CDR Salamander - Calm Yourself on the Drones for a Bit, if You Don't Mind...

After my Monday post about our use of Corsair USV in the attack on the Iranian shipyard/submarine, a very sensible and steady friend sent me a note expressing concern that I was getting a bit too excited. He was concerned that I was joining the gaggle of the drones-uber-alles people. I felt a little insulted that he would think so little of me…but such is the danger of my imperfect writing.

Here’s what I replied to his concerns,

I am not one of these drones-uber-alles fellas. It’s just an evolution of an existing tool that we can put in the toolbox. It’s not a sexy opinion, It’s not popular, but I think it is the reasonable position.

At the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Sean Andrews put together a solid case that I think gets it about spot on.

It is moderate, calm, and broad-scoped. The gods of the maritime combat domain smile:

At sea, drones are disruptive, but they are not decisive. They complicate the maritime fight, but they do not replace the enduring strategic logic of sea power.

Combat in the Black Sea and Persian Gulf demonstrate this.

I think a lot of the excitement about drones—a capability that has been steadily evolving for almost a century at this point, longer if you consider fireships as drones—comes from people too steeped in military fiction and too shallowly read in military history.

There are also a few high-profile types who are selling themselves or chasing clout, but I think they are the minority. A loud minority, but a minority.

There has been a quickening accelerated by the Russo-Ukrainian War. Modern drones have significantly increased their utility due to recent advances in materials and miniaturization of electronics that enable exceptional navigation, control, and automation.

Submarines did not get rid of surface ships. Machine guns did not get rid of infantry. Aircraft did not get rid of…everything else. No, they are just new tools in the toolbox, doubly good if your opponent has not been paying attention and is a few years behind you.

The debate over whether drones will make navies obsolete has become one of the most persistent and most misleading arguments in contemporary strategy. The imagery is seductive: cheap, fast, expendable drones humiliating billion-dollar warships; swarms overwhelming layered defences; small actors imposing strategic paralysis on larger fleets. But the conclusion that navies are entering their twilight is wrong.

Sean sees it the same way.

Drones can damage ships, but they can’t fill the roles of navies. They can harass maritime trade but can’t secure it. They can impose risk, but they can’t project sovereignty, uphold maritime order or provide the diplomatic and constabulary presence that underpins a stable Indo‑Pacific. Sea power has always been a much larger idea than naval power, involving a maritime ecosystem of fleets, infrastructure, industry and geography. Drones disrupt parts of that ecosystem; they do not supplant it.

…

The strategic logic endures. Sea power is not defined by the vulnerability of individual platforms but by the strategic functions that maritime forces perform.

First, navies persist because states require secure maritime trade routes. While drones can disrupt shipping, they cannot guarantee its safety. Second, navies support deterrence and coercive presence. Drone swarms cannot signal resolve, uphold freedom of navigation or reassure partners. Third, navies’ diplomatic and constabulary functions make them instruments of statecraft, not just warfighting machines. Lastly, naval warfare is about campaigns rather than single engagements. Drones may win tactical moments, but unlike maritime forces, they don’t have the level of endurance required to sustain strategic outcomes.

Globally, navies are adapting. From steam to submarines to radar, the history of naval technology has shown that new systems are absorbed, not simply bolted on. The same will be true for drones.

The real shift is conceptual. Navies must operate under conditions of intermittent visibility, persistent surveillance and compressed decision cycles. They must assume that their signatures will be detected and targeted. They must build depth, magazines, repair capacity and industrial surge. And they must generate fleeting, localised windows of superiority rather than relying on continuous dominance.

Policy makers and operators would be smart to check their hot-takes off Sean’s. If you’re too far ahead, dial yourself back a bit. If you’re too far behind, you’re missing the story.

I think he hits the right balance. Though he is writing from an Australian perspective—another middle-power perspective—I think it applies to navies larger and smaller as they look to what role Robotic Autonomous Systems should have now and will evolve to in the future.

…the drone era will come not from choosing between ships and uncrewed systems but from generating a force that can survive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance saturation; sustain itself under fire; and adapt faster than adversaries. Mass, dispersion, industrial depth and maritime logistics – not the drones themselves – will decide who prevails. Drones disrupt, but they do not replace sea power. The future belongs to countries and navies that understand that.

Amen.

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