CDR Salamander - What if the TLAM was Combat Ineffective Tomorrow?

Sometimes, history whispers to you during small and medium-sized wars. It won’t force you to listen or even understand, but it is a loud enough whisper that you know it is there. These are not private whispers, only for you. These are understandable by anyone making an effort to hear them.

More often than not, it is not a good-news whisper. No, it is an uncomfortable whisper, an inconvenient whisper, an expensive whisper. You don’t have to think about the implications of this whisper, but other people may.

These whispers from small to medium-sized wars are, on occasion, riddle-strewn prophecy, but more often than not they are clear and direct about what you should expect in the next big war.

The various military actions following the October 7th invasion of Israel by Hamas, and the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022, are thick with lessons.

There is a lot of interesting information from this interview by RBC-Ukraine with Deputy Chief of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, Major General Vadym Skibitskyi.

Yes, yes, yes…consider the source, etc…but what he is saying vibes well with what we’ve seen elsewhere in open source.

His comments about the Russians’ suspension of AS-24 Killjoy (Kinzhal) and the modernized AS-4 Kitchen (Kh-32) production are interesting, as well as the 11,000 Shahed drones-per-month production and the long-awaited Russian Starlink equivalent are interesting, but they are not what got my attention.

Here is the money quote that the U.S. needs to ponder.

The SS-N-27 Sizzler (AKA Kaliber) is a functional equivalent of the U.S. Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile.

They have become so combat ineffective that, even though other missiles are going direct from the factory to launch at Ukraine, the SS-N-27s are being pushed into reserve like so many pre-dreadnoughts in 1914.

I emphasize that for a reason.

The Ukrainians have figured out how to shoot down close to 100% of them before they reach the target. Let’s say that is a bit inflated, and instead put that at 75% for planning purposes.

You can bet your house that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) already has the “how” being looked at by their people.

Why? Simple. They know that U.S. military planning relies in large part on certain planning assumptions about the TLAM.

The U.S. has had decades of exceptional success using TLAM against second-rate to fourth-rate militaries. Like the sun rising in the east, we just assume that it is there. In many ways, we have designed a fleet around it. It is so ubiquitous that it has created almost a monoculture. It is the Cavendish banana of weapons systems…IYKYK.

Did you hear that whisper from the Pontic Steppe?

What if our assumptions about our preferred 1970s-era performance TLAM are dangerously dated?

“They are not really drawing down their stockpiles. Almost everything being used now is coming straight off the production line. The only exception is the Kalibr missiles - most of them are currently being allocated to other Russian fleets, since all new Russian warships and submarines are equipped with these systems. In effect, those missiles are going into reserve stockpiles. In addition, our interception rate for Kalibr missiles is nearly 100% when air-defense missiles are available.”

If by 2030 the PRC has the capability to shoot down 75% of any TLAM that goes feet-dry from Hainan to Shanghai, how would that change our OPLANs? What about 50%? 25%?

At what point does the intercept rate of our TLAM introduce so much volatility into our warplans that the math just does not work anymore.

Then what?

Don’t forget the toolbox metaphor. You need a diverse toolbox, you need variety. You don’t know exactly which tool you will be at the next crisis. You need to have the desire to future-proof your arsenal as a core concept.

The Cult of Efficiency will always push the accountant. Accountants are important, but ensure the warfighter remains in front of them. Keep the supporting-vs-supported relationship sound.

Do you now understand my continual advocacy for Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)? The whisper is just reinforcing what I—and others—have been feeling for years.

Oh, I almost forgot…for over two years, I have been asking us to stop calling CPS, “CPS”. It should be called, “Drakon“.

H/t Rob Lee.

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