CDR Salamander - TLAM, Messaging, Theory, & Reality

Rightfully, over the last week there’s been a fair bit of chatter about TLAM going to Ukraine.

The United States is considering Ukraine’s request to obtain long-range Tomahawk missiles for its effort to push back against Russian invaders, Vice President JD Vance said on Sunday.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has asked the United States to sell Tomahawks to European nations that would send them to Ukraine. Vance said on “Fox News Sunday” that U.S. President Donald Trump would make the “final determination” on whether to allow the deal.

ISW, where the above graphic came from, had a solid thread over at X on the implications, but it could use a little bit of a wet blanket.

ISW assesses that there are at least 1,945 Russian military objects within range of the 2,500-kilometer variant Tomahawk and at least 1,655 within range of the 1,600-kilometer variant. Ukraine likely can significantly degrade Russia’s frontline battlefield performance by targeting a vulnerable subset of rear support areas that sustain and support Russia’s frontline operations.

As an old TLAM fella, I can’t let this stand. Let me give everyone an opportunity to take a deep breath and relax.

First of all, Europe has not seen a Western Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) since the Cold War nuclear-armed Gryphon. That disappeared decades ago. We never had a conventional GLCM then or until very recently. TLAM of any tactical utility is a sea-based weapon, for now.

We are only now getting in the GLCM game with the U.S. Army’s Typhon system we covered a bit over a year ago. In summary, you get four MK-41 VLS cells like you have on Navy ships in a shipping container. A battery has four of them, but 16 missiles total.

We are building them as fast as we can for our Army, but Germany wants some, so does the Philippines, and maybe the USMC as well. The only way Ukraine could even hope to get a single battery would be if the next one set for the U.S. was diverted to them. Whenever that will be.

My great TLAM day was over a quarter century ago when we disgorged well over 300 TLAM during Desert Fox. Trust me on this: 16 TLAM will not make a tactical impact in the Russo-Ukrainian War…however…

What sending TLAM to Ukraine will do is strategic. Yes, Ukraine will be able to strike a few significant targets deeper. Expanding attacks on oil/gas industry for example. It will cause Russia to defend more strategically important targets. That isn’t nothing.

The substantial impact will be in underlining the course of action towards Russia we’ve talked about all year. If every effort the Trump administration can make will not bring Russia to the table in good faith, then the only option is to further back Ukraine in her fight. There are few other weapons still not provided to Ukraine. TLAM would be the next step…but as a messaging effort more than anything else.

It has to be.

1. We don’t produce enough TLAM for our own needs. We can only send a token number to Ukraine.

2. One does not simply become a TLAM operator. There is A LOT of support and infrastructure that comes with being able to operate TLAM. From mission building teams, to software, hardware, and not to mention the crews to plan and execute the mission. At a standstill, leveraging Ukrainian forces trained in other missile systems such as Neptune, you might be able to have a team ready in, what, six months?

3. We do not have warehouses full of Typhon to give away, as mentioned above.

Tactically, Russia’s deep targets are safe from TLAM. In a year, maybe some will be in danger.

A year is a long time at war…but here’s a funny thing. What if smart people in hard jobs have already started the process of getting Ukraine ready to receive TLAM via Typhon months ago, just waiting for CINC to give the green light?

In that case, what if they rolled off the ramps of C-17s in Ukraine on Halloween?

Interesting times, friends. Interesting times.

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