CDR Salamander - Keeping an Eye on the Long Game: Part CIII

I don’t publish new “Long Game” editions as much as I used to in the two decades since it started. The major reason is that the Long Game is here.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has the world’s largest navy. It could be argued that she is the greatest regional naval power in the Western Pacific. We are well past the point that the Pacific could be considered an American lake. Her challenge at the global scale is already well underway, pun intended.

However, there is another Long Game that must be played out; it is changing the mindset and people in government, academia, and industry who refuse, for a whole host of reasons, to acknowledge the threat to the West from the PRC—militarily, economically, and in global and space standards—that we will have to address as we approach mid-century.

It is amazing that here, in the middle of 1QFY26 we still have to work around the China doves—those who welcome China’s rise, relish the pseudo-sexual masochistic thrill of seeing the U.S.A. and the West dominated, or—even more base—are just looking for some extra income.

No matter how much evidence accumulates, the doves don’t care how they injure their own nation. A perfect example comes from the latest article by Shyam Sankar over at WSJ.

Many American business elites persist in denying this reality. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang said in a recent interview that while some Americans wear the label “China hawk” as a badge of honor, it is really “a badge of shame.” The future, Mr. Huang says, “doesn’t have to be all us or them. It could be us and them.”

A nice sentiment, but Chinese Communist Party leaders don’t believe it. They often speak soothingly of their country’s “peaceful rise.” But the party’s history and actions tell a different story.

This is, of course, part of something we have been discussing here for over a decade and a half+, dating to at least when we started The Long Game series almost two decades ago.

Here’s a little pull quote from Part XXX in 2010 discussing what finally broke through for me in the 1990s. It was bad enough seeing everyone selling themselves to make some change in the China trade…but from the delusional “they will just make the Varyag a casino”, to OPS crane sale, to educating their next generation so they can steal our IP, to the obscene Coffee Klatch Era:

He outlines well the second and third order effects of military exchanges and technology transfer. Short term thinking with long term consequences.

Globalization, developments in the international law of the sea, and the revolution in military affairs aided the emergence of China and other new naval powers. Globalization was a democratizing force among navies. The wealth effect of expanding trade and rising economies combined with the spread of doctrine, training and operational art, serving as a force multiplier. The result of globalization was a vastly improved Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in terms of its force structure and warfighting skills. The proliferation of advanced weapons technology helped nations that historically had never exercised naval power to make generational leaps in precision-guided munitions.

Just for starters, review Loral from the ‘90s.

What can be done? Plenty. All it takes is leadership and will. Back to Shyam:

As it did with Operation Warp Speed during the pandemic, the federal government could coordinate with industry and allies to accelerate the production of critical goods that China has virtually monopolized, including rare-earth materials and pharmaceuticals. The U.S. government could remove regulatory roadblocks that slow energy production and industrial projects. It could underwrite the demand side, acting as a guaranteed buyer of critical products at sustainable prices, so that the private sector can invest and innovate without fear of being crushed by swings in global commodity prices or Chinese mercantilism. And the government could keep or even raise tariffs on Chinese goods, both to fund rebuilding at home and to offset the artificial price advantage of China’s heavily subsidized goods.

Washington could also restrict U.S. investment in China, including by limiting American companies from building factories on Chinese soil. As they did during the Cold War, U.S. companies will have to pick sides. They should build at home and in our closest allies’ countries.

It won’t be easy or painless, but it is doable and in the long run, let difficult and a fraction of the pain than if we do nothing.

None of this will be easy or cost-free. Beijing has leverage over America, from supplies of critical minerals and pharmaceuticals to its stockpile of U.S. Treasury bonds. But using that leverage is also costly for China, threatening massive economic losses and public discontent, which Beijing’s control-obsessed officials fear. Ultimately, the Chinese Communist Party has more to gain from continued economic integration with the U.S. than we do. We should prepare for a long and painful road, while recognizing that the problem will get worse if we delay, rewarding China with more investment and trade to use against us.

The usual suspects will complain. The compromised, the money hungry, and the last of the doves. However, when they push back, this will be the point where someone, in a very public venue, needs to respond:

As a final note, if you did not get a chance to listen to Shyam’s visit to the Midrats Podcast earlier this year, take the time to give it a listen.

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