CDR Salamander - Alas, poor DDG(X)! I knew him, Shipmate; a fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy;

We need to talk about an unpleasant subject.

I briefly mentioned it last week, and talked about it a little on the latest Midrats Podcast, but that is enough fiddling around the topic. Time to man up and address the topic head-on.

I think the DDG(X) program is a dead program walking.

There could be an error, as there was with BBG-1 vs. BBGN-1 in the chart, but let’s look again at the latest Shipbuilding Plan.

There is no DDG(X) in the plan…just Arleigh Burke DDGs being built, as the Salamander says, until the crack of doom.

In the Shipbuilding Plan, it is mentioned only once in this paragraph.

The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG 51) is the most capable surface combatant anywhere at sea, but we have reached the limits of its capacity. Even the planned DDG(X) program made undesirable capability and weapon system compromises. Our Fleet deserves and our national security requires the most comprehensive capability a surface combatant can provide, not just what we can make do with tradeoffs. The nuclear-powered Battleship is designed to provide the Fleet with a significant increase in combat power by longer endurance, higher speed, and accommodating advanced weapon systems required for modern warfare.

Others have picked up on it as well. There is nothing official coming out, but I think it is clear—DDG(X) is going to be the price to get BBGN-1. If the DDG(X) ship look more promising and closer to cutting steel, perhaps it would be saved—but that did not happen.

Remember my three proposed Flights of DDG(X) as a backup to BBGN-1 that I outlined last February? One way to stop that from even being an option is to take the entire class off the table.

That leaves a hole in our fleet design that has to be filled. We don’t even have a “heavy frigate”. The FF(X) is a patrol frigate at best. We need a DDG, so…

To the crack of doom, we shall build Arleigh Burkes. To the crack of doom. There is no other option but to keep producing a ship designed when the Soviet Union was still a threat.

There’s a problem, though. This is what we’re leaving behind.

Via the 2025 GAO Weapon Systems Annual Assessment:

I’ll ignore the fact the image above does not have a main gun—which the last few years have proven its worth … but we are bypassing the ability to “…accommodate future capability growth…sufficient size and power margins…” that even the Flight IIA and III Arleigh Burkes simply can’t accommodate.

Take a peek at the “Shakira Mod” to the USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) Arleigh Burke-class Flight IIA recently taken by the good people at San Diego Webcam.

The Arleigh Burke is now at the muffin-top stage of modification, giving it a dorky look not seen since the Albany Class CG of the middle Cold War era.

But, here we are. Perhaps it is not so much dead as in a medically induced coma? I don’t know, but we once again have proof that our Navy has not had a successful surface ship program after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 came into effect—and all the backwash that came with it.

Arleigh Burke Hull-1 was commissioned on July 4th, 1991, five months before the Soviet Union fell apart and half a decade since Goldwater-Nichols was signed into law, but make no mistake: Goldwater-Nichols had no impact on the design or the program by the time it started displacing water.

Ever since then, with the accretions encumbered acquisition system that our Navy and Pentagon have labored under, we have failed with every new surface combatant program we have tried.

I don’t want to even add up the billions of dollars spent that resulted in nothing useful to the deployed fleet. The opportunity cost is enough to drive an honest man insane.

We may very well see an Arleigh Burke DDG serve until, when, 2065 if we keep building them nine more years? Looks like it.

One must do what one must, but we need to be very sober about what we are looking at. We have lost two, almost three generations of ship design progress simply because we lack the people, leadership, and bureaucracy to build warships. That has a cost. It is a primary indication of a broken institution. Do we know that?

In a few years, will we talk about a cancelled BBGN-1 program too? Then what?

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