CDR Salamander - So, While You Still Have CSAR in Your Scan

The rescue of the pilot and weapons sensor officer from the F-15E Strike Eagle that went down in Iran is—even with the limited information we have right now—an almost-unbelievable act in the history of the profession of arms.

I am looking forward to the details to come out, but let’s let that work its way through the system. That isn’t what I want to focus on today.

As always, let’s first look at the chart.

Initial reports are that this was an “all hands on deck” operation where we sent every service but the Postal Service in to retrieve our last airman on the ground. That was pretty far inland.

We have access to bases in every nation on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, and in Iraq.

It appears at first glance that all the units involved were land-based. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and other USAF units sure were.

When you get into any discussion of Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), with the usual suspects you get a lot of “Joint” that gets folded into the discussion. That is great and good, but, here’s the problem. Geography is not a”Joint” solution.

Look at that map again. The Persian Gulf is almost an inland sea. The ranges are short, and the shore options are many.

Look again across the Persian Gulf from Iran and all the bases we have, in depth, a short flight to the south/southwest.

Now, shift your view to the rest of the world, especially the Pacific. The below is a to-scale map of Iran rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise and placed along the coast of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) across from Taiwan.

As we reviewed last week, the PRC has 15X the population on almost 6X the land mass and she has a first-rate military. Any Great Pacific War that starts with (and let’s not kid ourselves, it will not be limited to) Taiwan, there will be MANY more strikes ashore against a much better capitalized and numerous military. Additionally, as this is an advantage of aircraft carriers, our aircraft from the sea can come from any axis from Hainan Island to the Yellow Sea.

So, where will our USAF-led “Joint” CSAR efforts be based within range of U.S. Navy ingress and egress routes to and from targets?

Yes, yes, yes…we will start the war with standoff weapons, but I hope everyone is aligned with ‘Ole Sal now that by D+30, that bolt will be shot. We will have to get up close and personal. As no one will entertain my Three Gorges Dam COA until the war will have gone on too long, we will have a lot of USN pilots and naval flight officers needing rescue at sea and ashore.

What has Big Navy done to prepare for this?

In the Korean War, with a much smaller coastline, the data are hard to come by, but the USN had dedicated CSAR units, as did the USAF.

Then LT. Robert L. Dolton, USNR (he received a Distinguished Flying Cross for a CSAR he conducted) gave some solid information in 1952. Via the Naval Helicopter Association.

Pretty inspirational stories…even make good works of fiction.

I think it is safe to say that in any Great Pacific War against the PRC, we will not have the luxury of having our warships close to shore as we did in the Korean War. Take out the plane guard mission, that leaves 198 CSAR missions, 64 of them ashore, the rest at sea.

Use whatever metric you wish for a conflict against the PRC in the next decade or so to upscale that number, but who exactly will retrieve those airmen who are not in close enough proximity for “Joint” CSAR assets based <looks again at the chart> where again, exactly?

The record of USN rotary-wing CSAR in the Vietnam War is even more extensive.

Yes, yes, yes, we have multi-purpose helicopter squadrons based on all sorts of warships and auxiliaries…but are they trained to conduct CSAR in a non-permissive environment?

This stands as a great disgrace that, when this need arises, will become a national scandal that will be the mirror image of the feeling of national greatness we feel right now after the successful CSAR in Iran.

It is not a new concern. No. Back in 1984, while on staff at the Naval War College the late Captain Wade J. Pharis, USN, directed then LCDR Kerry J. Sullivan, USN to write the often referenced paper, Navy Combat Rescue: The Forsaken Mission. Of note, sixteen years and even more experience in military and civilian rescue operations, he wrote, A pilot’s guide to rescue: Getting help when you need it, but I digress. Let’s get back to now.

In one of the most blinkered, myopic, and rage-inducing acts of accountancy of the last decade, we decommissioned the last USN reservoir of rotary-wing special operations expertise kept in the USNR as embodied in HSC-85. At a time when everything in the real world demonstrated we should be expanding this capability in our Navy, instead we killed the remnant.

As we know about, without our helo-capable ships getting close to shore, we will not have enough helicopters within range to rescue enough people. A solution exists right now in the Japanese US-2, but in spite of appreciating the platform and the problem it solves, we still dither and make excuses. Excuses that won’t work when American airmen are abandoned to exposure and a myriad of possible nightmarish deaths that can come from being lost at sea.

So, as you start this week, all I ask is for you to ponder the above. Are we—and by we I mean the US Navy—really prepared to follow through with the “leave no man behind” statement we have been bragging about over the weekend.

If you in any way respond with the word “Joint” in your reply—then find another area of interest in which to invest your time. You are part of the problem, not the solution.

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