Impressions of the damage wheeler sustained depended very much on the vantage point within the base at Wheeler – aircraft wreckage was substantial but not all hangers were damaged – the glass windows and doors suffered substantial destruction. Operational aircraft were relocated as quickly as possible following the attacks. Bellows had much less damage. The chapter focuses on the post-attack searches and patrols with the 86th Observation Squadron of O-47B planes flying out of Bellows and repairs made to less damaged craft – 14 were repaired by the evening of 7 December and 11 more the next day. Hangar aprons were renovated and wreckage bulldozed as the base prepared for a potential invasion. Food was distributed hat evening and the recovery and removal of bodies is also discussed. The “long night” of 7-8 December saw three separate alerts, the circulation of fake and incorrect news, and the unfortunate loss of life as Navy Grumman F4F-A3 fighters flying in from the USS Enterprise that night were attacked by “friendly fire” with two aviators killed at NAS Pearl Harbor on one at Wheeler. The 73rd Pursuit Squadron lost all of its aircraft at Wheeler and its personnel moved to Haleiwa to relieve the 45th Pursuit Squadron, and aircraft collisions at Bellows damaged several planes. A series of significant issues that arose included a shortage of experienced pilots as well as aircraft replacement – one in three planes were serviceable after the raid — and base refurbishing. Damage to Hangars 1 and 3 and the Machine Shop in Building 23 were detailed. Fortunately, the oil tanks at Pearl Harbor had not been attacked. Dependents were evacuated from base housing to safer locations. The authors also detail the beaching of a Japanese midget submarine, the capture of Ensign Sakamaki Kazua (Prisoner of War Number One) and his initial imprisonment. The latter part of the chapter deals with the pros and cons of grudges, conspiracies, and retrospectives as well as thoughts about underestimating Japanese capabilities and feelings about Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans in Hawaii and elsewhere. In addition, they reflect on the deaths of airmen Dains and Brown, condolences, and the reluctance of survivors to discuss the day’s events. This fourth volume in the series is outstanding in terms of detail that describe actions in the air and on the ground at both personal and tactical levels from both American and Japanese perspectives. The compelling narrative employs newly available sources that were not declassified when the first three volumes were published, and were consulted to provide a better in-depth understanding of the conflict as seen at Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa. The images of American and Japanese pilots and the personal accounts of their participation on 7 December 1941, as well as plans of the bases and maps of the attacks newly executed by Di Verglio, add a great deal of context for the general reader as well as for military historians. Collectively the four volumes provide 1,128 pages of narrative coupled with a unique collection of 1,105 images. The authors are to be congratulated for their exhaustive research and clear prose that provides us with the most comprehensive, detailed, and certainly the best illustrated account of the Pearl Harbor air fields, combatants, and the attack yet published. These are essential readings for anyone interested in the attack itself, the Pacific Theater during World War II, and the military strategies, tactics, and outcomes of air power. Dr. Kolb is a United States Naval Institute Golden Life Member Military historian J. Michael Wenger has co-written eleven books, and numerous journal articles, newspaper features, and reviews. His main interest is Japanese carrier aviation and doctrine in World War II. He lives in Raleigh, North Carolina.  Naval historian Robert J. Cressman lives in Silver Spring, Maryland. His The Official Chronology of the United States Navy in World War II received a John Lyman Book Award (1999) and his body of work on U.S. naval aviation history was recognized by the Admiral Arthur W. Radford Award (2008). He is currently editor of the on-line Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Military historian John Di Virgilio lives in Honolulu, Hawaii. He is the author of two groundbreaking articles related to Pearl Harbor and is recognized for his extensive research on Japanese naval ordnance, and for his illustrated Pearl Harbor battleship damage profiles. Book Title. By J. Michael Wenger. (naval Institute Press: 2022) The post “A Pitiful, Unholy Mess”: The History of Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa Fields and the Attacks of 7 December 1941 first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  22. By J. Michael Wenger, Robert J. Cressman, and John F. Di Virgilio, Naval Institute Press (2022) Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb, Ph.D. This is the fourth volume in the Pearl Harbor Tactical Series published by the Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. The previous three volumes are No One Avoided Danger: NAS Kaneohe Bay and the Japanese Attack of 7 December 1941 (2015); This is No Drill: The History of NAS Pearl Harbor and the Japanese Attacks of 7 December 1941 (2018); and They’re Killing My Boys: The History of Hickam Field and the Attacks of 7 December 1941 (2019) previously reviewed by me in 2020: www.navyhistory.org/2020/12/pearl-harbor-tactical-studies-series/ The first three volumes in the series documented the attacks on the Naval Air Stations at Kane’ohe Bay and Pearl Harbor, and the Army Air Corps field at Hickam. These publications focused on descriptions of actions in the air and on the ground at the deepest practical tactical level, from both the U.S. and Japanese perspectives. The narratives provide histories of each airfield and descriptions of the fields, hangars and buildings, the numbers and types of aircraft present at the time of attack and the resulting damage after the 7 December 1941 attack. This fourth volume is longer and even more detailed than each of its predecessors, and is comprised of 12 chapters (xxi + 337 pages), accompanied by 319 illustrations – primarily black-and-white images – 29 lists or tables, 655 scholarly endnotes, a bibliography with 643 entries, and a detailed 22-page index. A Pitiful, Unholy Mess is a detailed combat narrative focusing on the Japanese attacks on O‘ahu’s Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa Fields. Since these bases comprised O’ahu’s fighter defenses, the Japanese determined that it was essential to neutralize these bases – in particular Wheeler Field – in order to prevent U.S. aircraft from interfering with attacks on the Pacific Fleet anchored in the harbor on a peaceful Sunday morning. Although the loss of life at the three fields was less than that sustained by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the attacks caused devastation and chaos that proved disastrous and helped to bring the United States into World War II. The illustrations include photos from the NHHC [Naval History and Heritage Command] and line drawings and maps especially prepared for this volume. The bibliography (pp. 301-314) is divided into 53 categories, 50 of which are primary sources with 502 citations, and 141 secondary sources, which include books, articles, and Internet resources. The archival sources include U.S. Army Air Force Individual Flight Records at NARA [National Archives and Records Administration], St. Louis, that provided operational details of the pilots’ flights, as well of their military careers. The authors were among the first to research these microfilmed records within months after NARA, St. Louis accessioned them. Other major resources included an array of American documents, reminiscences, interviews, and photographic images. In addition, the authors sought Japanese accounts and photography from the attacks, many of these appearing in print for the first time. For example, information from the reports of the Japanese air groups and the aircraft carrier Shōkaku has never before been used. The authors researched the backgrounds and personalities of key Japanese participants and translated and incorporated Japanese aircrew rosters from the attacks. The authors acknowledge the assistance of Japanese historians and researchers in the United States and Japan. Therefore, the narratives of both sides provide a meticulous understanding of the events at Wheeler, Bellows and Haleiwa Fields that has been impossible to present heretofore. These unique materials were unavailable for the earlier volumes in the Pearl Harbor Tactical Series. The initial chapter documents the development of Wheeler Field located south of Schofield Barracks on O’ahu by men of the U.S. Army beginning in February 1922. The first permanent buildings (hangars for aircraft were also used as barracks, shops, and headquarters) were completed by July 1923 with an NCO club, BOQ officers’ club, machine shop, and fire station soon to follow. In a region of heavy rainfall, the buildings had flat roofs…. The original buildings were demolished 1932-1936 with new construction begun 1939-1941. The first Control Tower was constructed in early 1940 and an underground fueling system with six 50,000 gallon tanks, mess hall, headquarters building, barracks, and aircraft revetments also completed before 7 December 1941; a map illustrates the finished base. The “primitive backwater” had been converted into a desired “ideal spot” to be stationed. The second chapter recounts the development of Bellows and Haleiwa airfields as “satellites” of Wheeler Field on the south coast of O’ahu near Honolulu among “sugar cane and guava bushes” beginning in March 1917. An area of 1,510 acres was purchased from Crown Lands of Kamehameha III and initially served as the Waimanalo Military Reservation gunnery range prior to the Air Corps developing a rest camp and landing field in 1928 with a tent “city” before the permanent construction of a landing strip in 1933 and buildings in 1936, with “no frills” structures built 1939-1941 [still with flat roofs]. A permanent Control Tower was proposed by Lt. Gen. Walter Short on 5 April 1941. The original area at Haleiwa contained a sugar plantation, railway, a tourist hotel, and private airfield and there was no paved runway until 1941 which accommodated three Pursuit Squadrons (45th , 46th , and 47th ) that rotated from Wheeler Field. Chapter 3 focuses on the genealogy of Wheeler Field beginning at the end of the biplane era in 1930. All metal fighters arrived from San Diego in March 1938 when Lt. Col. William Lynd assumed command and Wheeler officially separated from Schofield Barracks by August 1939. Twenty P-36As as pursuit aircraft arrived from Michigan and Virginia via California in September 1939 and the Hawaiian Air Force (HAF) was established in November 1940 with Major General Frederick Martin in command of obsolete P-26 and P-36 aircraft. By February 1941 Admiral Kimmel had taken command of the Pacific Fleet and lamented the inexperience among Army pilots, and shortfalls in men and materiel, but arranged for P-36A and P-40B aircraft from as far as Buffalo, NY to assemble in California and ferried by naval carrier to Wheeler. Army P-36s were brought by USS Enterprise to O’ahu in February and March from NAS San Diego having been flown there from Selfridge Field, MI and Hamilton Field, CA. Brigadier General Davidson assumed command at Wheeler in April 1941and revised the pursuit squadron command structure in October 1941 — the authors suggest “musical chairs” in the modifications. Hence, by December 1941, Wheeler and other airfields had old or obsolete planes, untried pursuit pilots, and new Army and Navy commanders in an interservice battle for air assets (pp. 61-62). Chapter 4: “It Was a Paradise … A Quiet and Peaceful Life.” This chapter describes the airmen who were assigned to Wheeler and Bellows and who represented a “cross section of America’s population.” Individuals who were interviewed described their impressions of barracks and tent cities, the construction of modern quarters, and Hawaii. In addition, famous military and civilian pilots visited the two fields; among them were Australian World War I aviator Sir Charles Kingsford- Smith and the already famous Amelia Earhart Putnam who crashed her Lockheed 10E Electra when a tire failed on takeoff. The annual “Dole Derby” competition of flights from the West Coast to Hawaii with a $25,000 prize was a diversion. Entertainment and morale were also discussed and Schofield Barracks was officially separated from Wheeler on 30 August 1939. Beer gardens, boxing matches, and baseball games were significant diversions and there was widespread gambling, swimming and sunbathing, and “going to town” at Honolulu and Waikiki. Nothing is said about local women as “diversions.” Chapter 5: “A Rather Carefree Lot Who Had to be Kept in Check” characterizes ranks and specialties and the complexities of the multi-engine ships of the 4th Reconnaissance Squadron compared to the single-engine planes of the 46th Pursuit Squadron. The importance of revetment construction and bunkers and duties of defense squads are also documented. Wheeler aircraft were Curtiss P-36 and P-40s (the latter with inadequate armor and armament) and North American O-47s; Bellows also had O-47s (flown by a pilot with an observer-rear gunner). In September 1941 training emphasis shifted from individual pilot training to tactical training in groups of aircraft, and the pace of training accelerated to overcome lax mentality, weak leadership, and “ignorance of Japan’s intentions and timetables” (p. 106). The subsequent essay, “’Concern with Preparing Ourselves, and Come What May’: The Last Weeks of Peace” documents differences in attitudes toward the Japanese as potential adversaries by comparing Germany with Japan. Several “occurrences” took place: Brig. Gen. Howard Davidson (7th Fighter Command in Hawaii) was absent on a trip to the United States from 15 October to 3 December 1941 and left no adequate replacement to conduct training operations. CNO Adm. Harold Stark had devised plans to transfer Marine Aircraft Group 21 to Wake and Midway or, alternatively, send Army planes via Navy aircraft carrier. A 27 November conference of Army and Navy staffs with Admiral Kimmel reached an impasse – no formal record of this meeting was kept (pp. 107-109), although Army pilots practiced takeoffs from Navy carriers. The 27 November “War Warning” from Gen. George C. Marshall was sent without mentioning Hawaii itself. The alert was still in effect on 3 December when Davidson returned and there were delays in returning aircraft to revetments from hangar frontage locations when the alert ended (pp. 113-117). We are also informed that the “movement of aircraft requires substantial preparation.” In Chapter 7 “’The Town was Jumping’: The Last Hours of Peace” the authors provide stories of individual Americans regarding their leaves on Saturday night, 6 December while Japanese airmen were preparing to fly to O’ahu on the morning of 7 December. Actions at NAS Pearl Harbor, Hickam and Wheeler are recounted with the deployments and attacks by dive bombers, high-level bombers, and fighters led by Lieutenant Commander Takakashi, Lieutenant Sakamoto, and Commander Fuchida. The narratives are accompanied by ground plans of the American aircraft locations and detailed maps of the attacks. “’Dear God What Did We Do to Deserve This?’ The First-Wave Attacks at Wheeler” (pp. 133-165) elaborates the attacks and provides comprehensive details including lists of the attack leaders and groups, as well as the names of pilots and radiomen-rear gunners. The designated targets and results of the attacks are also specified. Opinions on the efficacy of the Japanese attacks by the Japanese themselves and by American are reviewed; the former noting efficiency and cost-effective execution of tactics and damage assessments — the latter are combined in one report making separate evaluations difficult. In the evaluations of United States personnel, they observed that the Japanese “lacked discipline in target selections.” Chapter 9: “’Disperse All Your Planes and Fly Fully Loaded with Ammunition’: The First-Wave Attacks at Haleiwa and Bellows” (pp. 167-187) provides an overview of officers and pilots preparing their planes and the well-known actions of 2 nd Lieutenants Welsh and Taylor, as well as lesser knowns: Rogers, and Brown and Dains (the latter two were killed). The unexpected landings of two B-17s (one B-17E and one B-17C) at Bellows flying in from California and avoiding Wheeler and Pearl Harbor are also described. Chapter 10: “’It Was an Awful Looking Situation’: Haleiwa and Wheeler Launch Their Fighters.” Taylor, Welch, and Brown initially flew to Haleiwa in P-40s to receive orders before attacking the Japanese. Many planes from the 18th and 15th Pursuit Groups were destroyed by Sakamoto’s dive bombers which, inadvertently, caused so much smoke that they obscured other potential American targets. Chapter 11: “’Disperse the Flyable Aircraft and Prepare Them for Launch’: Fighter Action over O’ahu” (pp. 196-233) recounts the Japanese Second Attack Wave. Five actions are detailed: 1) Bellows Field (map p. 197) with the Japanese dive bomber tactics documented as are the exploits of Flying Cadets Myers and Whitman, 1st Lieutenant Bishop, and 2nd Lieutenants Welch, Taylor, and Christiansen (the latter died). 2) Barbers Point and Ewa Field were dive bombed but Taylor and Welch also flew here as well. 3) Ka’a’awa radar station was defended by Dains in a P-40B who shot down a bomber; Taylor and Welch landed here for fuel and/or ammunition. 4) Wheeler Field where Taylor and Welch battled bombers and where members of the 89th Coastal Artillery Regiment from Schofield, using BARs, shot down a Japanese aircraft. 5) Kane’ohe Bay (map p. 218) where Army pilots from the 46th Pursuit Squadron (1st Lieutenant Sanders and 2nd Lieutenants Sanders and Rasmussen) conducted dog fights with the Japanese attackers while a sailor with a Browning Automatic Rifle shot down or damaged an enemy plane. Chapter 12: “’Looks Like We’ve Had it for Now’: The Aftermath” (pp. 234-262). Visual Impressions of the damage wheeler sustained depended very much on the vantage point within the base at Wheeler – aircraft wreckage was substantial but not all hangers were damaged – the glass windows and doors suffered substantial destruction. Operational aircraft were relocated as quickly as possible following the attacks. Bellows had much less damage. The chapter focuses on the post-attack searches and patrols with the 86th Observation Squadron of O-47B planes flying out of Bellows and repairs made to less damaged craft – 14 were repaired by the evening of 7 December and 11 more the next day. Hangar aprons were renovated and wreckage bulldozed as the base prepared for a potential invasion. Food was distributed hat evening and the recovery and removal of bodies is also discussed. The “long night” of 7-8 December saw three separate alerts, the circulation of fake and incorrect news, and the unfortunate loss of life as Navy Grumman F4F-A3 fighters flying in from the USS Enterprise that night were attacked by “friendly fire” with two aviators killed at NAS Pearl Harbor on one at Wheeler. The 73rd Pursuit Squadron lost all of its aircraft at Wheeler and its personnel moved to Haleiwa to relieve the 45th Pursuit Squadron, and aircraft collisions at Bellows damaged several planes. A series of significant issues that arose included a shortage of experienced pilots as well as aircraft replacement – one in three planes were serviceable after the raid — and base refurbishing. Damage to Hangars 1 and 3 and the Machine Shop in Building 23 were detailed. Fortunately, the oil tanks at Pearl Harbor had not been attacked. Dependents were evacuated from base housing to safer locations. The authors also detail the beaching of a Japanese midget submarine, the capture of Ensign Sakamaki Kazua (Prisoner of War Number One) and his initial imprisonment. The latter part of the chapter deals with the pros and cons of grudges, conspiracies, and retrospectives as well as thoughts about underestimating Japanese capabilities and feelings about Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans in Hawaii and elsewhere. In addition, they reflect on the deaths of airmen Dains and Brown, condolences, and the reluctance of survivors to discuss the day’s events. This fourth volume in the series is outstanding in terms of detail that describe actions in the air and on the ground at both personal and tactical levels from both American and Japanese perspectives. The compelling narrative employs newly available sources that were not declassified when the first three volumes were published, and were consulted to provide a better in-depth understanding of the conflict as seen at Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa. The images of American and Japanese pilots and the personal accounts of their participation on 7 December 1941, as well as plans of the bases and maps of the attacks newly executed by Di Verglio, add a great deal of context for the general reader as well as for military historians. Collectively the four volumes provide 1,128 pages of narrative coupled with a unique collection of 1,105 images. The authors are to be congratulated for their exhaustive research and clear prose that provides us with the most comprehensive, detailed, and certainly the best illustrated account of the Pearl Harbor air fields, combatants, and the attack yet published. These are essential readings for anyone interested in the attack itself, the Pacific Theater during World War II, and the military strategies, tactics, and outcomes of air power. Dr. Kolb is a United States Naval Institute Golden Life Member Military historian J. Michael Wenger has co-written eleven books, and numerous journal articles, newspaper features, and reviews. His main interest is Japanese carrier aviation and doctrine in World War II. He lives in Raleigh, North Carolina.  Naval historian Robert J. Cressman lives in Silver Spring, Maryland. His The Official Chronology of the United States Navy in World War II received a John Lyman Book Award (1999) and his body of work on U.S. naval aviation history was recognized by the Admiral Arthur W. Radford Award (2008). He is currently editor of the on-line Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. Military historian John Di Virgilio lives in Honolulu, Hawaii. He is the author of two groundbreaking articles related to Pearl Harbor and is recognized for his extensive research on Japanese naval ordnance, and for his illustrated Pearl Harbor battleship damage profiles. Book Title. By J. Michael Wenger. (naval Institute Press: 2022) The post “A Pitiful, Unholy Mess”: The History of Wheeler, Bellows, and Haleiwa Fields and the Attacks of 7 December 1941 first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  23. John H. Maurer and Erik Goldstein (editors), Naval Institute Press, (2022). Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb, Ph.D. The editors are well-published senior scholars, well-equipped to undertake the organization and editing of this volume which focuses on the interwar years of two global conflicts. Professor John H. Maurer is the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy and served as the Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Erik Goldstein serves as Professor of International Relations and History Boston University; his research interests include diplomacy, formulation of national diplomatic strategies, the origins and resolution of armed conflict, and negotiation. The Road to Pearl Harbor offers a timely examination of conflicts in the Pacific prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor and provides lessons applicable to understanding contemporary Great Power flash points between Asia and the West. In this book, the editors bring together renowned historians and analysts of grand strategy to illustrate the fateful decisions that culminated in war. The seven contributors take a pragmatic view of the policy and strategy options, as well as the decisions made by the leaders of the great powers. This important history underscores that the choices made by political, military, and naval leaders mattered in determining questions of war and peace. Highlighting Japan’s war against China and the protracted resistance of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime, The Road to Pearl Harbor provides historical context for understanding the political and economic struggles in Asia and decisions for war. The volume provides an important contribution to interwar naval history by examining the views of the Japanese navy’s leaders, who wanted to build up their navy to defeat Britain and the United States at sea. This interwar history is relevant, as the concluding chapter demonstrates in a revealing examination of the current views held by Chinese naval officers about fighting a future war in the Pacific. The volume has an “Introduction,” seven chapters, and a single conflated Bibliography and a valuable Index. “Introduction: Great Power War in Asia: Why Pearl Harbor?” by John H. Maurer and Erik Goldstein. The editors discuss the period between the two world wars and examine the struggle for mastery of Asia that cost the lives of millions by reviewing the decisions made by leaders who directed the actions of the great powers. These key individuals were David Lloyd George of Britain, the uniformed leadership of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), Chiang Kai-shek of China and the Sino-Japanese Wars, Winston Churchill of Great Britain, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) of the United States, and the background of the U.S.-Japanese War beginning with the attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, quickly followed by declarations of war on Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands. Maurer and Goldstein provide a brief characterization of the initial eleven months of “The World in 1941” and events in French Indochina, China from 1937 to 1941 and her military and politics, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and Stalin’s strategic moves, the Japanese advance into southern Indochina and the reactions by America and Britain by issuing embargoes on oil and metals, as well as perspectives from Tokyo, Japanese movements into Manchuria, and American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations. The editors also make a vital point that the connections between Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union and the vital role of China by preventing the Japanese from attacking the Soviet Union was generally unrecognized during the early years of World War II. Chapter 1: “Constructing a Liberal International Order: David Lloyd George, and Peacemaking” by Erik Goldstein. This essay begins with a characterization of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance beginning in 1902 as precursors to the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 where Britain was a true global power and Lloyd George was the only Big Four leader still in office after the World War. He proposed a new international framework which involved a huge British imperial footprint in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia in an attempt to avoid the specter of an arms race with the United States. We are reminded that the IJN was modeled on the Royal Navy (RN) and that this partnership gave Britain important trade benefits in East Asia including British technology and materiel, notably in military equipment and training. Although the United States had rejected Woodrow Wilson’s concept of the League of Nations, she still wished to participate in international cooperation under “friendly” President Harding. Britain relied on the RN for essential protection and desired armaments control. Other attendees at the Conference also sought armaments control and reduction but American Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes outmaneuvered the British in proposing the “ratio scheme” to the Four Powers which gave the British and Americans advantages over France, Japan, and other nations. The 1930 London Naval Conference saw aggressive challenges to the ratios from the Japanese and Anglo-American opposition to the Japanese. The Japanese abrogated the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922 and the Lloyd-George government fell with the subsequent government — in order to diminish military expenditures — failing to follow through on British naval base construction at Singapore and not deploying a fleet there. The Japanese would withdraw from participation in the naval armaments conferences, moved militarily forward in Manchuria, and began a new program of naval armaments during the 1930s. Chapter 2: “Return to Great Power Competition: Imperial Japan’s Rejection of the Washington System” By Peter Mauch. Senior lecturer in modern history in the School of Humanities at the University of Western Sydney, Australia. Mauch begins with a review of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 and the First and Second London Conferences of 1930 and 1935. In September 1933, Japanese Naval Minister Ōsumi Mineo told journalists that the naval arms limitations were never meant to remain “in perpetuity” and that the Japanese were dissatisfied with the 5:5:3 U.S.-British and Japan ratios and demanded change to 5:5:5 at the Second London Naval Conference in 1935 but came away “empty handed.” France and Italy were at rations of 1.75 but the tonnage ratios for cruisers and submarines were diminished as well. The author continues with a detailed examination of the situation as detailed by Stephen Peltz in Race to Pearl Harbor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974) and Sadao Asaso in From Mahan to Pearl Harbor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), and notes that the Japanese had also translated Hector Bywater’s The Great Pacific War (London: Constable, 1926) into Japanese and that it was read widely by IJN officers. Both the right and left wings of Japanese political parties also expressed hostile views to the Western powers and a Japanese Army plot near Mukden, Manchuria sabotaged Japanese railroad track and blamed Chinese soldiers. Propaganda booklets blamed the United States for the deterioration of trans-Pacific affairs and there were major domestic and international public relations effort aimed at revising the current naval arms limitations and proposals that best road for peace was to have Japan lead in Asia, the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and Britain in Europe. An example of Japanese views was published in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1934 written by Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō. Mauch concludes that the public relations campaign waged from 1921 through 1933 rejecting the Washington system was highly successful. Chapter 3: “Tasting Gall: Chiang Kai-shek and China’s War with Japan” by Grant F. Rhode who is a Senior lecturer at Boston University, adjunct professor at the Naval War College and associate in research at the Fairbanks Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. The Three Powers leaders (Chiang, Roosevelt, and Churchill) at the Cairo Conference of November 1943 laid out a post-war settlement that would restore China to a position of wealth and power and was a highlight of the legacy of Chiang (b. 1887) who was to have great failure and great success. Rhode reviews the First Sino-Japanese War (1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), and Chiang’s military training in China and Japan and Chiang being influenced by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Four chronological periods are detailed: 1) Versailles to Manchukuo 1919-31: Topics include the Locarno Pact of 1915, Washington Naval Conference 1921-22, Chinese Communist Party first meeting 1921, First Congress of the Nationalist Party 1924, the 1926 Northern Expedition, and Chiang’s early military career and his ability to unify major parts of China. 2) Manchukuo to Pearl Harbor 1931-41: The issue of the beginning of the Second Sino-Japan War starting in 1937 or in 1937 is covered, including the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931, the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, and the Long March are detailed. The Battle of Shanghai from August to November 1937 displaced 30 million refugees, and the following Nanjing Campaign (or Rape of Nanking) displacing up to 300,000 persons. The Soviet Red Army defeated the Japanese at Nomonhon in 1939 and a Japan-Soviet non-aggression pact followed in April 1941 just after the Tripartite Pact was concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy which meant that China now allies (the United States and Britain) against Japan for the first time. 3) Pearl Harbor to the Japanese Surrender 1941-45: This was an unparalleled opportunity for China and Chiang as the Pearl Harbor attack was followed by the Doolittle Raid on Japan in April 1941 and General Stillwell’s ability to increase military actions against the Japanese in Southeast Asia beyond the Flying Tigers’ air war in China under General Chenault, and Stillwell’s desire for a land war using Chinese troops and the building of the Ledo (Burma) Road beginning in 1943. Japan launched a major counteroffensive in China to disrupt the land road and destroy Allied air bases in eastern China. The Cairo Conference of 1943 may have been Chiang’s finest hour since the following Tehran Conference (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) diminished Chiang’s role in the war. Stillwell was promoted to full general by FDR over both American and Chinese troops (a blow to Chiang) while Japanese failed in their objectives as Nationalist Chinese troops bore the brunt of the action and while Stalinist Mao Zedong’s Communist troops gained strength from 40,000 to over one million troops and prepared for the Civil War of 1945-49. 4) Japanese Surrender to the Death of Chiang 1945-75: The Nationalist armies were depleted by the Japanese and were defeated by the Communists who would establish the Communist Peoples’ Republics of China in April 1949 while the Nationalist were driven to Taiwan. Chiang felt betrayed by FDR and declared martial law in Taiwan and prior to his death in 1975, transfer power to his son Ching-kuo. Mao would die in 1976 but the political die had been cast. In assessing Chiang Kai-shek versus Mao, Rhode believes that very little attention has been paid by Western historians to the backstory and notes the overlap of China’s war with Japan and the Nationalist versus Communist clash which continues in the post-World War II era, and Communist China’s current goals to surpass Japanese leadership in Asia and that China must remain a global power and eschew a second-tier position. Rhode makes a compelling argument and has assembled persuasive evidence. Chapter 4: “Winston Churchill and the Gathering Storm in Asia” by John H. Maurer. In 1939 the British Empire controlled a vast territory in Asia from New Zealand and Australia to Southeast and South Asia to India, and the Middle East with 25% of the world’s population and rich resources. Britain was a superpower in the 20th century in competition with German, Japanese, and United States industry and naval power. In 1941, British weaknesses in Asia were exposed as territories were seized or threatened, and Winston Churchill’s views on international strategy were evolving as Japan’s policies and strategic options changed with December 1941 and early 1942. Maurer provides background on Britain and the emerging threat citing the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) when most of Japan’s warships were British built in Britain. The alliance of Britain and Japan 1902-22 was a period of technology transfer and know-how from Britain to Japan of naval and aviation equipment. As a cruel twist of fate “the student surpassed the teacher.” In World War I and the beginning of II, Britain could concentrate on Germany since Japan was allied (Japanese warships escorted ANZAC troops to the Middle East and conducted operations in the Mediterranean against the Central Powers). In the 1930s, Japan’s military leadership and army and navy grew in strength while the British economy was sluggish during the interwar years and its military and naval budgets were diminished. Churchill downplayed the dangers posed by Japan, as did the isolationist United States, and began to arm “too little and too late.” Germany’s rearmament under Hitler, the Tripartite Pact, the defeat of France, and Lend Lease spurred the hawkish FDR and Churchill to issue the Atlantic Charter, while Germany turned its attention to the invasion of the Soviet Union, which had been successful in battles with the Japanese in 1938-39. Churchill had envisioned four possible scenarios in confronting the Japanese (p. 112-113) so that the attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s declaration against the United States was a relief to Churchill. Maurer outlines Churchill’s four revised priorities for the war in Europe (p. 115) and comments on Churchill’s misjudgment of Japan regarding the unexpected attacks which destroyed four British ships in Southeast Asia: HMS Prince of Wales and cruiser Repulse near Singapore in 10 December 1941, and the cruisers HMS Cornwall and Dorsetshire four months later. Chapter 5: “FDR and America’s Road to War in the Pacific” by Walter A. McDougall. Professor of history, Alloy-Ansin Professor of International Relations, University of Pennsylvania. McDougall reminds readers of Hector Bywater’s 1921 and 1925 books which predicted events in the Pacific including the sneak attack: Sea-power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem (London: Constable, 1921) and The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (London: Constable, 1925). FDR dismissed these forecasts and initially contended that Japan should be trusted. The period between the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) through various meetings and the Washington Naval Conference are recounted, and America’s hypocrisy and the Japanese move to a defensive position are reported. FDR’s isolationist policies of the interwar period continued into the New Deal Congress of 1935-37 and passage of neutrality acts and the expansion of the U.S. fleet while Britain and France did nothing to hinder Hitler’s rise to power and rearmament. The Japanese joined Nazi Germany in the Anti-Cominturn Pact of 1936 and Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937 were viewed as “undeclared war” as FDR shifted to a position of interventionalist because of the “new order” being established in Europe and Asia. Nazi expansion into Austria and Czechoslovakia followed by the Wehrmacht’s invasion into Poland and then the Soviet Union, plus the ability of the United States to read the Japanese diplomatic code (“Purple”) and FDR’s meeting with Churchill resulting in the Atlantic Charter, reshaped Roosevelt’s position from reserved to forceful by July 1941. These events led to Lend Lease and American troops sent to Greenland and Iceland, with other actions at the beginning of the Battle of the Atlantic, none of which provoked Hitler. General MacArthur was sent to the Philippines at the time that General Tojo became the Japanese Prime Minister in October and Admiral Yamamoto was ordered to assemble the Japanese combined fleet for military action that would be at Pearl Harbor. Eleventh hour negotiations were seen as a “waste of time” by both sides as the American Navy lost track of the Japanese carrier forces. Of interest was how a top-secret copy of Rainbow 5 (a 350-page plan detailing American’s strategy for World War II which assumed that the United States was allied with Britain and France and provided for offensive operations by American forces in Europe and Africa) became public. On December 4, 1941, the Chicago Tribune, with the headline “F.D.R.’s War Plans!”, along with The Times Herald of Washington, D.C., published the Rainbow 5 plan; the “leak” was never resolved. These events led to Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into a global war. Chapter 6: “Igniting the U.S.-Japan War, 1941” by Richard B. Frank. A recognized authority on the Asia-Pacific War, Frank discusses the “inexplicable disaster” at Pearl Harbor and the issue that FDR or Churchill, or both, knew in advance of the attack and reviews books published by Anthony Flynn (1945), Charles Beard (1948), Rear Admiral Robert Theobald (1954), and Robert Stennet (1999). This chapter focuses on material derived from Frank’s own Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia Pacific War July 1937-May 1941 (New York: Norton, 2020) the first volume of a trilogy. He states that the Japanese victory at Pearl was not just an American defeat – both tactical and operational – but also a Japanese strategical defeat coupled with American misjudgment and failed communication. He initially sketches to state of the world in 1941 focusing on China and French Indochina with 40-80 million refugees and 7.5 million dead (80% non-combatants) which tied down massive numbers of Japanese troops: 22 divisions in China, 13 in Manchuria, and 2 in Korea. Overall, Japan had 51 divisions and ten were selected for “Southern Operations.” The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor grew from the need to keep the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler and necessitated that the United States not abandon China. He reviews the German deep penetrations into the Soviet Union and their logistical miscalculations and notes that that Stalin ordered Mao Zedong only to provide diversionary attacks against the Japanese to keep China in the war and build up the Communist Chinese Army. Meanwhile the Japanese advanced into Southern Indochina, seized Dutch East Indies petroleum sources and sought ways to extract themselves from the “Chinese quagmire” and determined that they would enter the war against the Soviets only if Germany was able to crush the Soviets on the western front. The American-Japanese negotiations in 1941 pivoted around the China question and that the Japanese desired that the Americans abandoned China and that Japan would withdraw from southern Indochina if the United States restored the flow of petroleum to Japan. Frank contends that historians neglect the link between Hitler and the Soviet’s war and the vital role of China preventing the Japanese from attacking the Soviet Union. Chapter 7: “Chinese Views of Future Warfare in the Indo-Pacific: First Strike and U.S. Forward Bases in Japan” by Toshi Yoshihara. A Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC., the author examines the prospects of war between United States and China from viewpoints of scale, underlying causes, and opening moves utilizing a variety of sources including published Chinese documents and books. The PLA (People’s Liberation Army) is predisposed to deliver the first blow: large-scale strategic raids and long-range strikes. The PLA’s views of U.S. forward bases in Asia (including naval) includes 80 bases in Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. One key base is Yokosuka’s command and control and logistics centers, shipyards, and repair facilities for aircraft carriers, and fuel storage. The PLA’s view on logistics and modern warfare includes the vulnerability of logistic systems, supply concentrations, and lack of stockpiles. Yoshihara notes that China has a holistic view of modern warfare including systematic attacks on enemy systems and command hubs, logistical support systems, and information systems and joint firepower strikes vs. CAISR systems. Six types of surprise attacks include: rapid raids, ambush sneak attacks, long-range raids, sabotage raids, harassment attacks, combinations of “frontal assaults,” and decisive blows and/or multiplier effects. For offensive campaigns the PLA possesses three types of missiles: 1) Land attack medium-range (MRMB), 2) nuclear weapon land attacks and anti-shipping (DF-21C 1588 km range), and 3) land attack cruise missiles (CSS-5 Mod 4 and CH-55C-9 (CJ-10) LAGM l), and attack cruise missiles, CGLCM ground launched cruise missiles, and DF-26 IRBM intermediate missiles. Yoshihara provides a critical assessment of PLA’s threats to American naval bases in Japan, commenting this it is one element of a larger campaign and that retaliation against mainland China would draw in Japan, hence, China is weighing the risks and benefits of a first strike. New technologies and capabilities include hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence. He observes that there is a shrinking battlefield in terms of time and precision. This diverse but cohesive group of papers provides a wider and more detailed context on Pacific and global backgrounds of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which is often characterized as Japan’s motivation driven by its national self-interests, its scarcity of key economic resources, and America’s embargo policy. The authors clearly show that the political, military, and naval decisions made by the leaders of the great powers were often faulty and ill advised. They show that events other than the American perceptions other members of the Washington Naval Treaty, and of 1930s Japanese leaders, notably the Japanese invasion of China and the actions of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist versus Mao Zedong’s Communist armies during the Civil War, helps cause foreign policy dilemmas, and create fluctuating decisions made by Churchill and Roosevelt. The seven papers were not given at a conference or symposium, but it would have been interesting if there was a debate among the contributors. The volume is, indeed, a significant contribution to our understanding of the attack on Pearl Harbor illustrating interrelated issues and problems including Hitler’s attack of the Soviet Union and Chinese perspectives on this and other issues. Dr. Kolb is a United States Naval Institute Golden Life Member John H. Maurer, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Distinguished Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy at the Naval War College.   Erik Goldstein is professor of International Relations and History, Boston University. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. The Road to Pearl Harbor: Great Power War in Asia and the Pacific. By John H. Maurer and Erik Goldstein (editors) (Naval Institute Press: 2022) The post The Road to Pearl Harbor: Great Power War in Asia and the Pacific first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  24. John H. Maurer and Erik Goldstein (editors), Naval Institute Press, (2022). Reviewed by Charles C. Kolb, Ph.D. The editors are well-published senior scholars, well-equipped to undertake the organization and editing of this volume which focuses on the interwar years of two global conflicts. Professor John H. Maurer is the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy and served as the Chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Erik Goldstein serves as Professor of International Relations and History Boston University; his research interests include diplomacy, formulation of national diplomatic strategies, the origins and resolution of armed conflict, and negotiation. The Road to Pearl Harbor offers a timely examination of conflicts in the Pacific prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor and provides lessons applicable to understanding contemporary Great Power flash points between Asia and the West. In this book, the editors bring together renowned historians and analysts of grand strategy to illustrate the fateful decisions that culminated in war. The seven contributors take a pragmatic view of the policy and strategy options, as well as the decisions made by the leaders of the great powers. This important history underscores that the choices made by political, military, and naval leaders mattered in determining questions of war and peace. Highlighting Japan’s war against China and the protracted resistance of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime, The Road to Pearl Harbor provides historical context for understanding the political and economic struggles in Asia and decisions for war. The volume provides an important contribution to interwar naval history by examining the views of the Japanese navy’s leaders, who wanted to build up their navy to defeat Britain and the United States at sea. This interwar history is relevant, as the concluding chapter demonstrates in a revealing examination of the current views held by Chinese naval officers about fighting a future war in the Pacific. The volume has an “Introduction,” seven chapters, and a single conflated Bibliography and a valuable Index. “Introduction: Great Power War in Asia: Why Pearl Harbor?” by John H. Maurer and Erik Goldstein. The editors discuss the period between the two world wars and examine the struggle for mastery of Asia that cost the lives of millions by reviewing the decisions made by leaders who directed the actions of the great powers. These key individuals were David Lloyd George of Britain, the uniformed leadership of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), Chiang Kai-shek of China and the Sino-Japanese Wars, Winston Churchill of Great Britain, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) of the United States, and the background of the U.S.-Japanese War beginning with the attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, quickly followed by declarations of war on Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands. Maurer and Goldstein provide a brief characterization of the initial eleven months of “The World in 1941” and events in French Indochina, China from 1937 to 1941 and her military and politics, the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and Stalin’s strategic moves, the Japanese advance into southern Indochina and the reactions by America and Britain by issuing embargoes on oil and metals, as well as perspectives from Tokyo, Japanese movements into Manchuria, and American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations. The editors also make a vital point that the connections between Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union and the vital role of China by preventing the Japanese from attacking the Soviet Union was generally unrecognized during the early years of World War II. Chapter 1: “Constructing a Liberal International Order: David Lloyd George, and Peacemaking” by Erik Goldstein. This essay begins with a characterization of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance beginning in 1902 as precursors to the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 where Britain was a true global power and Lloyd George was the only Big Four leader still in office after the World War. He proposed a new international framework which involved a huge British imperial footprint in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia in an attempt to avoid the specter of an arms race with the United States. We are reminded that the IJN was modeled on the Royal Navy (RN) and that this partnership gave Britain important trade benefits in East Asia including British technology and materiel, notably in military equipment and training. Although the United States had rejected Woodrow Wilson’s concept of the League of Nations, she still wished to participate in international cooperation under “friendly” President Harding. Britain relied on the RN for essential protection and desired armaments control. Other attendees at the Conference also sought armaments control and reduction but American Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes outmaneuvered the British in proposing the “ratio scheme” to the Four Powers which gave the British and Americans advantages over France, Japan, and other nations. The 1930 London Naval Conference saw aggressive challenges to the ratios from the Japanese and Anglo-American opposition to the Japanese. The Japanese abrogated the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1922 and the Lloyd-George government fell with the subsequent government — in order to diminish military expenditures — failing to follow through on British naval base construction at Singapore and not deploying a fleet there. The Japanese would withdraw from participation in the naval armaments conferences, moved militarily forward in Manchuria, and began a new program of naval armaments during the 1930s. Chapter 2: “Return to Great Power Competition: Imperial Japan’s Rejection of the Washington System” By Peter Mauch. Senior lecturer in modern history in the School of Humanities at the University of Western Sydney, Australia. Mauch begins with a review of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 and the First and Second London Conferences of 1930 and 1935. In September 1933, Japanese Naval Minister Ōsumi Mineo told journalists that the naval arms limitations were never meant to remain “in perpetuity” and that the Japanese were dissatisfied with the 5:5:3 U.S.-British and Japan ratios and demanded change to 5:5:5 at the Second London Naval Conference in 1935 but came away “empty handed.” France and Italy were at rations of 1.75 but the tonnage ratios for cruisers and submarines were diminished as well. The author continues with a detailed examination of the situation as detailed by Stephen Peltz in Race to Pearl Harbor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974) and Sadao Asaso in From Mahan to Pearl Harbor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), and notes that the Japanese had also translated Hector Bywater’s The Great Pacific War (London: Constable, 1926) into Japanese and that it was read widely by IJN officers. Both the right and left wings of Japanese political parties also expressed hostile views to the Western powers and a Japanese Army plot near Mukden, Manchuria sabotaged Japanese railroad track and blamed Chinese soldiers. Propaganda booklets blamed the United States for the deterioration of trans-Pacific affairs and there were major domestic and international public relations effort aimed at revising the current naval arms limitations and proposals that best road for peace was to have Japan lead in Asia, the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and Britain in Europe. An example of Japanese views was published in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1934 written by Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō. Mauch concludes that the public relations campaign waged from 1921 through 1933 rejecting the Washington system was highly successful. Chapter 3: “Tasting Gall: Chiang Kai-shek and China’s War with Japan” by Grant F. Rhode who is a Senior lecturer at Boston University, adjunct professor at the Naval War College and associate in research at the Fairbanks Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. The Three Powers leaders (Chiang, Roosevelt, and Churchill) at the Cairo Conference of November 1943 laid out a post-war settlement that would restore China to a position of wealth and power and was a highlight of the legacy of Chiang (b. 1887) who was to have great failure and great success. Rhode reviews the First Sino-Japanese War (1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), and Chiang’s military training in China and Japan and Chiang being influenced by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Four chronological periods are detailed: 1) Versailles to Manchukuo 1919-31: Topics include the Locarno Pact of 1915, Washington Naval Conference 1921-22, Chinese Communist Party first meeting 1921, First Congress of the Nationalist Party 1924, the 1926 Northern Expedition, and Chiang’s early military career and his ability to unify major parts of China. 2) Manchukuo to Pearl Harbor 1931-41: The issue of the beginning of the Second Sino-Japan War starting in 1937 or in 1937 is covered, including the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931, the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, and the Long March are detailed. The Battle of Shanghai from August to November 1937 displaced 30 million refugees, and the following Nanjing Campaign (or Rape of Nanking) displacing up to 300,000 persons. The Soviet Red Army defeated the Japanese at Nomonhon in 1939 and a Japan-Soviet non-aggression pact followed in April 1941 just after the Tripartite Pact was concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy which meant that China now allies (the United States and Britain) against Japan for the first time. 3) Pearl Harbor to the Japanese Surrender 1941-45: This was an unparalleled opportunity for China and Chiang as the Pearl Harbor attack was followed by the Doolittle Raid on Japan in April 1941 and General Stillwell’s ability to increase military actions against the Japanese in Southeast Asia beyond the Flying Tigers’ air war in China under General Chenault, and Stillwell’s desire for a land war using Chinese troops and the building of the Ledo (Burma) Road beginning in 1943. Japan launched a major counteroffensive in China to disrupt the land road and destroy Allied air bases in eastern China. The Cairo Conference of 1943 may have been Chiang’s finest hour since the following Tehran Conference (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) diminished Chiang’s role in the war. Stillwell was promoted to full general by FDR over both American and Chinese troops (a blow to Chiang) while Japanese failed in their objectives as Nationalist Chinese troops bore the brunt of the action and while Stalinist Mao Zedong’s Communist troops gained strength from 40,000 to over one million troops and prepared for the Civil War of 1945-49. 4) Japanese Surrender to the Death of Chiang 1945-75: The Nationalist armies were depleted by the Japanese and were defeated by the Communists who would establish the Communist Peoples’ Republics of China in April 1949 while the Nationalist were driven to Taiwan. Chiang felt betrayed by FDR and declared martial law in Taiwan and prior to his death in 1975, transfer power to his son Ching-kuo. Mao would die in 1976 but the political die had been cast. In assessing Chiang Kai-shek versus Mao, Rhode believes that very little attention has been paid by Western historians to the backstory and notes the overlap of China’s war with Japan and the Nationalist versus Communist clash which continues in the post-World War II era, and Communist China’s current goals to surpass Japanese leadership in Asia and that China must remain a global power and eschew a second-tier position. Rhode makes a compelling argument and has assembled persuasive evidence. Chapter 4: “Winston Churchill and the Gathering Storm in Asia” by John H. Maurer. In 1939 the British Empire controlled a vast territory in Asia from New Zealand and Australia to Southeast and South Asia to India, and the Middle East with 25% of the world’s population and rich resources. Britain was a superpower in the 20th century in competition with German, Japanese, and United States industry and naval power. In 1941, British weaknesses in Asia were exposed as territories were seized or threatened, and Winston Churchill’s views on international strategy were evolving as Japan’s policies and strategic options changed with December 1941 and early 1942. Maurer provides background on Britain and the emerging threat citing the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) when most of Japan’s warships were British built in Britain. The alliance of Britain and Japan 1902-22 was a period of technology transfer and know-how from Britain to Japan of naval and aviation equipment. As a cruel twist of fate “the student surpassed the teacher.” In World War I and the beginning of II, Britain could concentrate on Germany since Japan was allied (Japanese warships escorted ANZAC troops to the Middle East and conducted operations in the Mediterranean against the Central Powers). In the 1930s, Japan’s military leadership and army and navy grew in strength while the British economy was sluggish during the interwar years and its military and naval budgets were diminished. Churchill downplayed the dangers posed by Japan, as did the isolationist United States, and began to arm “too little and too late.” Germany’s rearmament under Hitler, the Tripartite Pact, the defeat of France, and Lend Lease spurred the hawkish FDR and Churchill to issue the Atlantic Charter, while Germany turned its attention to the invasion of the Soviet Union, which had been successful in battles with the Japanese in 1938-39. Churchill had envisioned four possible scenarios in confronting the Japanese (p. 112-113) so that the attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s declaration against the United States was a relief to Churchill. Maurer outlines Churchill’s four revised priorities for the war in Europe (p. 115) and comments on Churchill’s misjudgment of Japan regarding the unexpected attacks which destroyed four British ships in Southeast Asia: HMS Prince of Wales and cruiser Repulse near Singapore in 10 December 1941, and the cruisers HMS Cornwall and Dorsetshire four months later. Chapter 5: “FDR and America’s Road to War in the Pacific” by Walter A. McDougall. Professor of history, Alloy-Ansin Professor of International Relations, University of Pennsylvania. McDougall reminds readers of Hector Bywater’s 1921 and 1925 books which predicted events in the Pacific including the sneak attack: Sea-power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem (London: Constable, 1921) and The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (London: Constable, 1925). FDR dismissed these forecasts and initially contended that Japan should be trusted. The period between the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) through various meetings and the Washington Naval Conference are recounted, and America’s hypocrisy and the Japanese move to a defensive position are reported. FDR’s isolationist policies of the interwar period continued into the New Deal Congress of 1935-37 and passage of neutrality acts and the expansion of the U.S. fleet while Britain and France did nothing to hinder Hitler’s rise to power and rearmament. The Japanese joined Nazi Germany in the Anti-Cominturn Pact of 1936 and Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937 were viewed as “undeclared war” as FDR shifted to a position of interventionalist because of the “new order” being established in Europe and Asia. Nazi expansion into Austria and Czechoslovakia followed by the Wehrmacht’s invasion into Poland and then the Soviet Union, plus the ability of the United States to read the Japanese diplomatic code (“Purple”) and FDR’s meeting with Churchill resulting in the Atlantic Charter, reshaped Roosevelt’s position from reserved to forceful by July 1941. These events led to Lend Lease and American troops sent to Greenland and Iceland, with other actions at the beginning of the Battle of the Atlantic, none of which provoked Hitler. General MacArthur was sent to the Philippines at the time that General Tojo became the Japanese Prime Minister in October and Admiral Yamamoto was ordered to assemble the Japanese combined fleet for military action that would be at Pearl Harbor. Eleventh hour negotiations were seen as a “waste of time” by both sides as the American Navy lost track of the Japanese carrier forces. Of interest was how a top-secret copy of Rainbow 5 (a 350-page plan detailing American’s strategy for World War II which assumed that the United States was allied with Britain and France and provided for offensive operations by American forces in Europe and Africa) became public. On December 4, 1941, the Chicago Tribune, with the headline “F.D.R.’s War Plans!”, along with The Times Herald of Washington, D.C., published the Rainbow 5 plan; the “leak” was never resolved. These events led to Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into a global war. Chapter 6: “Igniting the U.S.-Japan War, 1941” by Richard B. Frank. A recognized authority on the Asia-Pacific War, Frank discusses the “inexplicable disaster” at Pearl Harbor and the issue that FDR or Churchill, or both, knew in advance of the attack and reviews books published by Anthony Flynn (1945), Charles Beard (1948), Rear Admiral Robert Theobald (1954), and Robert Stennet (1999). This chapter focuses on material derived from Frank’s own Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia Pacific War July 1937-May 1941 (New York: Norton, 2020) the first volume of a trilogy. He states that the Japanese victory at Pearl was not just an American defeat – both tactical and operational – but also a Japanese strategical defeat coupled with American misjudgment and failed communication. He initially sketches to state of the world in 1941 focusing on China and French Indochina with 40-80 million refugees and 7.5 million dead (80% non-combatants) which tied down massive numbers of Japanese troops: 22 divisions in China, 13 in Manchuria, and 2 in Korea. Overall, Japan had 51 divisions and ten were selected for “Southern Operations.” The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor grew from the need to keep the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler and necessitated that the United States not abandon China. He reviews the German deep penetrations into the Soviet Union and their logistical miscalculations and notes that that Stalin ordered Mao Zedong only to provide diversionary attacks against the Japanese to keep China in the war and build up the Communist Chinese Army. Meanwhile the Japanese advanced into Southern Indochina, seized Dutch East Indies petroleum sources and sought ways to extract themselves from the “Chinese quagmire” and determined that they would enter the war against the Soviets only if Germany was able to crush the Soviets on the western front. The American-Japanese negotiations in 1941 pivoted around the China question and that the Japanese desired that the Americans abandoned China and that Japan would withdraw from southern Indochina if the United States restored the flow of petroleum to Japan. Frank contends that historians neglect the link between Hitler and the Soviet’s war and the vital role of China preventing the Japanese from attacking the Soviet Union. Chapter 7: “Chinese Views of Future Warfare in the Indo-Pacific: First Strike and U.S. Forward Bases in Japan” by Toshi Yoshihara. A Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC., the author examines the prospects of war between United States and China from viewpoints of scale, underlying causes, and opening moves utilizing a variety of sources including published Chinese documents and books. The PLA (People’s Liberation Army) is predisposed to deliver the first blow: large-scale strategic raids and long-range strikes. The PLA’s views of U.S. forward bases in Asia (including naval) includes 80 bases in Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. One key base is Yokosuka’s command and control and logistics centers, shipyards, and repair facilities for aircraft carriers, and fuel storage. The PLA’s view on logistics and modern warfare includes the vulnerability of logistic systems, supply concentrations, and lack of stockpiles. Yoshihara notes that China has a holistic view of modern warfare including systematic attacks on enemy systems and command hubs, logistical support systems, and information systems and joint firepower strikes vs. CAISR systems. Six types of surprise attacks include: rapid raids, ambush sneak attacks, long-range raids, sabotage raids, harassment attacks, combinations of “frontal assaults,” and decisive blows and/or multiplier effects. For offensive campaigns the PLA possesses three types of missiles: 1) Land attack medium-range (MRMB), 2) nuclear weapon land attacks and anti-shipping (DF-21C 1588 km range), and 3) land attack cruise missiles (CSS-5 Mod 4 and CH-55C-9 (CJ-10) LAGM l), and attack cruise missiles, CGLCM ground launched cruise missiles, and DF-26 IRBM intermediate missiles. Yoshihara provides a critical assessment of PLA’s threats to American naval bases in Japan, commenting this it is one element of a larger campaign and that retaliation against mainland China would draw in Japan, hence, China is weighing the risks and benefits of a first strike. New technologies and capabilities include hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence. He observes that there is a shrinking battlefield in terms of time and precision. This diverse but cohesive group of papers provides a wider and more detailed context on Pacific and global backgrounds of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which is often characterized as Japan’s motivation driven by its national self-interests, its scarcity of key economic resources, and America’s embargo policy. The authors clearly show that the political, military, and naval decisions made by the leaders of the great powers were often faulty and ill advised. They show that events other than the American perceptions other members of the Washington Naval Treaty, and of 1930s Japanese leaders, notably the Japanese invasion of China and the actions of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist versus Mao Zedong’s Communist armies during the Civil War, helps cause foreign policy dilemmas, and create fluctuating decisions made by Churchill and Roosevelt. The seven papers were not given at a conference or symposium, but it would have been interesting if there was a debate among the contributors. The volume is, indeed, a significant contribution to our understanding of the attack on Pearl Harbor illustrating interrelated issues and problems including Hitler’s attack of the Soviet Union and Chinese perspectives on this and other issues. Dr. Kolb is a United States Naval Institute Golden Life Member John H. Maurer, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Distinguished Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy at the Naval War College.   Erik Goldstein is professor of International Relations and History, Boston University. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. The Road to Pearl Harbor: Great Power War in Asia and the Pacific. By John H. Maurer and Erik Goldstein (editors) (Naval Institute Press: 2022) The post The Road to Pearl Harbor: Great Power War in Asia and the Pacific first appeared on Naval Historical Foundation. View the full article
  25. We started doing the "Long Game" series about the rise of the People's Republic of China to challenge American's place in the world. At the end of that first post in the series in July of 2004, I wrote; Say what you want about the Chinese, they are very focused on their long term strategic needs. They will continue to study the way we do business at sea, and they will make sure they are ready when the call comes. Are we? A lot of folks hear rustling in the woods behind us. There were a lot of us, but few were listening. 18.4 years later, they are now. That is part of the reason it has been since May of this year since I did a Long Game post. I've written a fair bit about the PRC since then, but did not use the "Long Game" tag. Why? Simple, we are here. Over 18 years is a "long time." All but the most compromised see the threat from the PRC and the game is afoot. It is military, economic, and academic - and it is in our face. I still think the tag is helpful in that while the PRC is now ready to call our bluff west of Wake, they are the nation with thousands of years of history, and they have a plan ... we just need to keep an open eye and mind to see it. If you want to get the view from the official organs of the US government towards the PRC, a good place to look would be the recently published review of military and security development in the PRC by the USA's Department of Defense. There is one paragraph early on that I think is the most important; Sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment that the PRC have attempted to acquire include radiation hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, naval and marine technologies, syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, military communication jamming equipment, dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. How will they acquire all this dual use technology? If you are thinking it is Spy-vs-Spy old school espionage, you are only looking at a very small portion of what is going on. You need to look at the very sober fact that they are getting that technology the most efficient way - they are convincing us to give it to them. It starts at our universities and pipelines right in to industry. First of all, let's look at some charts from Statista. Even with the COVID effect, the numbers are staggering. Here's the number of college and university students from China in the United States from academic year 2010/11 to 2020/21 : Note the decline to the USA is not the same as the decline globally. Here's the number of students from China going abroad for study from 2010 to 2020; The numbers here are hard to come by and I would consider the above to be on the high side. SCMP puts the number at 290,086. A 2020 study from Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service have about half those numbers, but the commentary to the study is sound; The results speak to ongoing policy conversations about the risks and benefits of Chinese students enrolled in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs at U.S. universities. These conversations have been hampered by a lack of granular data on the number of enrolled Chinese students by field and degree level. For example, it is currently impossible to calculate the financial impact of Chinese students on the U.S. university system because we do not know how many Chinese graduate students are in master’s programs (and thus likely to pay full tuition) versus Ph.D. programs (for which they often receive university or federal funding). This paper seeks to provide such data and to identify remaining data gaps that should be filled. Because there is no single database of domestic and international students in the United States that includes all the relevant information, analysts have had to produce estimates using several different data sources. These sources often count slightly different things over possibly different periods, complicating the analysis and increasing the risk of inadvertent errors. Our findings differ from widely-cited government estimates. Whereas those estimates suggested that 25 percent of U.S. STEM graduate students and 15 percent of STEM undergraduates are Chinese, we conclude with high confidence that the numbers are 16 percent and 2 percent, respectively. That's right kiddies; one of the nation's top universities that happens to be in our nation's capital with incredible connections to our federal government finds, "..no single database of ...international students in the United States..." In case you were wondering, the number of Americans studying in China in 2020 was 2,481. I can't find out how many are completing a full program of study or just doing a semester ... or what their majors are ... but just look at that delta. From that study, it is clear that they are not in the USA to get Gender Studies degrees. Look at how close the numbers of undergrads and graduate students are. Note that they're all STEM. You cannot classify math. You cannot classify dual-use research. You cannot remove knowledge gained. Just look at those numbers. Look at those fields. Look up-post what areas the PRC wants to advance in. We are making our #1 competitor better, and taking away opportunities for the children of American taxpayers who especially with land grant universities, paid for these universities to exist to serve them. I don't blame the PRC's citizens for wanting to come here to study, for both personal and professional reasons. However, they never really leave their dystopian nation behind; On the bucolic campus of Purdue University in Indiana, deep in America’s heartland and 7,000 miles from his home in China, Zhihao Kong thought he could finally express himself. In a rush of adrenaline last year, the graduate student posted an open letter on a dissident website praising the heroism of the students killed in the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. The blowback, he said, was fast and frightening. His parents called from China, crying. Officers of the Ministry of State Security, the feared civilian spy agency, had warned them about his activism in the United States. “They told us to make you stop or we are all in trouble,” his parents said. Then other Chinese students at Purdue began hounding him, calling him a CIA agent and threatening to report him to the embassy and the MSS. Kong, who goes by the nickname Moody, had already accepted an invitation from an international group of dissidents to speak at a coming online commemoration of the Tiananmen massacre anniversary. Uncertain if he should go through with it, he joined in rehearsals for the event on Zoom. Within days, MSS officers were at his family’s door again. His parents implored him: No public speaking. No rallies. That powerful hook back home isn't just used to keep people under control - but to get them to do further things for the PRC. In August 2015, an electrical engineering student in Chicago sent an email to a Chinese national titled “Midterm test questions.” More than two years later, the email would turn up in an FBI probe in the Southern District of Ohio involving a suspected Chinese intelligence officer who authorities believed was trying to acquire technical information from a defense contractor. Investigators took note. They identified the email’s writer as Ji Chaoqun, a Chinese student who would go on to enlist in the US Army Reserve. His email, they say, had nothing to do with exams. Instead, at the direction of a high-level Chinese intelligence official, Ji allegedly attached background reports on eight US-based individuals who Beijing could target for potential recruitment as spies, according to a federal criminal complaint. The eight – naturalized US citizens originally from Taiwan or China – had worked in science and technology. Seven had worked for or recently retired from US defense contractors. The complaint says all of them were perceived as rich targets for a new form of espionage that China has been aggressively pursuing to win a silent war against the US for information and global influence. It would be one thing if we took an active roll here in the US and other Western nations (like The Netherlands in the link below), but we allow not just PRC police and intelligence services to run free, we allow other students (many the same people) to act as enforcers. 26-year old UG student Meng avoids interacting with Chinese government supporters altogether, if she can. ‘These Pinkies are way too sensitive’, she says, using the nickname for young Chinese Communist Party supporters. ‘They are always very aggressive and feel they represent the side of justice.’ I’m always careful about choosing people to talk to She is also careful when talking to people she doesn’t know well. And when she participated in a protest in Amsterdam this summer, remembering the 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square that cost hundreds of lives and left thousands wounded when the Chinese government opened fire on protesters, she wore a mask and disguised herself in cheap clothes. ‘There were Chinese people there who kept taking pictures of us with their mobile phones’, she remembers. ‘When the protest was over, my companion and I walked to a place where no one was around. We changed our clothes and threw the outfit we had on in a trash bin.’ The FBI is, in theory, on the hunt - but read this from NPR and tell me if you think they are getting all the help they need from universities. "The Chinese intelligence services strategically use every tool at their disposal — including state-owned businesses, students, researchers and ostensibly private companies — to systematically steal information and intellectual property," FBI Director Christopher Wray said at the Council on Foreign Relations in April. Former FBI agents say the bureau's recent visits to universities are merely an extension of long-running efforts to collaborate with the private sector and academia on national security issues. Speaking of dual use, not only are many of the finite number of PhD programs going to foreign nationals - and as this is a zero sum game - and not US citizens; so are the jobs. Chinese and Indian students make up nearly half, and “most stay long after graduation”. “In February 2017, approximately 90% of Chinese nationals and 87% of Indian nationals who completed STEM PhD programmes in the US between 2000 and 2015 were still living in the country, compared to 66% of graduates from other countries,” the report states. "Wait..." you say, "How can they help the PRC's military if they are working for American companies and universities?" Well, its complicated - and made more so by the numbers being so large. It is hard for the FBI to keep track of what the threats are when the pool of candidates are so large and the connections so varied. Heck, the problem people don't even have to be from China; The China Initiative’s most high-profile case has been that of Charles Lieber, the chair of the chemistry department at Harvard and a perennial Nobel Prize candidate, as well as the recipient of more than fifteen million dollars of federal funding, including from the Department of Defense. From 2012 to 2017, Lieber participated in China’s Thousand Talents, the most vaunted talent program; his contract paid him fifty thousand dollars per month, along with generous startup fees to establish a lab in Wuhan. He had, however, neglected to inform Harvard of his double-timing in China, and, when approached by federal investigators, he continued to conceal the arrangement—and the sacks of cash he had smuggled through customs. In December, he was convicted of lying to federal authorities, falsifying tax returns, and failing to report foreign earnings. Some felt that this was just another anti-Chinese expedition; a D.O.D. official testified that the investigation was prompted by the sheer number of Chinese students working in Lieber’s lab. But John Krige, the historian, has noted that Lieber’s contract stipulated that he work on the development of batteries for high-performance electric vehicles, an area of industrial competition. “The academic research community must ask itself if it is morally or politically acceptable to engage in international scientific collaboration with China in fields that can seriously harm the domestic economy,” he wrote. This problem of our own creation is worthy of a few books and won't be solved here - but policy makers have to address: - Too many of the finite numbers of US STEM graduate program seats are being taken up by citizens of the PRC. - These STEM degrees feed the knowledge base for dual-use technology. - PRC nationals working in cutting edge technology jobs received by having been given one of those limited positions make them the target for PRC exploitation. - Even if PRC nationals take nothing material when they go home, they take their education and exposure with them. - For a quarter century, us government and educational institutions have developed close and unequal relationships from entities controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. This should be a non-partisan issue - but an American issue. View the full article

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