CDR Salamander - Too Small U.S. Navy: Cliffs Notes Version - Raw Intel

21 hours ago21 hr

I mentioned @Schizointel’s graphic from last month on the last UNCLAS Read Board Podcast, and it keeps popping into my mind.

Only the paying subscribers get access to the UNCLAS Read Board Podcast, so I thought I’d bring it to the Substack, chat about it a bit, and then perhaps it will get out of my head. Probably not, because it is one of the best representations of a regular topic of ours here: we have too small of a Navy.

It is also a good representation of what it takes to conduct a blockade and deal with the threat of the once-3rd-rate and now-4th-rate-power of Iran and her proxies.

So, here it is.

How many ships do you need? Today, let’s just look at our Aegis ships, specifically our Arleigh Burke DDG.

Everyone has heard me say it before: it takes three to make one.

However, I’ve been counseled by my friend Bryan McGrath that the number is actually higher, five to make one. Let’s compromise between myself and Bryan and let’s call it four to make one.

Yes, there will be math.

What that means is if you want a ship deployed, you have to have three, four, or five ships non-deployed in post-deployment maintenance, training, or other non-deployed duty, depending upon what confession you’re part of. We’re going with the Church of Four.

In the graphic, there are a couple of the last of our Aegis Ticonderoga Class cruisers.

They are not long for this world, and soon will no longer show up in anyone’s Carrier Strike Group. If we need ships deployed—especially in a carrier escort or combat role—we will soon just have Arleigh Burke DDGs. We don’t have any frigates, and those that do arrive in the next decade won’t be able to survive forward well by themselves. Our Littoral Combat Ships aren’t fit for purpose in a hostile environment either. So when you’re going into a hostile environment, we’re down to our Arleigh Burkes.

A lot of us have kept wondering how many DDGs are needed to sustain the present operations against Iran. It is hard to keep a regular tab on who is where, but a variety of sources keep pushing out a number +/- from 17.

When you look at the graphic, from August, that looks like a very good planning number.

For the operations against Iran and her proxies, we are not just talking about ships escorting our carriers. We have to include DDGs in the Eastern Mediterranean defending against ballistic missiles coming down on Israel and Jordan that we’ve seen in the last week. We need a few to manage the ongoing challenges from the Houthis in the Red Sea as well.

I think how many Arleigh Burke class destroyers did we had in mid-August is a good proxy for this blockade against a 4th rate power and her proxies.

The number is 20 if you include the cruisers Smalls and Princeton escorting carriers G.H.W. Bush and Washington.

Lincoln, at least in this graphic, doesn’t have a cruiser with her. So, there’s your new normal.

For just DDGs, we have the Peterson, Ross, Cook, Shoop, John Paul Jones, Milius, McFall, Higgins, Mason, John Finn, Peralta, Delton D. Black, Mustin, Spruance, Murphy.

Gonzalez is alone and unafraid in the Red Sea. The Roosevelt and the Paul Ignatius are showing the flag in the Eastern Mediterranean.

That’s your 18.

Now for math. If the optimist says that three get you one: 18 x 3, gets you to a requirement for 54 DDGs.

For the compromise of four get you one, if it takes four to make one, that’s to 72.

So somewhere between 54 and 72.

And it’s north of there if you are part of the McGrath School of Math.

Guess how many DDGs we have.

We have 75.

So we are tapped out sustaining operations against a 4th rate power.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and her Navy are a first rate threat in a much larger in the Pacific. So we would have a much greater demand for ships.

What if things get furry and we need to sustain operations west of the International Date Line? Just on a normal rotation with no losses?

We can’t send any more against them than we are sending against Iran and her proxies.

Sure, we could surge forces forward for a spell, but you cannot sustain that. No one at the end of 4QFY26 really thinks we will have a short war against the PRC? I hope not.

If we do, we won’t be able to worry about problems in the Middle East, that’s for sure.

NATO?

Again, a note to my European friends. Y’all’ve known for twenty years that there’s been a Plan Salamander.

The Europeans need to be able to take care of their own waters because the USA still has global requirements, a few of which are more important to America than Europe’s recurring tribal bloodlettings.

Should one of them pop up while we’re busy in the Pacific, we’ll help them if they need it, but you won’t get much, and those you do get will be second-rate forces. Think of the Burma Theater in WWII.

Harsh? No. Simple math.

The US Navy is not going to be able to help anyone anywhere else because we just don’t have a large enough Navy. We just need to accept that fact.

As it stands right now, with this blockade—a maritime policing operation if you will—we have minimal to no help by the Europeans, and as we covered last week, they’re not ready for the hardest fight anyway.

They should work on that.

With DDG(X) being put in a drawer with CG(X), Constellation-class FFGs limited to a short run, and FF(X) not ready to close any shore anytime soon…we wi—as the punchline goes—need to build Burkes until the crack of doom…and faster.

The best time to fix this problem was twenty years ago. The second best time is now.

Now, that brings us to the hard math problem, except this time I am not going to do your work for you. I have my answer, and I’ve given it to you quite a few times over the years. You have to either remember it or come up with it yourself. I’ll leave plenty of bread crumbs.

For you Marines out there, don’t worry—I’ll tell the story with pictures.

Assume that we solve the industrial capacity and manpower issues.

There are no magic beans. Robotic and Autonomous Systems are augments to, not replacements for manned warships. At least in the foreseeable future, there is very little “substitution” you can expect to squeeze out of them.

Where will we get the money?

First of all—the 10-year yield has now “renormalized.” It is not ‘high.’ It is simply back to its normal place.