CV32

Report

February 26, 200521 yr

I'm not sure why you're having a problem with it, Jan. Did you follow all of the instructions properly ? If still no joy, maybe Tony will have a look at it.

Shrewd Tactics to Defeat Diesel Submarines

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February 26, 200521 yr

In a way, yes. Or a miniaturized SOSUS ...

... U.S. commanders will get accurate information about the location of potential enemy submarines, via a network of miniaturized sensors that will be deployed in strategic coastal areas. The information provided by those sensors, he says, would allow commanders to “see things and gain an understanding before they move in.”

When would they deploy such a network ? As soon as possible ? Potentially years before any conflict ? In times of increased tension ? In time of war ? There's a whole host of potential problems, some of them dependent on exactly when such a network would be deployed. Trying to do it AFTER the enemy's diesels have sortied, for example.

How could an enemy nation counter such a sensor network ? If it was deployed in advance, in their coastal areas, they would have considerable time to find ways to counteract, disrupt or destroy the network.

Just a couple of thoughts.

Russian nuclear forces, 2005

Report

February 25, 200521 yr

From The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org

NRDC: Nuclear Notebook

Russian nuclear forces, 2005

By Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen

There were several key quantitative and qualitative developments with regard to Russian nuclear forces during the past year. [1] Russia continued to reduce its nuclear forces, and officials were unusually candid in describing the likely composition of forces for the coming decade. We estimate that as of early 2005, Russia has approximately 7,200 operational nuclear warheads in its active arsenal. This includes about 3,800 strategic warheads, a decrease of some 400 from 2004 due to the withdrawal of approximately 60 ballistic missiles from operational service. Our estimate of operational non-strategic nuclear weapons remains unchanged from last year at 3,400.

At the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Soviet Union may have had as many as 35,000 nuclear weapons--though not all of them were fielded. Estimates of the dismantlement rate vary widely, from hundreds to 1,000-2,000 per year. We estimate that the total current arsenal of intact warheads is around 16,000. Of those, we consider some 7,200 active and operational; the balance occupy an indeterminate status. Some may be officially retired and awaiting disassembly; others may be in short- or long-term storage, categories similar to the U.S. categories "responsive force" and "inactive reserve."

Russian nuclear forces conducted 15 ballistic missile test launches in 2004, a significant increase from previous years. Two tests failed and a third was an ejection test with no engine ignition. Eight of the tests involved submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); seven were of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Each test involved a single missile launch, except for the March 17 launch of two missiles from a Delta IV nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

Russian defense officials lifted the veil of nuclear secrecy slightly in late 2004 and announced what amounts to an abbreviated nuclear posture review. Their announcements suggested a plan for future strategic forces based on unilateral decisions and implementation of the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which set a limit of 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads for 2012. The officials described significant changes in the size and composition of the future ICBM force, lesser changes for the submarine force, and few changes to the bomber force. The table "Projected Strategic Warheads, 2005-2015" contains estimates of Russia's strategic forces based on several assumptions: that annual deployment of SS-27 ICBMs continues at about six single-warhead missiles per year; that Russia commissions two new third-generation strategic subs and maintains five operational Delta IIIs; and that Tu-160 Blackjack bomber production remains low.

Russia's new plan indicates it will reduce its emphasis on ICBMs, traditionally the backbone of its strategic forces, by withdrawing most of the multiple-warhead SS-18 and SS-19 missiles. This will decrease the number of ICBM warheads by nearly 70 percent, from 2,270 to roughly 750 during the next five years. By 2010, ICBMs and SLBMs will carry approximately the same number of warheads.

Throughout 2004 President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the importance of Russia's nuclear weapons to its security. "We will continue . . . to build up the armed forces in general and its nuclear component," Putin reportedly told the military high command. With perhaps some exaggeration he said, "These are projects which do not exist elsewhere and which other nuclear states will not have in the next few years." [2]

Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Sciences, said in October 2004 that the long-term program involves "primarily qualitative improvements to the Russian nuclear arsenal and development of delivery vehicles capable of getting past phased arrays of antimissile defense systems." [3] The new chief of the general staff, Col. Gen. Yury Baluyevsky, spoke of a new maneuverable warhead that will be able to overcome "foreign [anti-ballistic missile] systems." Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said in late 2004 that Russia would be able to sustain qualitative nuclear parity with the United States. [4]

ICBMs. Russia currently deploys 585 operational ICBMs, 23 missiles fewer than a year ago. Significant changes are in store for the ICBM force. On December 10, 2004 the commander of strategic missile troops, Col. Gen. Nikolay Solovtsov, announced that by 2009 "all old-class liquid-propelled missiles" will be removed from combat service. [5] This appears to reverse Russian pledges made in 2002 and 2003 to extend the service life of the SS-18 to between 2010 and 2015 and to begin deploying "tens" of additional SS-19s with "hundreds of warheads" in 2010. The use of the term "old-class" may mean that some more recently produced missiles (about 50 SS-18s and 30 SS-19s) will be unaffected. [6]

Under the new plan, Russia will reduce the types of active ICBMs from five to two: the silo-based Topol-M (SS-27) and a mobile version of the Topol-M, which has not yet been deployed. According to Solovtsov, the goal is to have "several divisions" of Topol-Ms deployed. [7] If "several" means two divisions (each composed of 10-12 regiments of 10 missiles), this would require producing at least another 160 Topol-Ms to add to the present total of 40. The current production rate varies between three and nine missiles annually, or a new regiment about every two years. At this modest pace it will take until 2023, at the earliest, to field two divisions.

Deployment of the Topol-M began at Tatishchevo in 1997. Russia added 10 silo-based Topol-Ms (one regiment) in 2004, and a fifth regiment is scheduled for deployment in 2005. The mobile version will replace the road-mobile SS-25, and Russia expects to begin deployment in 2006.

Since the Topol-M carries a single warhead, a future force of two divisions, or 200 missiles, would dramatically reduce the total of ICBM warheads from the current level. Rumors suggest that the mobile Topol-M might carry between three and six warheads in the future. [8] The START I treaty prohibits increasing the number of warheads attributed to a specific ICBM type, but after the treaty expires in 2009, Russia would be free to put multiple warheads on the Topol-M. The Topol-M has a throw weight of 1.2 tons, similar to the U.S. Minuteman III, which can carry up to three warheads.

As the SS-27 Topol-M is introduced, the number of SS-25 Topols continues to decline. Approximately 300 are deployed at nine locations. The solid-fueled missile seems unaffected by the plan to withdraw older liquid-fueled missiles from service by 2009, but the transition to an all-Topol-M force suggests that the SS-25 will be completely retired. Russia will withdraw the last 15 rail-based SS-24M1s, the division at Kostroma, this year.

The number of SS-19s continues to decline; 130 remain in service. The six-warhead missile was scheduled for elimination under START II, but after the treaty's demise in 2002, Putin declared that deployment of "tens" of additional SS-19s with "hundreds of warheads" would begin in 2010. Any new deployments are likely to include the approximately 30 SS-19s in storage. [9] Russia will likely retire the older versions of the SS-19 by 2009.

During the peak years from 1981 to 1992, Russia maintained more than 300 SS-18s. Now there are about 100, and Russia will withdraw about 50 in the next five years. With a service life extension program, the remaining newer variant of the SS-18, referred to as RS-20V, could last until 2016-2020. As part of that program, Russia successfully flight-tested a 16-year-old RS-20V from an operational silo on December 22, 2004. The launch occurred at the Dombarovsky missile base in Russia rather than at the Baikonur test range in Kazakhstan. Solovtsov has said that Dombarovsky will support five to seven launches a year.

Development of a new generation ICBM, possibly with liquid-fuel propellant, appears under way. According to several news reports, the new ICBM will possess a throw weight of 4.4 tons (similar to the SS-19) and be able to carry up to 10 warheads. [10]

SSBNs. The strategic submarine fleet continues to shrink from its high of 62. Today, 12 strategic subs--six Delta IVs and six Delta IIIs--are deployed with two of Russia's four fleets. Of the Delta IVs, the Verkhoturye, Yekaterinburg, and Novomoskovsk are active, and the Tula, Bryansko, and Karelia are undergoing overhauls. All six are with the Northern Fleet and based in Gadzhiyevo on the Kola Peninsula.

Of the Delta III submarines, the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Svyatoy Giorgiy Pobedonosets, Zelenograd, and Podolsk are based at Rybachi on the Kamchatka Peninsula; the Ryazan and Borisoglebsk are based at Gadzhiyevo. The military uses a seventh nonoperational Delta III, located at Rybachi, as a test platform. Though rumors suggest that Russia might retire the Delta III class during the next few years, to achieve the stated goal of 208 SLBMs in 2010 at least five must remain in service.

Two Borey-class SSBNs remain under construction and behind schedule at the Severodvinsk shipyard. Russia plans on commissioning the Yuri Dolgoruki in 2005, according to Ivanov, but it has not flight-tested the Bulava SLBM that it is to carry. The Borey might wait to enter service for several years until the missile is ready. The Borey will carry 12 Bulavas (possible designation SS-N-27), though it is unclear how many warheads the missile will carry.

The keel of the second boat, the Alexander Nevsky, was laid down at Severodvinsk in March 2004 with delivery scheduled for 2008. Russia plans on completing a third boat in 2012. The navy would like to build three more Borey SSBNs, but if construction continues at the current pace, the final sub would not be ready until 2026. The Russian Navy chief, Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov, told ITAR-TASS in May 2004 that the Russian Navy should have 12-15 operational SSBNs. The future fleet will likely be smaller.

The 25,000-ton Typhoon-class SSBN was decommissioned at the end of April 2004. The withdrawal also signals the retirement of the SS-N-20 SLBM, which carried 10 warheads. Russia modified one of the Typhoons, the Dmitri Donskoi, to be a test platform for the Bulava SLBM. The navy conducted December 2003 and September 2004 Bulava ejection tests (with no engine ignition) from the Dmitri Donskoi in the Barents Sea.

Strategic aviation. Russian strategic bombers include 78 aircraft of three types: 14 Tu-160 Blackjacks; 32 Tu-95 MS6 Bear-H6s; and 32 Tu-95 MS16 Bear-H16s. Bomber deployment and weapon systems remain essentially the same as last year (see "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004," July/August 2004 Bulletin.)

Russia may deploy a nuclear variant of a new cruise missile (Kh-102), similar to the U.S. advanced cruise missile but with a prop engine, for the Blackjack and Bear bombers in 2005. Like the United States, Russia has begun to convert a portion of its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to non-nuclear versions (Kh-555s). In December 2004, a senior Russian Air Force official said that the first conventional ALCMs had been delivered.

Small-scale production of the Tu-160 Blackjack resumed in 2004 with two aircraft planned for delivery this year. [11] In early 2004 air force commander-in-chief Col. Gen. Vladimir Mikhailov announced plans to upgrade Tu-160 avionics and communications equipment and to modify the bomber to carry new types of missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads. [12] Russia's new defense plan envisions a force of 75 bombers in 2010. If Blackjack production continues after 2006, the bombers will likely replace Bears on a one-to-one basis. The development of conventional ALCMs seems to indicate that Russia envisions a more active bomber force.

Non-strategic weapons. We estimate that approximately 3,400 operational warheads comprise Russia's non-strategic arsenal for use by tactical aircraft, naval forces, and ballistic missile and air defense systems. Between 10,000 and 12,000 warheads might exist in reserve or retired status.

During an October 2004 Moscow visit, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker accused Russia of not fully honoring its 1991 pledge to reduce its tactical nuclear force. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded by recounting its May 2004 announcement: "More than 50 percent of the total nuclear ammunition for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation, anti-aircraft missiles, and nuclear aviation bombs has been liquidated." The ministry added, "The reduction of tactical nuclear weapons is continuing." [13] Officials had previously committed to the elimination of "nuclear weapons of the army" by 2004. [14]

Russia conducted a series of exercises in August in the Murmansk region to practice safely protecting nuclear weapons in storage facilities and during transport by road and rail. Participants in the "Avariya [Accident] 2004" exercises included specialists from the 12th Main Directorate, which oversees Russia's nuclear arsenal, officials from relevant federal ministries, and units from the Moscow and Leningrad military districts. Russia also invited some 50 representatives from 18 NATO member states to observe. Russia accepted an invitation to send six observers from the 12th Main Directorate to a U.S. nuclear weapons security exercise in Wyoming scheduled for April 2005.

1. Essential references for following Russian strategic nuclear forces are the web site maintained by Pavel Podvig, www.russianforces.org and the book Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Pavel Podvig, ed.

2. Reuters, "Putin Says Russia Working on New Nuclear Systems," November 17, 2004; ITAR-TASS, "Russia's Strategic Troops Chief Appears to Contradict Putin on New Missiles," December 15, 2004.

3. "Russia Looks to Beat Missile Defense, Official Says," Global Security Newswire, October 28, 2004.

4. "Russia Will be Able to Sustain its Nuclear Parity with U.S.--Defense Minister Ivanov," Novosti, December 24, 2004.

5. "Russian Missile Commander Promises Great Future To [sic] Topol-M," Novosti, December 10, 2004.

6. Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Concluding Remarks by President Vladimir Putin at a Meeting with Russian Armed Forces Commanders, Moscow, October 2, 2003," Daily News Bulletin, October 3, 2003. According to a report in Izvestia, this concerns 30 missiles. Dmitriy Litovkin, "We'll Get All of Them from Capetown to Beijing," Izvestia, October 21, 2003.

7. Novosti, December 10, 2004.

8. "Russia Test-Fires Ballistic Missile," New York Times, December 24, 2004; "Russia Deploys Strategic Nuclear Missiles," New York Times, December 22, 2003; "Russia Deploys New Missile Batch," CNN, December 22, 2003.

9. Daily News Bulletin, October 3, 2003. According to a report in Izvestia, this concerns 30 missiles. Dmitriy Litovkin, "We'll Get All of Them from Capetown to Beijing," Izvestia, October 21, 2003.

10. CNN, December 22, 2003; "Russia to Continue Developing Strategic Nuclear Forces," chinaview.com (Xinhuanet), December 23, 2003.

11. "Russia Set to Upgrade its Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: Ivanov," Novosti, December 10, 2004.

12. "Russia Air Force Modernization and Flight Safety Plans," Krasnaya Zvezda, January 16, 2004.

13. Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Russian Media Question at Press Conference at RIA Novosti Concerning Russia's Initiatives for Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons," October 7, 2004.

14. Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference under Article VI of the Treaty," New York, April 11, 2002; Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, "Statement by H. E. Anatoly Antonov, Ambassador-at-Large, Head of Delegation of the Russia Federation, at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," April 27, 2004.

VT Group Secures Contract For New OPV

Report

February 25, 200521 yr

From http://www.defence-aerospace.com

VT Group Secures Contract For New Offshore Patrol Vessel

Source: VT Group; issued Feb. 25, 2005

VT Group plc has been awarded a contract by the Ministry of Defence for the construction of a new 80 metre Offshore Patrol Vessel (Helicopter) for the Royal Navy.

The ship will be built to VT’s account, with production starting in June. She will be handed over to the Royal Navy in Autumn 2006, entering service, after the completion of trials, in Spring 2007. The ship will be chartered to the MoD for an initial period until March 2012.

The programme is expected to be worth an initial total of around £30 million, under a Public-Private Partnership arrangement, with the potential for this to increase if the charter is extended. Some 100 new jobs will be created by the programme and up to 400 existing jobs safeguarded.

The ship, based on the VT-built River Class which are currently under charter to the MoD, will replace the RN’s two existing Castle Class offshore patrol vessels and will carry out the role of Falkland Islands Patrol Vessel.

She will be manned and operated by the Royal Navy but VT will be responsible for providing a full Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) service to maintain the vessel so that she is available for sea for more than 300 days a year. By utilising modern automated equipment and commercial maintenance practices, VT will guarantee the availability with a single ship, compared to the two currently needed to provide the same availability.

VT Chief Executive Paul Lester commented: “This contract strengthens VT’s role as a leading provider of PPP/PFI solutions following the success of the River Class programme. The project will utilise excess capacity at our main shipbuilding facility, which already has a healthy order book through the Type 45 programme that stretches over the next four years.”

The ‘Batch 2’ River Class design will be enhanced with a helicopter deck capable of accepting helicopters up to the size of the new Merlin aircraft, increased accommodation to cater for an embarked force, a bigger gun, higher levels of survivability and surveillance radar.

HCDB: New Version Release Announcements

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in Current Events in the Americas

Are the scen that Tony talked about no more a problem?

I'm referring in particular to the 'DONOTUSE' SAM/AAA entries in the Installations annex that were inserted during the period we were experimenting with mobiles. AFAIK, no scenarios ever used these. The 'DONOTUSE' JDAMs will remain.

One other method that can give some space is to only have generic military units rather than designated ones, like all those "X/Y Bn USMC" rather than only have one "USMC Bn" (Coy, etc.).

These are largely legacy platforms from the EC2003 campaign of scenarios, which rely on these entries for flavour. They won't be changed.

What about those "Not Used" entries (id.:
ID: 51208 ... 51447), can't we use them?

We can certainly utilize any unused ID's that are within the proper limits.

Boeing Rolls Out First KC-767 Tanker

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http://www.defensenews.com

From DefenseNews.com

Boeing Rolls Out First KC-767 Tanker

By TOM KINGTON, ROME

Boeing on Feb. 24 rolled out its first 767 tanker transport aircraft at its Wichita, Kan., plant for its first client, the Italian Air Force.

Italy has ordered four of the KC-767A aircraft and expects to take delivery of the first in 2006, once flight tests and certification are completed, Boeing said in a statement.

Boeing is producing the aircraft at its Everett, Wash., plant before cargo doors and refueling equipment are added in Wichita.

The other three Italian tankers will be converted to tanker transport format by Officine Aeronavali, a unit of Finmeccanica, here.

The second Italian aircraft is due to arrive at Aeronavali for conversion in May, with work completed by the Italian firm by August 2006.

The $849 million purchase of the aircraft, agreed in 2002, covers conversion, five years of logistical support, crew training and spare parts.

Aeronavali’s work forms part of an industrial compensation package for Italy, equal to 100 percent of the purchase price of the aircraft.

Finmeccanica officials previously said they had been offered work supplying kits to convert tankers set to be acquired by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Air Force, although with the U.S. orders now on hold, Boeing could seek other offset work for Finmeccanica to make up the total value required.

Ukraine Missiles Go Missing from Crimea Naval Base

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http://www.defensenews.com

From DefenseNews.com

Ukraine Defense Minister Aghast At Missile Disappearance

By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, KIEV

Ukraine’s defense minister expressed alarm Feb. 24 over the apparent theft of two anti-aircraft missiles and a launch system from a Ukrainian naval base in the Crimean peninsula.

“This is a critical situation for the armed forces, particularly with such a class of weaponry,” the Interfax news agency quoted Defense Minister Anatoly Hrytsenko as saying.

However, Ukrainian navy chief Ihor Kynaz denied any missiles had gone missing, saying it could be a problem of a faulty inventory at the arms depot after the transfer by the Russian Black Sea fleet in Crimea of some weaponry to the Ukrainian fleet.

Guards came across two unidentified persons breaking into a weapons depot near Chernomorskoye, western Crimea, early Feb. 22.

The two escaped, but guards then discovered a depot with a forced padlock from which two missiles stored in containers and a launch system for the Strela-3M portable air defense missile system were missing.

Shrewd Tactics to Defeat Diesel Submarines

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http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/iss...ewd_Tactics.htm

From National Defense Magazine, March 2005 issue

Shrewd Tactics Underpin Navy Strategy to Defeat Diesel Submarines

In preparation for future wars, U.S. ship commanders will be trained to employ unconventional tactics against enemies equipped with diesel submarines.

Navy planners anticipate that adversaries will try to deny U.S. forces access to key strategic coastal areas by deploying quiet diesel-electric submarines. These hard-to-detect boats would make it difficult for U.S. ships to move around freely without exposing themselves to an enemy torpedo shot. For that reason, the U.S. Navy is adopting an entirely new approach to tackling this threat, says Capt. David Yoshihara, who heads the Antisubmarine Warfare Task Force, a group specifically created to help fix the Navy’s current shortfalls in antisubmarine warfare.

A new “concept of operations,” approved in late December by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vernon Clark, makes a drastic departure from the traditional ways of conducting antisubmarine warfare, Yoshihara says in an interview.

Clark views the new concept of operations as a remarkable achievement, because it provides the Navy—for the first time since the end of the Cold War—a guiding document to develop ASW tactics and techniques, Yoshihara explains.

The concept of operations, fundamentally, is built on the notion that U.S. commanders will get accurate information about the location of potential enemy submarines, via a network of miniaturized sensors that will be deployed in strategic coastal areas. The information provided by those sensors, he says, would allow commanders to “see things and gain an understanding before they move in.”

Current ships don’t have access to such intelligence, and primarily rely on massive firepower to defend themselves against enemy submarine strikes.

That defensive stance makes it difficult for U.S. ships to maneuver and gain access to a particular area of operations—especially in coastal waters—close to where U.S. forces may engage in combat. The new concept favors an “offensive posture,” which means that U.S. ships will try to beat the enemy by getting to a contested area faster, before these adversaries have a chance to deploy their submarines.

The sort of speedy response envisioned in the new antisubmarine warfare concept is unprecedented in the U.S. Navy, where ASW occasionally is mocked as “awfully slow warfare,” according to Adm. John Nathman, vice chief of naval operations.

The concept now in place shrinks the response time from months to days, says Yoshihara. The measure of success, in this context, is the ability to “seize the initiative very quickly … To secure the battle space under our terms and conditions.” In short, “we have to be able to enter an area and claim it as our own.”

The previous strategy was “attrition based,” he says. “We were counting on killing more of them than they were able to kill us.” Under the new concept, “We don’t necessarily have to kill submarines. We just have to be able to operate in the environment to our satisfaction.”

Some of the unconventional ASW tactics envisioned for the future are used in other war-fighting disciplines: decoys and deception, information operations and psychological warfare. It comes down to a basic question, Yoshihara says, “How can we influence enemy behavior so we can gain access quickly, and accomplish our mission?”

Navy leaders are confident this strategy will work, Yoshihara says, because it takes into account the real-world experience and the needs of fleet commanders, instead of becoming yet another policy directive written by “a bunch of guys within the Beltway, who get accused, rightfully so, of not fully understanding the fleet.”

An ASW command based in San Diego is responsible for collecting input from the fleet and making sure commanders’ priorities are met, he adds. “They’ll tell us what they believe the fleet needs to fill capability gaps.”

Without that support, Yoshihara says, the new concept of operations likely would be dismissed by fleet commanders as another “Navy staff drill” that fails to grasp the needs of the fleet.

Although Navy officials would not discuss specific scenarios they foresee in future conflicts, they stress their belief that diesel-electric submarines are proliferating around the world and will be used to deny U.S. forces access to coastal areas.

Quiet submarines, for the most part, cannot be detected with the conventional sonar technologies now employed aboard the Navy’s nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships.

Modern diesel boats have advanced propulsion systems that run quietly underwater, as well as coatings that eliminate echoes, says Navy Capt. Curt Stevens, an antisubmarine warfare expert.

But technology alone does not provide the definitive edge, Stevens explains. Sophisticated tactics and training certainly can make up for outdated technology. “We ought to not lose sight that old submarines—even those 20 to 30 years old—can be very capable adversaries,” he says. “A lot may depend on crew training and their doctrine … A low-end submarine with a very capable and competent crew can be potentially a bigger threat than the latest and greatest submarine with a poorly trained and poorly motivated crew.”

For U.S. Navy commanders, the challenge is to counter savvy enemy tactics with speed and instant access to information, says Yoshihara.

U.S. forces engaged in antisubmarine operations cannot just rely on submarines, surface ships and airplanes. They need both waterborne and airborne sensors to collect information around the clock, develop a “common picture of the battle space, and distribute it,” says Nathman.

This goal cannot be achieved, however, until the U.S. Navy and the other services develop and deploy an overarching command-and-control network, Yoshihara says.

The Defense Department has spent billions of dollars on high-tech communications, but there is no joint command-and-control net that integrates all U.S. military assets. “We talk about that a lot,” says Yoshihara. “There is a large gap in our ability to tie everything together.”

Also, the Navy will need sensors that can process information autonomously. There will not be enough bandwidth to move mountains of data from sensors at sea, for example, to human-operated workstations on land or aboard ships. Yoshihara characterized this as a “tough” challenge for technologists.

Another item on the ASW wish list, he says, is a “rapid attack” torpedo that can be guided with pinpoint accuracy.

To better understand what technologies are available in the private sector, the ASW task force plans to issue “broad area announcements” to industry on a regular basis.

Ukraine Missiles Go Missing from Crimea Naval Base

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Ukraine Missiles Go Missing from Crimea Naval Base

By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, KIEV

Two anti-aircraft missiles and a launch system have gone missing from a Ukrainian naval base in the Crimean peninsula, the defense ministry said Feb. 22.

Guards came across two unidentified persons breaking into a weapons depot near Chernomorskoye, western Crimea, early in the morning Feb. 22, a statement said.

The pair escaped, but guards then discovered a depot with a forced padlock from which two missiles stored in containers and a launch system for the Strela-3M portable air defense missile system were missing.

Police were searching for the thieves and a special commission headed by the deputy head of Ukraine’s navy, Igor Matviyenko, had gone to the scene to investigate, the defense ministry said.

Indian Bid for Patriot Missiles Would Cause Crisis

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From http://www.defensenews.com

Indian Bid for Patriot Missiles Would Cause Crisis: Pakistan

By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, ISLAMABAD

Pakistan said Feb. 23 that any bid by India to buy U.S.-made Patriot missiles would plunge the region into crisis and threaten an ongoing peace process between the two nuclear-armed rivals.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan said that Islamabad, a front-line ally in what the U.S. calls its “war against terrorism,” had conveyed its concern to Washington over New Delhi’s interest in the anti-ballistic missile system.

“This is our stance — that this step would be counterproductive, this would erode deterrence, that this would send our region into crisis mode,” Khan told a weekly news briefing in the Pakistani capital.

India was reported to have discussed the possibility of buying Patriots during talks on arms deals with the United States this week. The missiles are used for defense against ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft.

The South Asian neighbors both possess long-range missiles capable of striking deep into each other’s territory and carried out back-to-back nuclear tests in May 1998, but after fighting three wars in the past half-century and returning from the brink of nuclear conflict in 2002, they currently are engaged in 13-month-old peace talks.

Last week, they agreed to start a historic bus service between their portions of the divided Himalayan state of Kashmir.

Khan said if India were allowed to buy Patriots it would spark an “unintended arms race here which nobody wants.”

“It would induce higher risk-taking and this, we think, is not in sync with the goals of peace and security we have here in the region,” Khan added.

He also questioned New Delhi’s motives for wanting Patriots, saying: “India has been pursuing rapprochement with China and a composite dialogue with Pakistan.

“So where is the threat, and what is the threat perception down the road?”

GDM-008 aka Millennium - 35mm naval gun system

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in Current Events in Asia-Pacific

Thanks, Jan. Is this weapon a true CIWS in the class of Phalanx or Goalkeeper ?

First Steel Cut for New NZ Fleet

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in Current Events in Asia-Pacific

Well, sort of. The Air Combat Force was disbanded. A plan to lease 28 American F-16A/B Block 15s was axed in March 2000. They would have replaced the fleet of A-4K Skyhawks that have since been withdrawn from service, together with the MB339C trainers. The 2, 14 and 75 Squadrons that flew them disbanded in late 2001. I think the 17 A-4K/TA-4K Skyhawks were sold to Air Training Systems International (ATSI) in Phoenix, Arizona, and the Aermacchis to the Malaysian Air Force.

Since then, the RNZAF has spent most of its time (and money) upgrading the transport and maritime patrol/recce fleets, that is, the five C-130H Hercules and six P-3K Orions. They also bought a pair of Boeing 757-200s to replace their ageing 727s.

First Steel Cut for New NZ Fleet

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From www.defence-aerospace.com

(Source: Tenix Defence; issued Feb. 22, 2005)

Tenix Defence began cutting steel for the NZ$500m Project Protector naval shipbuilding contract at its Williamstown, Melbourne shipyard today. NZ Secretary of Defence, Mr Graham Fortune, switched on computerised cutting equipment to begin manufacturing plates for two 85m, 1500 tonne Offshore Patrol Vessels for the Royal New Zealand Navy. The ships are being constructed as part of Royal New Zealand Navy seven-ship order, which includes four 55m Inshore Patrol Vessels and a 131m Multi-Role Vessel, as well as the Offshore Patrol Vessels. Tenix Defence CEO Robert Salteri said the ceremony at Williamstown underlined the skills and capabilities developed by Tenix Defence and its suppliers and subcontractors in Australia and New Zealand. "Tenix Defence won the Project Protector contract last year in global competition, against shipbuilders from the UK, the Netherlands, Singapore and Germany," Mr Salteri said. "This followed our successes first with completing two FFG frigates for the Royal Australian Navy, then the 10 ANZAC frigates for the Australian and New Zealand navies. "Tenix has assembled a team with the world class skills to take on competitors from the leading shipbuilding nations, winning major domestic and export orders and providing jobs, wealth and training," Mr Salteri said. The seven ships are being built at three locations:

--The Multi-Role Vessel is being built in the Netherlands, with final fit-out at Williamstown.

--The Offshore Patrol Vessels will utilise the modular construction method used with the ANZAC frigates. Modules will be built at Williamstown and the Tenix facility at Whangarei in New Zealand, and the ships will be consolidated and launched at Williamstown.

--The Inshore Patrol Vessels will be constructed entirely at Whangarei.

Congratulations & Good Luck

in General

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February 22, 200521 yr

Thanks, Eugene. Much appreciated.

While perhaps Harpoon is "just a game" at its core, I sometimes wonder whether it might be better described as a phenomenon. We will be working hard to ensure that the "very best" of what makes Harpoon so great happens here.

WarfareHQ.com

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February 22, 200521 yr

The War-Forums have a great Harpoon section (and a great moderator ), but also plenty of other discussion on other war games/sims. Some of them, like TacOps, have been used in complementary fashion with Harpoon to stage some pretty amazing PBEM (play by e-mail) and MBX (Mail Battle Exercise) war games.

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February 21, 200521 yr

An easy addition would be the Type 206 subs U-13 to U-30. They are nearly the same as the U-206As but with AN-104A4 sonar (3 nm range) and DM-1 torpedoes. Also the Dutch Potvis could go there.

Hi, JMS. Welcome to HarpGamer.

Fortunately, there is still plenty of room for new submarines in the HCDB.

I will look at your suggestions. Thanks for the source too; that's always appreciated.

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February 21, 200521 yr

Can u specify what are exactly "some clean-up being done in that annex" plesae?

Hi Jan,

Welcome to HarpGamer.

Regarding the "clean-up" in the Installations Annex, you may recall that we exceeded the maximum allowable number of entries in that annex (approx 2,000) some time ago. The entries over and above that limit, which did not appear in the GE/SE in any event, have now been deleted. This should correct a problem with export hang-ups that some were experiencing. Also, there are a number of "DONOTUSE" entries, mostly SAM/AAA installations, which will be deleted in due course and replaced. These had been added when the code team was still experimenting with the introduction of mobile platforms.

About installations types, a generic civilian nuclear facilty, a basic power facility, a generic railroad station maybe.

I think the nuclear facility and power station already exist in one form or another (though they may need re-naming), and I will look at these. A generic railway station or railyard is a good idea, and I will take that one under advisement.

Thanks again for your continuing input.

HCDB: New Version Release Announcements