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CV32

Staff Pukes
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Posts posted by CV32

  1. On 1/2/2024 at 4:05 PM, TonyE said:

    Nice conversation guys :).  I agree that ideally one would have electronic warfare gear as part of the loadout and zero out the aircraft level entries.

     

    Ideally, we'd have both. Some electronic warfare systems are intrinsic to the airframe (this being more popularly the case as time goes on) while others are carried in pods.

  2. On 1/1/2024 at 1:43 PM, broncepulido said:

    Some considerations on the use of Kh-22/32 Kitchen in Ukraine. For months I did think on any Kitchen has been shoot-down in Ukraine. This article gets many observation and ideas, but some are not clear or definitive. Perhaps all the Kitchen employed are those converted to Kh-32, flying at 44.000 meters (opposite to 27.000 meters the Kh-22), and are out of the flying envelope of most of the defensive missiles (less perhaps PAC-3 MSE). A solution can be doing the Kh-32 flying "Too High/suborbital" in the HCE DBs (In Harpoon V that height begins at 30.001 meters). Other highlight in the article is probably any Kh-47 Kynzal has been shot-down. Comments welcome:

    https://www.eurasiantimes.com/deadlier-than-hypersonic-weapon-why-ukraine-fears-russias/

     

    I doubt all of the Kh-22s that have been employed in the war in Ukraine have been converted to Kh-32 standard. I have been watching this issue with some interest, and the claim that Kh-22/-32 has thus far evaded intercept appears pretty consistent.

    There's no doubt whatsoever that it is a very challenging target, but I certainly think PAC-3 CRI, PAC-3 MSE and SAMP/T can do the job.

    I think the most likely explanation is that Kh-22/-32 is being primarily employed against Ukrainian targets beyond the reach of where the most capable Western supplied SAM systems are being deployed. Patriot batteries, for example, appear to be present to defend Kyiv, Lviv and Kherson but cannot offer coverage everywhere else.

    In other words, Russia has been shooting them into areas where the best SAMs are absent, in places like Dnipro, Kremenchuk and Odesa.

    For example, many launches of Kh-22/-32 appear to be made in a north to south direction, e.g. from the Kursk and Belgorod directions south into Ukraine. This would make their interception by SAM batteries located in places like Kyiv simply impossible.

    Russia’s Kh-22 – the Missile Ukraine Has Yet to Shoot Down (Kyiv Post, 29 Dec 2023)

    • Like 1
  3. On 9/18/2023 at 11:58 PM, eeustice said:

    One of the limiting factors would be how far the Sonobuoy can transmit data to the processing equipment on the aircraft. ...

    I haven't been able to find out the transmission range to the aircraft of the buoy. That information may not be published for a good reason.

     

    Sonobuoys typically transmit via VHF, so there is a practical range of about 20 km.

    Much of the fundamentals of ASW is covered by my Tactics 101 piece on the subject.

    • Like 1
  4. 51 years ago, twelve F-4s, from the 8th TFW, released Paveway “smart” bombs, to finally knock down the Thanh Hóa (Dragon's Jaw) Bridge in N.Vietnam (April 27, 1972). Previously, 871 conventional bombing sorties had only succeeded in scratching the bridge. Air Power

    • Like 2
  5. I ran a test scenario in Command.

    A single Kh-22NA (NATO AS-4 Kitchen B Mod 3) was launched from a Tu-22M3 (NATO Backfire C) at near maximum range.

    The target was an industrial plant in Dnipro, Ukraine.

    A single Ukrainian S-300V1 (NATO SA-12) SAM battery was set up near the target.

    The S-300V1 began engagement (with 2x 9M83 missiles) when the Kh-22NA was at about 16 nm from the target, and descending below about 28,000 feet.

    The Kh-22NA was intercepted with 1x 9M83 SAM at about 9.7 nm from the target, while moving at 1499 kt and at 17,330 feet.

    I thought the scenario was interesting given the recent tragic Kh-22 strike in Dnipro and the widespread claims (by Ukraine and others) that Ukraine has no capability to defend against Kh-22.

    I didn't think that sounded technically correct, given that Ukraine does possess the S-300V1 and it was designed to defend against such weapons as Lance, Pershing and SRAM.

    The Kh-22 is certainly a challenging target, but the S-300V1 is at least technically capable of defending against it. (On "paper" or in a sim like this, of course. Caveats apply.)

    Still interested in what you might find in HCE.

    • Like 1
  6. 6 hours ago, jjnotme said:

    Hi

    I am using harpoon commander's is edition.

    Using the scenario editor, I am editing a harpoon scenario, I want to add
    Sam sites.

    Please tell me where I will fine the instructions on how to add the Sam
    sites.



    Thank you,

    John Perry
     

    Hi John,

    Add SAM sites just like any other unit. They are organized in the DB under Intl (international) by origin and with the prefix 'SAM' by name. The entries typically reflect a complete battery (launchers and associated radars) but in some cases you could add higher level radars to the mix. You can emplace the SAM sites individually on the map or add them to formations. I hope this helps.

    • Like 1
  7. Adversarial Studies Seminar: How the War in Ukraine is Evolving

    Monday, 05 September 2022
    15:00 - 16:00 (BST)
     

    We are delighted to be joined again by Michael Kofman, Director of Russia Studies at the Center for Naval Analysis, for a discussion on how the war in Ukraine is evolving. This event will examine how the Russian army has adjusted since its initial faltering invasion, the Ukrainian response, and the probable course of events in the coming months. The seminar will be chaired by Dr Sidharth Kaushal, Research Fellow, Sea Power, RUSI Military Sciences.

    How to Attend

    This event is open to all. To take part, you must pre-register no later than 4 September 2022 using the ‘Register Now’ button above. After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the webinar.

     

  8. Its an excellent overview of what likely happened to Moskva.

    I do question one conclusion, the assertion that a Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 provided targeting for the Neptun battery.

    I think it is probably just as likely (or even more likely) that an American Global Hawk UAV performed that role. (Although admittedly I haven't looked to confirm if the Global Hawk that was patrolling in the area was actually in position at the time.)

    My reasoning is as follows:

    (1) I am doubtful that the UA would send the TB2 into the air defence envelope of the Moskva, not just because of the risk to the UAV but it would also alert the ship.

    (2) The UA hasn't offered any imagery of the attack on Moskva taken by a TB2. I would think they would want to exploit the propaganda value of such imagery, as they did with Snake Island. Especially since Russia (predictably) denied that the ship was lost to an attack.

     

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