CDR Salamander - In the Red Sea, Don't Bring a Gun to a Missile Fight

Few people in the maritime space have been thinking, writing, and speaking about counter-piracy more than our friend Claude Berube. As a matter of fact, we discussed just this topic in Episode 2 of the Midrats Podcast back in January of 2010.

You can access the audio from the Episode, with the late, great Raymond Pritchard as one of the co-hosts, at this link. He was on a roll that year, the following month he was on a great panel at Heritage that, sadly, is no longer available on the internet. In 2012, my Midrats co-host wrote a nice article about a superb collection he co-edited, Maritime Private Security: Market responses to piracy, terrorism and waterborne security risks in the 21st century.

So, when Claude brings up the topic of piracy and lawlessness on the high seas, the best bet is to stop what you’re doing and give him a read—even his novels that tie in the subject.

Fast forward a decade and a half, over at his Substack on Saturday, he brought up some spot-on commentary on some of the latest news out of the Red Sea. Not all the outlaws on the high seas are the same…even when they are in the same neighborhood.

The recent attack on the Eternity C that left crew members dead, kidnapped, or missing and the ship itself on the seafloor was more than another statistic in the Red Sea. For a professional perspective on the entire incident, check Sal Mercogliano’s youtube. I want to focus on a particular aspect - that armed guards were aboard. Among those caught up in the chaos were guards from Ambrey, the world’s largest private maritime security company.

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The arrival of private security teams on merchant ships - and in some rarer cases a few companies that offered ships as security escorts - was effective enough that by the mid-2010s Somali piracy was largely under control. For years, that model held.

The threat posed by Houthis, however, changes that model.

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But the Houthis are not pirates. They’re not motivated by money but by politics. They’re less interested in capturing a ship than in the high-value publicity that a sinking ship offers to their cause.

Along the lines of my call at the end of last year to, Arm the Auxiliaries, is it time to,

What tools or commercially-available weapons be available to private maritime security companies to counter the Houthi threat. To be honest, I don’t know. I have some thoughts on some technologies but each time I look at it, there’s a cost associated the more complex a solution you find. And with those costs, shipping companies will weigh if it is simply more cost-effective to circumnavigate Africa (itself not so inexpensive) rather than risk a ship transiting the Red Sea conducting legitimate commerce. We’ve already seen changes during the Somali piracy era changed the cost of doing business as well as private security options.

No, that isn’t the answer. You know what is an answer?

What is your use of your navy if you cannot protect your own merchants?

The better answer is state-sponsored counter-measures to protect that commerce. That has been the traditional role of navies, and the US Navy has recent experience responding to the Houthi threat. But the US, under current limitations, cannot be the region’s only guarantor of legitimate maritime commerce.

What worked in the Gulf of Aden in 2011 won’t work in the Red Sea in 2025. Flexibility, good intelligence, and a commitment to protecting those at sea are still essential, but the playbook needs to change. If the last fifteen years were about putting armed guards on deck, the next fifteen will be about rethinking what security at sea really means - and who’s responsible for providing it.

There’s the nub. The nations that most like to talk about the “international order” seem to have a toxic combination of the lack of will to move beyond talk, and even when they do take action, lack the capacity or even capability.

There should be an international answer, but if the only suitable option is the Chinese CONOPS or the European close escort operation, then that will be it.

A reason for the lack of an international solution might be simple. An international solution would require U.S. Navy leadership. The U.S. Navy would prefer aggressive Rules of Engagement (ROE). However, European navies might impose restrictive national caveats and ROE. The U.S. could risk conflicts with Iran. Additionally, U.S. actions might be seen as supporting Israel, which many wish to avoid.

Thus, we’re left with Operation Hodgepodge.

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