CDR Salamander - So, We Have a National Defense Strategy

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As we discussed in the opening of last Sunday’s Midrats Podcast, I really have no idea why we keep publishing significant national security related documents on Fridays…but it is what it is.

As it has been four days, there has already been more than a few opinion pieces written about it and to be blunt, a lot of it is a bunch of hot garbage.

Even though I think everyone should agree with me, and one day you will, I would ask—after reading the rest of this post—that you read the National Defense Strategy yourself. It isn’t that long, and if you’ve already read the National Security Strategy we reviewed in the fall, nothing will be shocking.

Let’s start with one of my favorite things to do with policy documents…word counts and clouds.

Mentions:

• America/Americans: 92

• Allies and Partners: 31

• Homeland: 28

• China: 24

• Europe: 19

• Indo-Pacific/Pacific: 18

• Terror/ist/ism: 18

• NATO: 15

• Korea: 15

• Russia: 15

• Iran: 13

• Narco-terrorists/narcotics: 12

• Western Hemisphere: 11

• Israel: 10

• Economy/ics: 9

• Islam: 6

• Greenland: 5

• Canada: 3

• Japan: 2

• Africa: 2

• South America: 2

• Arctic: 2

• North America: 1

• Mexico: 1

• Germany: 1

• France: 1

• Eurasia: 1

• Asia: 0

• United Kingdom/Britain: 0

• India: 0

• Climate: 0

If you can work with meta tools like word counts/clouds, you’re already ahead of the game and will not be all that surprised at my commentary.

For those who are not fans of word counts/clouds, let’s dive in, shall we?

Like I did on Sunday, I will get my major critique out of the way. There is a fair bit in this document, especially in the introduction, that seems a bit too much like the 2024 political campaign. For those who may not be fans of the present admin who are still national security professionals who will try to dive into the document but will bail early or can’t focus because of the injection of domestic political positioning. This isn’t the first administration to do this, and I understand why some would want to drive the point home, but it wouldn’t have survived my edit. Diplomatic? No. On brand? Yes.

Enough of that, let’s get to the substance.

As a recidivist staff weenie and operational planner, I really liked the early and sustained alignment with Higher Direction and Guidance and Commander’s Intent. If you read the National Security Strategy, then really…nothing shocking is here.

… the Department will prioritize the most important, consequential, and dangerous threats to Americans’ interests.

…We will defend the Homeland and ensure that our interests in the Western Hemisphere are protected. We will deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation. We will increase burden-sharing with allies and partners around the world. And we will rebuild the U.S. defense industrial base as part of the President’s once-in-a-century revival of American industry.

You could almost stop here. This is repeated over and over and over…as a good document should.

One part of the looking back that I don’t consider too much of an echo of the 2024 campaign can be found in a diagnosis of how we got to the point the administration feels such a need for firm and clear realignment. I think the diagnosis of the last few decades is roughly correct—and is bipartisan in its critique.

America emerged from the Cold War as the world’s most powerful nation by a wide margin. We were secure in our hemisphere, with a military that was focused on warfighting and far superior to anyone else’s, engaged allies, and powerful industry. But rather than husband and cultivate these hard-earned advantages, our nation’s post–Cold War leadership and foreign policy establishment squandered them.

Rather than protect and advance Americans’ interests, they opened our borders, forgot the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine, ceded influence in our hemisphere, and outsourced America’s industry, including the defense industrial base (DIB) upon which our forces rely. They sent America’s brave sons and daughters to fight war after rudderless war to topple regimes and nation-build halfway around the world, in doing so eroding our military’s readiness and delaying modernization. They condemned our warfighters, criticizing and neglecting the warrior ethos that was once cultivated and heralded by our forerunners—and that made this American military the envy of the world. They allowed, even enabled, our cunning adversries to grow more powerful, even as they encouraged our allies to behave as dependents rather than partners, weakening our alliances and leaving us more vulnerable.

You have to get to page 16 to see a more concise summary of the framework that was covered before…but that’s OK. This is the main takeaway.

The Department’s strategic approach rests on the following key lines of effort (LOEs):

1. Defend the U.S. Homeland

2. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation

3. Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners

4. Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

There is a lot of detail here, but I will only pull out a few bits—but I would like to make this point here clear as possible.

If you are reading critiques from people saying the NDS is an abandonment of NATO, or makes nice-nice with China, or that the U.S. is retreating from the world—note those authors. They are either:

• Bad-faith actors in the pay of the West’s enemies.

• Useful idiots of the first group.

• Mindless partisans who will oppose anything not just from the Trump Administration, but from any Republican administration.

• Step-and-fetch-it writers who will do the bidding of their editors—editors usually in the first three groups—even if it were slanderous against their wife.

• Just lazy writers who either don’t have a desire to read or can’t get past some of the distractions I mentioned in my critique.

I can make the argument—but I won’t as the NDS does it for me—that if anything this is a very pro “allies and partners” NDS, and has a clear-eyed and realistic view of China and the Pacific.

Let’s start with the allies and partners.

Ours is not a strategy of isolation. As the NSS directs, it is one of focused engagement abroad with a clear eye toward advancing the concrete, practical interests of Americans. Through this America First, commonsense lens, America’s alliances and partners have an essential role to play—but not as the dependencies of the last generation. Rather, as the Department rightly prioritizes Homeland defense and deterring China, other threats will persist, and our allies will be essential to dealing with all of them. Our allies will do so not as a favor to us, but out of their own interests. In the Indo-Pacific, where our allies share our desire for a free and open regional order, allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing China. In Europe and other theaters, allies will take the lead against threats that are less severe for us but more so for them, with critical but more limited support from the United States.

Of course I like the above, as it aligns with the two-decades-old Plan Salamander that, while pulling back a lot from Europe, is Pro-U.S., pro-NATO, and focused on the Long Game with the People’s Republic of China.

In line with the above, this clarification of the 5% of GDP on defense is very helpful.

…a new global standard for defense spending at NATO’s Hague Summit—3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on core military spending and an additional 1.5% on security-related spending, for a total of 5% of GDP. We will advocate that our allies and partners meet this standard around the world, not just in Europe.

Australia and Japan, call your office.

The defense base discussion is the base of everything else.

…this Strategy will enable the Joint Force to provide President Trump with the operational flexibility and agility required for other objectives, especially the ability to launch decisive operations against targets anywhere—including directly from the U.S. Homeland…

…

This requires being clear-eyed about the threats that we face, as well as the resources available to both us and our allies to confront them. It requires prioritizing what matters most for Americans and where the gravest and most consequential threats to their interests lie. It requires being honest and clear with our allies and partners that they simply must do more rapidly, not as a favor to Americans but for their own interests. This will entail a sharp shift—in approach, focus, and tone. But that is what is needed to shift away from the legacy course headed for disaster and toward making America great again. It is also the one that will set the conditions for lasting peace not only at home but abroad—in other words, a better outcome not only for Americans but also for our allies and partners. Out with utopian idealism; in with hardnosed realism. That is the mission we at DoW must embrace—boldly, actively, and without hesitation.

Are you seeing, “allies and partners” over and over again? Good. Let’s put to rest the arguments otherwise.

At its heart, as the NSS lays out, an America First strategy must evaluate, sort, and prioritize. It must practically correlate ends, ways, and means in a realistic fashion.

Isn’t that what all national security professional and concerned citizens want their NSS to do?

For our friends overseas who are put off by the #1 priority, here’s why.

In recent decades, our nation has been overwhelmed by a flood of illegal aliens. At the same time, narcotics have poured across our borders, poisoning hundreds of thousands of Americans. Narcotics traffickers in our hemisphere have profited enormously off this evil and are rightly designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs)…

More direct military threats to the American Homeland have also grown in recent years, including nuclear threats as well as a variety of conventional strike and space, cyber, electromagnetic warfare capabilities. At the same time, although the United States has severely degraded Islamic terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS in recent decades, these actors continue to adapt and pose a credible threat.

For too long, America’s ruling elite—isolated from the impact of the attack and isolated in their intellectual terrariums and academic lounge theories—refused to address this threat. No longer.

Now to China. This is, simply, correct.

By any measure, China is already the second most powerful country in the world—behind only the United States—and the most powerful state relative to us since the 19th century. And, while China faces very significant internal economic, demographic, and societal challenges, the fact is that its power is growing. Beijing has already spent vast amounts on the PLA in recent years, often at the expense of domestic priorities. Yet China can still afford to spend even more on its military, should it choose to do so—and it has shown that it is able to do so effectively. Indeed, the speed, scale, and quality of China’s historic military buildup speak for themselves, including forces designed for operations in the Western Pacific as well as those capable of reaching targets much farther away.

This matters for America’s interests because, as the NSS recognizes, the Indo-Pacific will soon make up more than half of the global economy. The American people’s security, freedom, and prosperity are therefore directly linked to our ability to trade and engage from a position of strength in the Indo-Pacific. Were China—or anyone else, for that matter—to dominate this broad and crucial region, it would be able to effectively veto Americans’ access to the world’s economic center of gravity, with enduring implications for our nation’s economic prospects, including our ability to reindustrialize.

That, of course, ties the #2 priority China, directly into the #4 priority the U.S. industrial base. Interlocking.

We also want a mature relationship with China. They are not going anywhere, and peace is better than war for everyone.

The Department of War will follow President Trump’s lead in engaging our PLA counterparts through a wider range of formats. As we do so, our focus will be on supporting strategic stability and on deconfliction and de-escalation more broadly. At the same time, President Trump has made clear his desire for a decent peace in the Indo-Pacific, where trade flows openly and fairly, we can all prosper, and our interests are respected. DoW will use these engagements to help communicate that vision and intent to Chinese authorities, while also demonstrating through our behavior our own sincere desire to achieve and sustain such a peaceful and prosperous future. We will not lose sight, however, of President Trump’s most important direction for the Department—peace through strength. Recognizing this, it is our essential responsibility at DoW to ensure that President Trump is always able to negotiate from a position of strength in order to sustain peace in the Indo-Pacific. To that end, as the NSS directs, we will build, posture, and sustain a strong denial defense along the FIC.

On Russia, there is little more here but something everyone knows to be true.

European NATO dwarfs Russia in economic scale, population, and, thus, latent military power. At the same time, although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power. It follows that, although we are and will remain engaged in Europe, we must—and will—prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China.

In the event the U.S. finds itself in a Great Pacific War, Europe will have no choice but to secure their Eastern Front with little more than token American assistance. Everything we can get hold of that can go in the Pacific, will go in the Pacific. European deterrence against Russia will be an economy of force operation that will make Field Marshal William Joseph Slim, 1st Viscount Slim’s 14th Army in Burma in WWII look like a well-resourced operation.

The time to be ready for that is now, and they can do it without breaking a sweat…if they want to.

The graph on page 11 is just, well, perfect to make the point.

They continue to drive the point home.

It is only prudent for the United States and its allies to be prepared for the possibility that one or more potential opponents might act together in a coordinated or opportunistic fashion across multiple theaters. Such a scenario would be less of a concern if our allies and partners had spent recent decades investing adequately in their defenses.

…

This is why burden-sharing is such an essential ingredient of this Strategy, even as DoW prioritizes growing the Joint Force and advocating defense spending toplines to support such growth. America’s alliances and partnerships form a defensive perimeter around Eurasia. Not only do these relationships offer favorable geography, but they also include many of the world’s wealthiest nations. Taken together, our alliance network is far wealthier than all our potential adversaries combined.

This is the comparative advantage we all have and should embrace. See the wording here, “our alliance network”—that isn’t the U.S. retreating from the world, that is the U.S. trying to ensure what we are part of is playing to its best potential. Everyone wins.

U.S. allies and partners to take primary responsibility for defending against those other threats, with critical but more limited U.S. support. In doing so, it sets the conditions for lasting peace through strength across all theaters. To that end, the Department will prioritize strengthening incentives for allies and partners to take primary responsibility for their own defense in Europe, the Middle East, and on the Korean Peninsula, with critical but limited support from U.S. forces.

You see “critical but limited” come up three times in the document. The U.S. is at its best a maritime and aerospace power. On the Eurasian continent, we don’t need to be the primary land force. At sea and in the air, electromagnetic spectrum, space, and cyber—no one is better. There is the “critical” where we can best help. “Limited” because we have a world demanding access to our “critical but limited”—and everyone should be adults about that fact.

Uncle Sam isn’t going anywhere.

…we will maintain favorable balances of power in each of the world’s key regions, as directed by the NSS. As U.S. forces focus on Homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific, our allies and partners elsewhere will take primary responsibility for their own defense with critical but more limited support from American forces. This will enable President Trump to set us on a course to sustain peace through strength for decades to come and leave our alliances and partnerships stronger than they have been at any point since the end of the Cold War.

…and if you want us by your side, make sure you are doing the best you can with what you have.

Incentives work and will be a critical part of our alliance policy. We will therefore prioritize cooperation and engagements with model allies—those who are spending as they need to and visibly doing more against threats in their regions, with critical but limited U.S. support—including through arms sales, defense industrial collaboration, intelligence-sharing, and other activities that leave our nations better off.

As we have discussed for years, no one has a problem helping smaller friends, as long as those friends are trying the best they can with the resources they have.

A final note is the economic part. I am impatient but realistic about how long it will take to rebuild our industrial base—especially shipbuilding.

Our fighting force depends on the DIB to produce, deliver, and sustain critical munitions, systems, and platforms. Our readiness, lethality, range, and survivability—and, ultimately, the military options we provide—are directly linked to the DIB’s ability to securely develop, field, sustain, resupply, and transport the equipment and materiel that affords us our warfighting advantage. We will therefore bolster our organic sustainment capabilities, grow nontraditional vendors, and partner with traditional DIB vendors, Congress, our allies and partners, and other federal departments and agencies to reinvigorate and mobilize our great nation’s unrivaled creativity and ingenuity, re-spark our innovative spirit, and restore our industrial capacity. Making the DIB great again requires clear vision, strong relationships, and a solid commitment to rebuild the ultimate foundation of our military strength.

As the NSS makes clear, this effort will require nothing short of a national mobilization—a call to industrial arms on par with similar revivals of the last century that ultimately powered our nation to victory in the world wars and the Cold War that followed.

And there you go.

This is a workable NDS. I think well-meaning people can disagree on parts or all of it—but it needs to be an informed debate. Sadly, most to this point has been reactive hackery.

If you’ve seen some good responses to the contrary, please share in the comments.

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